Class 234.15 Book D512
General Theological Seminary Library
CHELSEA SQUARE, NEW YORK

PRESENTED BY
Soc'y for Promoting Religion and Learning

MAGIC AND GRACE

MAGIC AND GRACE

BY

LINDSAY DEWAR, B.D.

VICAR OF WITTON, BLACKBURN FORMERLY WARDEN OF ANSELM'S HALL, MANCHESTER, AND EXAMINING CHAPLAIN TO THE BISHOP OF MANCHESTER

GEN. THEO. SEMINARY
LIBRARY
NEW YORK

LONDON
SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING
CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE
NEW YORK AND TORONTO: THE MACMILLAN CO.

234.1S
D512

88698

First published 1929

[illegible]

Printed in Great Britain

PREFACE

THIS book attempts to deal with the problems of magic and of grace mainly from the point of view of psychology. In view of the undeveloped state of this science, and the inherent complexity of the problems themselves, it is scarcely to be expected that assured and certain conclusions can yet be reached concerning them. At any rate, I make no claim to have reached them. It has been my intention to seek to clear away some of the misconceptions with which these matters are at the present time obscured rather than to arrive at positive and dogmatic conclusions. These misconceptions flourish like the bay tree in the poor and sometimes shallow soil of the popular mind, and sometimes, it is to be feared, in the richer and deeper soil of the student's. No real progress can be made until they have been uprooted.

While it has been impossible altogether to avoid technicalities in the treatment of the subject, it is nevertheless hoped that the book will be of interest to the general reader. It is mainly in the first chapter that difficulties are likely to be encountered, especially by those with little or no acquaintance with modern psychology. The rest of the book will, I think, be found fairly easy reading.

This essay has been written in the intervals snatched from the busy life of a town parish priest. Inevitably, therefore, it suffers from defects from which it might otherwise have been free. It seemed best, however, to send it out now, such as it is, rather than to wait indefinitely for an opportunity to do real justice to so big a subject. In particular, I could wish that it had been possible for me to undertake a more thorough examination of the vexed question of the existence of a religious instinct. For it is my belief that as our understanding of the obscure and difficult phenomena of instinct grows (as it is gradually growing), an increasing amount of evidence to support the theory that there is a specific instinct of religion in man will

come to light. All that I have been able to do here is to attempt to show that this view is at least tenable, and, as I hope many who read this book will agree, even probable, and not one to be so lightly regarded as some would have us believe. Some writers even speak as if it had been 'disproved'! At any rate, I hope that what I have written upon the matters treated in this volume will at least serve as 'cannon fodder' to delay the onward rush of destructive criticism until there is time for others, equipped with bigger and better psychological guns, to enter the fray, and to win a decisive victory for the Faith once delivered to the saints.

I desire to express here my profound thanks to the Rev. Dr. E. J. Bicknell, and to the Rev. L. W. Grensted, who have both read through the whole book in typescript, and who have assisted me greatly with various criticisms and suggestions; to the Rev. Dr. E. O. James for many valuable comments upon Chapters II and III; and especially to the Rev. C. E. Hudson, with whom I have had the advantage of discussing from time to time several of the problems treated in this book, and, saving whose encouragement, it might never have emerged, through many distractions, into being. I am also most grateful to the Editor of *Theology* for kindly allowing me to reprint (with considerable modifications) portions of two articles which appeared in that journal; and to my wife for compiling the Index.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE v

Chapter I

HYPNOTISM AND SUGGESTION 1

Chapter II

MAGIC 22

Chapter III

RELIGION 59

Chapter IV

GRACE 94

Chapter V

THE LIFE OF JESUS CHRIST 126

Chapter VI

THE HOLY SPIRIT 170

INDEX OF NAMES 213

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 215

Chapter I

HYPNOTISM AND SUGGESTION

The main thesis of this book can be stated very simply. It is that the key to the understanding of magic is the phenomenon known as hypnosis, and that the key to the understanding of grace is the phenomenon known as suggestion. Our enquiry is, therefore, first of all necessarily directed towards an understanding of these two psychological processes. It would be hard to find any other area of thought where our knowledge and understanding have been so enormously increased during the past ten or fifteen years, as they have been in this. It is one of the least expected (as well as the most important) results of the Great War, that it has provided us with a mass of fresh evidence for the investigation of these problems.

It will assist our enquiry if we take a glance backwards before attempting to advance to the formulation of any new theory, and scan the history of man's researches relating to the phenomena with which we are immediately concerned.

The pioneer in this field was Mesmer, of Vienna, who died in the year of the Battle of Waterloo. He was accustomed to induce hypnosis in his patients by making passes down their arms to the extremities of their fingers; he also touched the seat of the pain with his fingers and with the palms of his hands, following the direction of the nerves as much as possible. This operation came to be known as Mesmerism, and it was believed that some mysterious fluid was transmitted from the operator to the patient to cause these phenomena. Drs. Elliotson and Esdaile developed hypnosis in their practice to a very high degree in the face of almost incredible prejudice and opposition, but they too held that the phenomenon was entirely physical. They believed that it was produced by a fluid termed 'od,' or 'odylic' force, the property of certain inanimate objects, such as metals, crystals

and magnets, as well as human beings. Not everybody was susceptible to this influence; those who were they termed 'sensitives.'

The first great advance forward was made by James Braid, who began by believing that hypnotic phenomena were either physically caused, or else the result of deliberate fraud, but who eventually changed his view, and succeeded in showing that they are primarily psychic in origin. To him it is that we owe the word 'hypnotism,' which he substituted for the term 'mesmerism.' He was able to show that the phenomena of hypnosis must be subjective in origin by throwing into a state of hypnosis a number of patients simply by causing them to fix their attention upon his portmanteau key, believing it to be endowed with the mysterious, mesmeric power. The Abbé Faria had indeed suggested, as far back as 1814, that mesmerism was a subjective phenomenon, but he did not follow up this hint, which was soon forgotten. Braid, on the other hand, devoted all his time and energy to the question, and he came to the conclusion that the power of hypnotism was liberated simply by suggestion, just as an engineer liberates power by pulling a lever. He held that this was plainly illustrated by homeopathy in particular, though he believed that the mental factor in the administration of drugs in general had been far too much overlooked.

The theory of Braid was carried to excess by Liébault and Bernheim, the leaders of what is somewhat loosely known as the Nancy School. Bernheim's position is summed up in his well-known saying: "There is no hypnosis; there is only suggestion."

According to this theory everybody is naturally suggestible, but if it is suggested to anybody that he is suggestible, he becomes still more suggestible, and this is what is called hypnosis.

The errors (as they are now universally agreed to be) of the earlier mesmerists were reiterated by Charcot and the Salpêtrière School, who maintained that hypnotic influence was purely physical, and also

that only hysterical subjects could be hypnotised, thus reproducing the old and fallacious distinction between sensitives and non-sensitives.

At the present day, the theories of the Salpêtrière School are almost everywhere rejected, but beyond this there is no large amount of agreement among different students of the subject. It may, however, be fairly safely said without fear of contradiction that there are generally recognised to be at least three sets of phenomena which must be explained by any satisfactory theory of hypnosis:

(1) The hypnotic state is one of greatly increased suggestibility, though it must be remembered that the degree of the suggestibility does not vary according to the depth of the hypnosis.[1]

(2) There is an element of mental dissociation in hypnosis, whether this definitely involves co-consciousness, or what Rivers called "alternate consciousness."

(3) There is an intimate correspondence or *rapport* between the hypnotist and the patient.

It seems to follow from the first of these considerations that we must gain a clear understanding of the nature of suggestion before tackling the problem of hypnosis. There have been those, of course, such as Bernheim (and the Nancy School), who have claimed that the two are identical, and that to understand the one is to understand the other. And it must be admitted that, while not many writers openly profess this faith, it is in fact difficult to gather from their treatment of the subject what essential distinction there is between the two. It is one of the purposes of this book to insist upon such a distinction and to explain wherein it consists.

We may provisionally adopt as a definition of suggestion the following account given by Dr. Hadfield: "Suggestion is the process by which ideas are introduced into the mind of a subject without being submitted to his critical judgment. The effect of any suggestion depends upon its evading the critical judg-

[1] Cf. W. Brown, *Suggestion and Mental Analysis*, p. 102.

ment of the reason. This definition corresponds with the use of the word suggestion in ordinary language. When we 'merely suggest' an idea, we mean that we are not prepared to defend it against antagonistic criticism. A 'suggestive' story is one which defies criticism on account of its 'double meaning'; it insinuates what it does not openly declare."[1] Etymologically, as Baudouin reminds us,[2] it signifies the same, viz. to bring in from beneath surreptitiously.

It will be observed that this is a definition which speaks in terms of cognition. That there is also an affective and a conative element is not, of course, denied. Some writers, such as Rivers, wished explicitly to include these in their definition. It seems, however, to be more in accordance with the common usage of the term to restrict its meaning as Hadfield does, and there can be no harm in this so long as the existence of the other elements is not denied or forgotten.

How, then, are we to account for this factor in mental life? The answer which we would give is this: Suggestion is the application of stimulus to instinct, whether this application be natural or artificial. Thus, to illustrate our thesis, if we posit a primary instinct of hunger, a natural stimulus is the breast, the mere sight of which immediately suggests sucking. An artificial stimulus for the same instinct would be a sweet or a pipe.

It is evident that this definition of suggestion plunges us into the midst of the thorny subject of the nature of instinct. The *locus classicus* on this question is undoubtedly the symposium in which Drs. Myers, Lloyd Morgan, Wildon Carr, Stout, and McDougall took part some years ago.[3] From this valuable discussion, in spite of the fact that unanimity of opinion was not reached, it seems to be clear that there are four sets of allied phenomena to be located in relation

[1] *Functional Nerve Disease*, ed. H. Crichton Miller, p. 63.
[2] *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion*, p. 28 (E.T.).
[3] See *British Journal of Psychology*, Oct. 1910.

to each other. They are: (*a*) reflex action; (*b*) instinct; (*c*) inherited dispositions other than those usually called instinctive; (*d*) fully conscious intelligent action.

We may distinguish with a fair degree of certainty between (*b*) and (*c*) by saying that the latter provides a special capacity for acquiring skill and knowledge, whereas the former leads directly to action of a definite kind. Thus (*c*) represents what we usually speak of as natural gifts or talents, as, for instance, for music or for mathematics, none of which would ever be described by the word 'instinct.' Nor is the distinction between (*a*) and (*b*) difficult to make, although some writers, such as Lloyd Morgan, for example, would include the former in the latter. We should rather hold that reflex action is a process which is entirely mechanical in its action, whereas in an instinct there is an element of conation and looking forward, which leads to the possibility of development and modification. It is generally agreed that the notion that instinct is perfect from the first in accuracy of performance must be rejected as being inconsistent with the facts.

We are thus left with instinct and intelligence on our hands. How is a differentiation to be made between them? This is the storm centre of controversy, and he would be over-bold who would speak dogmatically on the subject. It may, however, be conceded at once that there is no hard-and-fast line to be drawn between them, in practice. On this point there is general agreement. It is generally admitted too that instinctive action in man is modified from the first by intelligent action—i.e. by action which is not rigidly determined by inherited disposition. As a matter of theory, however, McDougall is probably right in seeking to maintain that actions in which there is no modification of innate dispositions by experience should not be called intelligent. This point is rather of theoretical, than of practical, importance, because it applies solely to instinctive actions performed once

and once only, as, for example, in the case of the Yucca moth.[1]

If this be the case, then, while admitting that, in practice, it is rarely possible to point to any action as being purely instinctively determined, since the innate disposition is from the first moment of its operation plastic to experience, or, in other words, intelligent, yet we can make a valuable theoretical distinction between instinctive action and intelligent action by saying that the former is the immediate and inevitable outcome of innate disposition, whereas the latter is not. Such, at all events, will be the standpoint of this book. We shall also follow McDougall in using the word 'instinct' to denote such an innate disposition, and not, as is frequently the case, the actions proceeding from such a disposition. Thus we should speak of fear as an instinct but not flight, nor any of the forms of action proceeding from the fear disposition.

So far we have not considered the question of human instincts. That there is a certain number of innate dispositions in the human species is generally conceded, but there is no agreement among psychologists as to what precisely these are. There is a tendency in certain quarters to reduce our human instincts to such simple forms of activity as sucking, wailing and crawling, but this is due, as McDougall has shown, to the desire to limit the instinctive to purely motor mechanisms, while ignoring the cognitive and the conative aspects entirely. There seems to be no good reason for doing this, and in consequence for refusing to recognise some dozen or more primary forms of human instinct. In any case, it is unnecessary for our present purpose that we should enter into a discussion on this subject, for it is mainly a matter of terms. It is enough that we have made it clear precisely what meaning we seek to attach to the word 'instinct,' and that we are allowed to posit the existence of a certain number of such instincts in the human species, without attempting to specify precisely

[1] See McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 74–6.

what these are. We shall seek later on to show that religion itself should be numbered among these instincts, but at present that is a question which can be left on one side.

Our thesis, then, is that suggestion is the appeal to any primary instinct. In seeking to uphold this theory we notice first of all that attempts have been made to account for suggestion by relating it, not to instinct in general as we seek to do, but by attaching it to one particular instinct. Thus Rivers found its root in the instinct of the herd; McDougall would explain it as an appeal to the instinct of submission; while, as is well known, Freud accounts for it by referring it entirely to the instinct of sex. Bernard Hart, in his *Psychopathology,* seems to be approaching our point of view when he writes of suggestion as follows: "In any case the only essential feature is the action of an emotional or instinctive factor, and this is the essential feature of all 'complex thinking.'"[1] But he does not follow up this clue, failing apparently to realise how valuable it may prove to be.[2]

We must now proceed to explain and to defend this our theory of the nature of suggestion. Our contention is that the phenomenon which we call suggestion is the name which we give (or ought to give) to the relationship between stimulus and instinct. It follows from this that it is not, in strictness, a relation existing only between persons, or other living organisms. On the instinctive side of the process there is naturally always a person or an animal, but the stimulus may be provided by an inanimate object. Thus if a hungry man sees a loaf of bread, we should be correct in saying that he receives thereby the suggestion to eat, or if a prize-fighter sees a punch-ball, he receives a suggestion to punch. Furthermore, it is clear that the effect of any particular stimulus on any particular

[1] *Op. cit.,* p. 136.

[2] Cf. W. Brown's statement (which he does not develop) in *Problems of Personality* (London, 1925): "Suggestion only works in relation to the activity of some instinct or other" (p. 307).

instinct will depend upon the history of the person or animal possessing the instinct. If a timid man, for example, has been bitten by a dog, he will receive a far more powerful stimulus to flight, when he meets a fierce-looking dog, than if this had not been the case. In like manner, the power of the stimulus to eat provided by the sight of a loaf of bread will be dependent upon the time which has elapsed since the hungry man had his last meal.

But suggestion, of course, is not concerned simply with motor actions, such as flight or eating; it is also concerned with the formation of ideas. Let us see how our theory is able to account for this. Take the case of a timid woman compelled to sleep alone in a large and lonely country house. As she goes up to bed with her candle, she hears the dog downstairs bark. Immediately there is conjured up in her mind the picture of a man outside the back door. The moon is shining in through the window of her room, and, as she enters, she sees it shining on the towel-horse, which she takes to be a ghost. And so the story goes on. All through the night, as she lies awake, unable to sleep, every sound suggests some terror to her, and even in her dreams the strongly-stimulated fear-instinct displays lurid and terrifying pictures upon the walls of her mind. The same kind of process takes place in the case of any other primary instinct, once it is strongly stirred. To the starving man a dry crust of bread appears as something entirely delectable; to one tortured by thirst a cup of cold water is more lovely than rubies, and as he travels through the desert, ever and anon he sees a mirage, even when none exists. In like manner, when a man is 'in love,' he can see no faults or failings in the beloved. But his ideas concerning the loved one have often very little relation to the facts; hence the truth of the saying, "Love is blind."

Two conclusions seem to follow from this. In the first place, a person's 'suggestibility' will vary according to the intensity of the stimulus and the

precise condition of his instinctive tendencies. The latter are the result of heredity plus previous experience. Some people, for example, seem to be born with very little instinct of curiosity. Nevertheless, even in such a case, if this instinct has been assiduously stimulated by a wise schoolmaster, let us say, it is possible for it to develop to a considerable extent. If, in addition to such cultivation, its exercise has been accompanied by success and not by frustration, it will develop still further, and become susceptible, in a considerable degree, to any appropriate stimulus. Under such circumstances, a person would be highly suggestible in relation to any instinct, and even a comparatively slight stimulus would produce a powerful effect.

This, in fact, is what happens in the case of the instinct of curiosity, when it has become highly susceptible by the encouragement provided by the formation of a theory which appears to be both original and illuminating. The possessor of the instinct (and the theory) reacts powerfully to comparatively insignificant stimuli, being led in consequence to imagine his theory to be capable of covering facts which in reality have little to do with it, and which may even be directly opposed to it! A person in such a state of mind is, from the psychological point of view, precisely similar to the timid lady who interprets the slightest noise as signifying the approach of a burglar. The ideas which result from excessive stimulus of a susceptible instinct produce what is technically known as phantasy. Such, for instance, are the ideas which the mother has of her darling boy, and such are the ideas which mother's darling has of himself. When the reaction between instinct and stimulus is less powerful, there will be probably still some distortion of the truth, precisely in ratio to the force of the reaction.

In the second place, it will follow that a person's 'suggestibility' will not be constant all round, as it were. It is far too commonly assumed that this is the case, and that we can speak of certain persons or

classes of persons as 'suggestible' or the reverse. The truth seems to be that any given individual is 'suggestible' in respect of certain instincts far more than in respect of others; so much so, indeed, that, in common parlance, he would be said to be suggestible in certain respects but not at all in others.

Let us suppose the case of a professor of botany who knows all that there is to know about the flora of his native land. Such a man would not ordinarily be in any degree suggestible in respect of any matter coming under the heading of his special subject. He would not accept uncritically any statement in this field, however eminent the authority from whom the statement proceeded. But if we may further suppose that he had a 'pet' theory of some kind, he would be highly suggestible in relation to any matters which seemed to confirm that theory. His instinct of curiosity and his instinct of self-assertion (or whatever we may call it) would thereby be stimulated. On the contrary, in the other case, his instinct of submission would be weak and undeveloped.

It is clear from this example that we can go still further, and say that not only is a person not equally suggestible all round, but even in respect of the same instinct he may be unequally suggestible. Thus our professor's instinct of submission would be hard to stimulate in connection with his special subject, but in other fields—for example in connection with his health—he may quite likely be suggestible to the stimulus of any wandering quack. It is, in fact, notorious that men who are eminent in one field are often completely 'gullible' in some other field. Hence admirals and colonels whose instinct of submission may safely be said not to be suggestible in connection with naval or military tactics respectively, may be, and indeed frequently are, altogether suggestible to some wild theory such as British Israelitism or the Baconian theory of Shakespeare.

It is, in fact, not difficult to see that this matter of suggestion is enormously complex. In the instances

we have selected we have simplified the problem by isolating particular instincts. In actual fact, of course, no such isolation is possible. There is a constant interplay of a number of primary instincts, each with a history behind it, and accordingly each is susceptible in different degrees in relation to varying stimuli, according to the precise nature of that history. At the same time, it is probably true to say that in every life one or two instincts play outstanding parts, and are on the stage practically the whole time, while others play smaller parts, and may even exert their influence by merely prompting behind the scenes. That sex plays a leading part in the majority of cases probably few would deny, and it is this fact which lends plausibility to the Freudian system and theory.

It may be worth while at this point to illustrate the nature of suggestion by contrasting the present account of it with the celebrated theory of the modern Nancy School as represented by MM. Coué and Baudouin. The latter would define suggestion as "the subconscious realisation of an idea," a view which he is able to maintain only because he adheres to the ideo-motor theory of action—a theory which is by no means generally accepted.[1] Hence for Baudouin all suggestion is essentially auto-suggestion. He admits indeed the existence of a second factor which he calls 'acceptivity,' which is the readiness on the part of the subject to receive a suggestion, i.e. an idea. Such acceptivity is at its height in a state of relaxation wherein one thought or idea is presented to the mind, a state which he designates 'contention.'

The abundant facts whereby Baudouin illustrates his theory—many of them taken from the astonishing practice of Coué—nobody can deny. It may, however, be doubted whether the theory is adequate. As we have seen, it rests upon the ideo-motor theory of action, which is now generally abandoned by

[1] For the benefit of the non-psychological reader it is necessary to add that the ideo-motor theory states that every 'idea' is not only a state of knowing, but also a tendency to movement.

psychologists. But apart from this, Baudouin does not really account for the emotional stirring which is essential, as he admits, for all suggestion. Moreover, Coué's famous Law of Reversed Action, whereby imagination is stated always to be victorious over will, is notoriously an inaccurate statement of the facts, and is practically universally rejected. At the same time, two critical sets of phenomena are undoubtedly touched by Baudouin's theories of 'contention' and 'reversed effort.' It will accordingly be a valuable test of our present theory to see whether it is able to throw any light upon them.

We may restate Baudouin's view of what he calls 'contention' by saying that what happens to a person in this condition is that one of his instincts is either 'spontaneously' (to use Baudouin's word) or artificially stimulated. If our theory be correct, then the instinctive level of thought is more fundamental than what we may for convenience call the logical level. In the states of incipient dissociation known as reverie or day-dreaming, the higher cortical levels are not functioning. This leaves the instinctive levels on top. Hence it is that any instinct can be forcibly stimulated at such a time, without having to submit to the control of the higher levels. If a person is practising what Baudouin has called 'reflective auto-suggestion,' what is happening is that he is stimulating some instinct by presenting to it some idea, or set of ideas, which produce a reaction as a result of this appeal to the instinct. The appeal may indeed be to a level still lower; in this case we have an artificial stimulation of the reflexes. Thus, if I adopt Coué's advice and repeat his celebrated formula in the half-waking state before getting out of bed in the morning, I am stimulating my instinct of self-assertion in such a way that I shall not so easily allow myself to be disheartened and lose confidence in the struggle of life. Moreover, in stimulating this instinct, I am necessarily stimulating other instincts at the same time, namely, those with which it has, in the course

of my personal history, been most intimately linked. In this way the 'notable intensity' which Baudouin claims as a pre-requisite for all auto-suggestion is accounted for most naturally.

When we turn to a consideration of the phenomena to which Baudouin and Coué have drawn attention in their respective statements of the now famous Law of Reversed Effort, it would seem that our theory once more justifies itself, and enables us to remove some of the misconceptions to which the statement of that Law, especially in the form which Coué has given to it, has given rise. It will be remembered that his well-known formula runs as follows: "Where the will and the imagination are at war, the imagination *invariably* gains the day." [1] Exception has been taken to this statement by many psychologists, chiefly on the ground that it is inaccurate to speak of 'will' at all in such circumstances, inasmuch as it is a very imperfect form of volition which is thus victimised by the imagination. There is force in this objection, and yet it is not easy to find a substitute for the word 'will': 'wish' is plainly too weak a word, and must be rejected as inadequate.

It would seem that the instinct theory of suggestion may enable us to find a way out of the difficulty. In the light of it we may restate the Law of Reversed Effort in some such form as this: "When a primary instinct is in open conflict with the rest of the subject's will, the instinct invariably gains the day." This statement of the Law appears to have three distinct advantages over Coué's formulation of it.

In the first place, it makes it perfectly clear what is the precise nature of the act of volition under such circumstances. It is an act of will, and not a mere wish, and yet it is an imperfect act of will. A true or perfect act of will is precisely one in which *all* the instincts work harmoniously together. Once let an instinct get out of hand and rise in rebellion against the rest of the self, and the most frantic efforts of the

[1] Baudouin, *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion*, p. 125 (E.T.).

latter will avail nothing. In the second place, our formula enables us to see the reason for this. It explains *why* it is that effort can never overcome instinct. The reason is that any effort to conquer an instinct can only be made by fixing the attention on the instinct, in other words, by stimulating it. Hence such an effort is bound to defeat itself. Thirdly, we are enabled to trace the evil imagination to its source, which is nothing else but a stimulated instinct.

If, for example, a man's instinct of pugnacity is stimulated, there will be vividly presented to his mind pictures of himself speaking or acting in his wrath, and the like. These imaginations may be to a greater or a less extent influenced by the man's environment. But it is true nevertheless that they draw most of their inspiration and their power from the store of emotion which is released by the instinct in a state of stimulation. Thus, to take Baudouin's familiar and forcible example, the beginner who, while learning to ride a bicycle, sees a large stone in the middle of the road, and makes direct for it, conjures up in his mind visions of himself performing this self-same action.

The ultimate source of these visions is undoubtedly instinctive fear, complicated, no doubt, by the instinct of submission and possibly other instincts. Were it not for these instinctive forces, there is no reason whatever why such notions should enter the cyclist's head at all. This becomes clear from a consideration of Coué's well-known illustration, in which a person is bidden to walk along a plank placed on the floor of the room. He does not find any difficulty in performing this action. But if the same plank were placed to span the distance separating the twin towers of a cathedral, it is practically certain that he would be able to do so no longer. The reason for this is simply that fear being strongly aroused in the man would give rise to numerous 'suggestions' that he was going to fall; and fall he almost certainly would. But apart from the operation of this instinctive fear no thought of falling for one moment enters his head.

If our interpretation of suggestion is on the right lines, then the high degree of suggestibility which is universally recognised to be one of the most striking features of hypnosis will clearly point to the inference that in the latter we are intimately concerned with the instinctive element in man's life. Let us see whether this will throw any light upon the second main characteristic which we have posited in connection with hypnosis, namely dissociation.

The phenomenon of dissociation, which has been most strikingly illustrated in Dr. Morton Prince's famous book, *The Dissociation of a Personality,* a good many years ago, is one of the most perplexing in the whole field of psychology. But the evidence for its existence has been vastly increased by the experiences of the war, and there is no doubt whatever that it is a phenomenon of general occurrence, and not confined to a few congenitally neurotic individuals. If we approach this subject from the point of view of instinct, and enquire whether the latter conception is able to give any assistance in understanding it, we are at once faced by a significant fact. The lower animals, in which instinct quite clearly plays a bigger part than it does in the case of man, afford no evidence of dissociation at all. We do not find alternations of 'personality' even in domesticated animals. What is the reason for this? If it is replied that animals have no personality and therefore cannot suffer dissociation, we shall not be greatly enlightened, for the nature of personality is in the present state of our knowledge shrouded in obscurity.

We shall perhaps best find an answer to our question by considering exactly what happens when there is a conflict of instincts in the case of the lower animals and in man. That a conflict of instincts takes place in the animals is beyond question. It is a common experience to see a timid dog, for example, torn between the instinct of flight and the instinct of curiosity when some piece of food is held out to it by a stranger. The conflict, however, in such a case is

short-lived, and is speedily ended by the victory of one of the contending parties. Or again, we know that there are certain seasons in an animal's life when the parental instinct is very strong. At such times no other instinct will prevail. Thus an animal which is ordinarily highly pugnacious will, under these circumstances, remain quietly attending to its young, and, unless it is molested, will make no attack upon any other creature. We may express this by saying that an animal appears to have the power of banishing all instincts save one from the scene of consciousness without suffering any harmful effects.

This, however, is precisely what man cannot do. If any particular instinct, which for one reason or another is powerful in the case of a given person, is banished from the theatre of consciousness, it refuses to go. Or, if it does go, it will most likely take with it a good deal besides itself; in other words, dissociation in some form will ensue. What essential difference is there between man and the lower animals to account for this?

The first answer which would naturally be made is that man's intelligence is developed to a far higher degree than that of the animals. Ever since the time of Plato Reason has been regarded as the charioteer of the soul, commanding and controlling the other elements in the personality. And our experience goes to show that, when this charioteer (who has affinities with Freud's 'censor') becomes drowsy, dissociation is specially likely to occur. In the state which we know as sleep, he lets go the reins, and the instinctive impulses are allowed to take the bit between their teeth.

It is clear, however, that this does not take us far enough in our quest, for sleep is a state which characterises the animals as well as man, and the state of general dissociation which therein ensues is not sufficient to account for the special dissociation which characterises morbid states in man and gives rise to dual or alternating personalities.

But we have to bear in mind that in the case of man, as his experience grows with the lapse of years, there is stored up that mysterious accumulation of reminiscences of the past which we call memory. That animals possess memory also is, of course, not denied, but there can be no doubt that it is a very rudimentary affair compared with the manifold and complicated thing which it is in man. Now these memories of the past do not exist in a state of complete incoherence. It is certain beyond question that they are in every case clearly bound up with the primary instincts. It will follow, therefore, that when a person banishes, or seeks to banish (or, to use the more usual word, repress) an instinct, he will at the same time be repressing all the memories associated with that instinct. But if, as is the case in the circumstances we are considering, the instinct concerned is specially influential in his life, the volume of memory attaching to it will be correspondingly great. If, therefore, the instinct becomes dissociated, it will carry with it a large part of the person's psyche, and we shall have what is called a state of dissociation. Such a contingency would not seem to be possible in any of the lower animals just because their experience is so limited and their memories are so undeveloped.

There is, however, a further element in man which makes him liable to dissociation, and which, so far as we know, does not exist in the lower animals, and that is what we may call his moral sense. There is no doubt whatever that this power or faculty in man is responsible for a great deal of the internal conflicts which trouble him, and that it plays a large part in causing the phenomenon known as repression, which we have seen consists in an attempt (whether wittingly or unwittingly as Rivers would say) to banish an instinct from the field of consciousness. That peculiarly painful state of mind which the theologians call "a sense of sin" is bound to lead to repression, if it does not lead to sublimation. It is indeed by the latter means alone that man can avoid the dangers of

repression, and in consequence the liability to dissociation.

It follows from the foregoing discussion that the explanation of dissociation is to be sought in man's instinctive life. Given a sufficiently powerfully stimulated instinct, and a sufficiently weakened control, and dissociation inevitably follows.

Now in the dissociation which is characteristic of hypnosis, we are concerned with a form of it not to be identified roundly with the state of general dissociation, which we have seen to be characteristic of sleep. It is true that hypnotic sleep may outwardly resemble normal sleep very closely, and may pass into it, but it is also true that hypnosis may occur without any of the usual symptoms of sleep at all. We are concerned rather with a special dissociation. What is the character of it? It is one wherein a part of the consciousness of the patient is under the control of the hypnotist.

This brings us to a consideration of the third fundamental characteristic of hypnosis, namely, the state of *rapport* existing between the operator and the subject. It was this state of *rapport* which most impressed the earliest investigators in this field, and which led them to attribute some mystic, and possibly magnetic, power to the hypnotist. McDougall, however, has pointed out that the phenomenon which has been called "the transference of the *rapport*" altogether explodes this idea. The operator is able by a word to put the patient *en rapport* with any third person, and once this transference has been made, the original operator has no control whatever over the patient.

It is accordingly evident that in the dissociation which ensues as a result of this state of *rapport* some instinctive forces are at work. Is it possible to say what they are? The answer which McDougall would give is to posit an instinct of submission, and to assert that it is the functioning of this particular instinct which gives the hypnotist his power and makes him

the cause of the dissociation which follows. McDougall points out justly that in the case of the lower animals certain individuals appear to be endowed with the power of leadership, just as some men are, and that the rest of the herd instinctively recognise this and spontaneously submit themselves to the leader. This appears to be a theory far better founded than the Freudian hypothesis that this power is derived from a sexual relation, and that the subject is, in fact (to put it plainly), 'in love' with the hypnotist, albeit unconsciously.

It seems to be probable that McDougall is right, at any rate to the extent that the instinct of submission is intimately connected with the induction of the hypnotic state. Nevertheless, we should perhaps hesitate to exclude the possibility of other instinctive forces coming into play. Thus Baudouin rightly says that the case of the mother asleep who is open to hear the faintest cry of her babe is not essentially different from hypnosis. In such a case the state of *rapport* is induced by the operation of the parental instinct. Any appeal to that instinct on the part of the infant is sure to find an immediate and unhesitating response. It is, in fact, notorious that the newly arrived babe dominates the entire household.

It will be remembered that Baudouin seeks to account for the *rapport* in hypnosis on the principle that any idea in the mind at the beginning of sleep tends naturally to dominate the sleep, and that in the case of hypnosis, the person of the hypnotist occupies the central position in the mind of the patient. Even supposing that this is a correct account of the matter, however, we have still to enquire *why* this should be. The theory that hypnosis is the result of stimulating a specific instinct or instincts does afford an explanation. For any instinct strongly stimulated at the time of falling asleep will inevitably function freely once the state of general dissociation frees it from the competition of rival instincts which it has to face in the normal waking state.

What we seem to find in hypnosis, then, is that there is a special dissociation, as we have called it, and that a part of the psyche is split off from the rest and operates independently of it so far as its master wills. This master is the hypnotist. Thus, instead of having to deal with a dissociation in which both parts are controlled internally within the psyche (as, for example, in the fugue), we have a dissociation in which one part of the psyche is controlled externally —controlled, in fact, much as the spiritualist medium claims that she is subject to a ' control.'

We may perhaps illustrate the position as follows. In an ordinary case of dissociation there is indeed war in the soul, but it is civil war, and a truce is finally reached by a segregation of the opposing forces, each under the leadership of a native of the country. In the species of dissociation known as hypnosis, on the other hand, one of the contending parties is led and governed by a foreigner. There appear indeed to be limits to his power. He cannot, for example, violate public opinion—in this case, what we call the conscience or moral sense of the psyche. Nevertheless, he has a tremendous amount of power, if he chooses to exercise it, once he has been called in. In witness of this we have the striking examples afforded by the phenomenon of post-hypnotic suggestion. This, translated into terms of our parable, means that even when the foreign intruder has taken his departure, and is no longer present in person, his party is still kept together by the memory of his leadership, and feels itself obliged to carry out his instructions, even though unwilling to do so. And if at any future time he should return, he can always be pretty sure of finding a following, if he comes to stir up strife and sedition. In actual fact, our foreign intruder is, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, concerned not to stir up strife, but to make peace, and to seek to harmonise existing discordant elements. He is a peace-maker and not a revolutionary. Hence, in practice, the dangers of hypnotism are negligible. In theory, however, an

unscrupulous hypnotist could do a vast amount of harm.

We have spoken as if the dissociation necessarily involved by hypnosis took place in a psyche previously united. In fact, this is usually not the case. As we have hinted, the hypnotist is called in to deal with an already existing state of dissociation. It may be, for example, that he is concerned to end a state of amnesia, which is an infallible sign of dissociation.

To sum up. Suggestion is the appeal of external stimulus, whether personal or otherwise, to a primary instinct. Hypnosis is akin to suggestion, in that appeal is made thereby to the instinct of submission; it differs from it, however, since it involves a state of dissociation in the subject, together with a condition of intimate *rapport* with the operator which is made possible by virtue of the dissociation. Nevertheless, there is no hard-and-fast line to be drawn between hypnotism and suggestion, for the simple reason that dissociation is a relative term. There is a sense in which every normal person is to some extent dissociated (more accurately speaking, he is not fully associated) even in the ordinary waking state; and in sleep, of course, a state of general dissociation ensues for a period in the normal course of events once every twenty-four hours. Our task is now to apply all this to the problems of magic and of grace. We shall endeavour to show that the phenomena of magic take their rise in a relationship which is essentially hypnotic, since they spring from the influence of dominant personalities. Grace, we shall claim, has, in fact, but little kinship with magic thus understood, but it is primarily to be viewed as the stimulation of the specific instinct of religion, and is accordingly a matter of ordinary suggestion.

Chapter II

MAGIC

The difficulty of defining magic is as great as that of defining religion, and there are as many varying definitions of the one as of the other. It is, no doubt, true that definition is a matter of words, but we have to remember that it is also a matter of things, of real entities; and where we are seeking to divide up our experience into parts and to name these parts, it is important that our divisions should correspond to the nature of things. If they do not, then, as Plato puts it, we are like bad surgeons, performing an operation without having regard to the principles of anatomy. Too frequently has this been the case with the framers of definitions. It is, no doubt, a pleasing operation to invent an attractive scheme, and then to try to fit the facts into it; but it rarely does anything but darken counsel. Especially is this the case if the scheme is one which attracts by its simplicity and its apparent comprehensiveness. Sir James Frazer has warned us of this danger in connection with anthropology in particular, and yet it seems that he has by no means escaped intact himself. He writes thus:

"In no branch of learning, perhaps, has this proneness to an attractive but fallacious simplicity wrought more havoc than in the investigation of the early history of mankind; in particular, the excesses to which it has been carried have done much to discredit the study of primitive mythology and religion. Students of these subjects have been far too ready to pounce on any theory which adequately explains some of the facts, and forthwith to stretch it so as to cover them all; and when the theory, thus unduly strained, has broken, as was to be expected, in their unskilful hands, they have pettishly thrown it aside in disgust instead of restricting it, as they should have done from the outset, to the particular class of facts to which it is really applicable. So it fared in our

youth with the solar myth theory, which, after being unreasonably exaggerated by its friends, has long been quite as unreasonably rejected altogether by its adversaries; and in more recent times the theories of totemism, magic and taboo, to take only a few conspicuous examples, have similarly suffered from the excessive zeal of injudicious advocates. This instability of judgment, this tendency of anthropological opinion to swing to and fro from one extreme to another with every breath of new discovery, is perhaps the principal reason why the whole study is still viewed askance by men of sober and cautious temper, who naturally look with suspicion on idols that are set up and worshipped one day, only to be knocked down and trampled under foot the next." [1]

This is a much-needed warning, and it ill becomes us to ignore it. It is, for example, from this point of view that objection must be taken to the position of Dr. Elliot Smith and the Diffusionist school concerning the origin of magic. They have, as is well known, sought to trace it back to the desire of primitive man to find " givers of life," and to his belief that certain substances, such as gold, quartz and pearls (to mention only a few examples) obviously were life-giving in character. Quite apart from the 'fallacious simplicity' of this theory, it is difficult to explain by means of it how magical objects which were, *ex hypothesi,* givers of life came to be employed for death-working purposes. For the avowed intention of many magical practices is to work injury and death; hence their designation 'black magic.' Whatever the source of the power believed to be wielded by the magician, it is surely clear that it is essentially neutral in character in the first instance, but capable of being employed for either beneficent or maleficent purposes according to the will of the magician.

It must be our aim, therefore, to guard carefully against the fallacy of adopting a view which errs by reason of too great simplicity. It must be insisted

[1] *The Golden Bough,* vol. i, p. 333.

accordingly that in putting forward the theory which it is our purpose to expound we do not claim that it can be made to cover the whole of the vast array of phenomena which are generally grouped somewhat loosely under the heading of magic.[1] It is, indeed, safe to say that no single theory ever will succeed in doing this. The most that we can hope to do is to throw some additional light upon a subject which has been obscured by much darkened counsel, and in particular by the carelessness of the popular use of the word magic. But if we are able to point to any fundamental principle, or principles, which, when applied to the nebulous collection of data usually associated with the term, can cause them to take definite shape, our efforts will not have been in vain. To change the figure, we may say that it is inevitable that in such a vast ocean of thought there will be innumerable streams and cross-currents, which perhaps no theory will enable us to estimate rightly, as well as impenetrable depths, which we may never be able fully to explore. At the same time, progress will not be made in the understanding of the nature of magic, so long as we allow vague and popular ideas to determine our attitude towards it.

With these highly important considerations before us, let us pass on to consider the view which it is one of the purposes of this book to uphold; for the sake of convenience I shall call it the Hypnotic Theory of Magic. That is to say, it is contended that the phenomena which are covered by the term hypnosis provide an indispensable clue for the right understanding of magical theory and practice. We may perhaps even go so far as to say that they have exerted a more powerful influence in this matter than any other single factor. For this reason it seems to be appropriate to speak of the hypnotic theory of magic.

This is a theory which has been put forward by no

[1] Thorndike's *History of Magic and Experimental Science* is typical. He uses the term to cover "all occult arts, sciences, superstitions and folk-lore" (*op. cit.*, p. 2).

anthropologist, so far as I am aware, but it was hinted at many years ago by an eminent pioneer in the realm of hypnosis who wrote as follows:

"In conclusion, I would beg leave only further to observe, that the advanced state of physical and chemical science has now enabled us to explain, on scientific principles, many phenomena which, in former days, were looked upon as the results of Magic and Witchcraft. When to these are added the peculiar manifestations of nervous diseases, and the power of imagination, sympathy, imitation, predominant ideas, easy credulity, fixed attention, habit and suggestion in all its varying forms, in changing or modifying mental and physical phenomena in many individuals, even in the waking condition, and their almost unlimited control over those who pass into the second-conscious state of hypnotism—as explained in the foregoing pages—the whole of the well-ascertained apparent miracles of Magic, Witchcraft, Animal Magnetism, Hypnotism, Electro-Biology, Crystal-gazing, etc., become level to our apprehension, and admit of explanation without violating any of the recognised laws of physiology and psychology." [1]

If this theory [2] is true, then the anthropologists are right who have insisted that the spell is central for the understanding of magic. But how are we to account for the spell? A simple answer to this question lies near at hand. We know full well from our own experience even in these modern days that in every group of persons, whether it be large or small, there exist certain more or less dominant personalities. According to the degree of this dominance are they born to lead, just as others are born to be led. These have their instinct of self-assertion powerfully inherited, just as those their instinct of submission. If

[1] James Braid, *Magic, Witchcraft, Animal Magnetism, Hypnotism and Electro-Biology*, p. 118.

[2] MM. Hubert et Mauss, *Esquisse d'une Théorie Générale de la Magie*, L'Année Sociologique, VII, at times come near to this point of view, but they are led astray by regarding the magical and the holy as generically the same.

a leader of this description arises, there are always many who are ready and willing to be led, for nature seems to have provided a far greater abundance of the submissive variety than of the dominant. But where a dominant individual comes into contact with a person, or persons, of the submissive type, we have the conditions for the exercising of the power which is hypnotic, i.e. for the use of the spell.

In a society where the standard of education is comparatively high, of course, the hypnotic relationship seldom takes place, except under abnormal conditions; for education tends to reduce the force of the instinct of submission by arousing self-assertive impulses in connection with the instinct of curiosity. Among primitive peoples, however, things turn out very differently, as we can tell from our knowledge of uneducated persons even in modern Europe, in those places where the standard of education is low, and the majority are unable to read or write. Under such conditions it is no exaggeration to say that dominant and powerful personalities wield an influence which is essentially of the hypnotic order.[1]

A fortiori will such a state of affairs exist in primitive times and among primitive peoples. Under these circumstances, when a really dominant personality arises, he will speedily exert a powerful sway in the social group which is his; and, since nothing succeeds like success, the more power he wields the more that power continues to wax strong; finally a magician stands before the world.[2] As his power increases, it

[1] It is interesting to note in this connection the language which Signor Mussolini uses in speaking of the influence of Lenin: "The power of Lenin—I admit it—had assumed the character of a potency only paralleled in mythology. The Russian dictator domineered the masses. He enchanted the masses. He charmed them as if they were hypnotised birdlings" (*My Autobiography*, by Benito Mussolini, p. 112 (E. T.)). Speaking of his own power he says, "Where money alone is concerned I am anything but a wizard" (*ibid.*, p. 48). The inference seems to be that under other circumstances he regards himself (at least subconsciously) as one.

[2] "It is an empirical fact that in all savage societies magic and outstanding personality go hand in hand" (B. Malinowski, *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 76).

would be strangely unlike human nature as we know it if he did not set his heart upon increasing it still more. Then will arise the temptation to use deceit and fraud, and to employ his power for unscrupulous purposes in order to further his own ends. The magician need not, however, necessarily be a conscious deceiver. He may believe completely in his own power, and indeed, the more he believes in it himself, the more successfully will he wield it. But if on occasion it seems to fail him at the critical moment, the temptation will be almost overwhelmingly strong to attempt to retain his hold and his reputation by illegitimate means.

It is well known that Sir James Frazer has found in the dominance of the magician the origin of kingship. "When the welfare of the tribe is supposed to depend on the performance of these magical rites," he tells us, "the magician becomes a person of much influence and repute, and may readily acquire the rank and authority of a chief or king. The profession accordingly draws into its ranks some of the ablest and most ambitious men of the tribe, because it holds out to them a prospect of honour, wealth and power such as hardly any other career could offer." [1] Again he writes: "Whatever else he may have been, the old king seems commonly to have been a magician." [2]

It is clear from what we have said above that we shall not be able to agree with Frazer in holding that the magician is more likely to be successful if he is a complete impostor than if he is an honest man, just because we cannot agree "that every single profession and claim put forward by the magician is false." [3] It will not follow on our theory, therefore, that the supreme power will necessarily tend to "fall into the hands of men of the keenest intelligence, and the most unscrupulous character." [4] No doubt keenness of intelligence is a valuable asset to the magician, as to everyone else, and a little unscrupulousness may prove

[1] *The Magical Origin of Kings*, p. 82.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

useful to him at times; but it remains true, in our opinion, to say that the *sine qua non* for a successful magician is that magnetic power, of the hypnotic order, which characterises those who are highly endowed with what is commonly called 'personality.'

There is a large body of evidence for the centrality of the hypnotic relationship for the understanding of magic in the widespread belief in what is known as "the evil eye." Wilhelm Wundt, in fact, many years ago suggested that "magic in its primary form consists in the supposed direct action of soul on soul, as when the evil eye is feared." [1] He did not, however, follow up this clue, being preoccupied with his theory that the source of magic is to be found in the strange and unexpected. F. T. Elworthy, in his book *The Evil Eye,* which is the *locus classicus* on the subject, stated definitely that in his opinion the fascination associated with the evil eye is "nothing more nor less than what we now call Mesmerism or Hypnotism, by which, as we know, certain people have an extraordinary influence over others." [2] Elworthy was indeed somewhat credulous as to the powers of the hypnotist, and he proceeded to cite a dubious instance in which, under hypnotic influence, a certain woman was induced to commit murder.

Even if such powers on the part of the hypnotist exist only in the pages of third-rate fiction, the very fact that Elworthy himself was able, when he wrote, to believe in them is in itself strong evidence in support of the hypnotic theory of magic. For it is enough for our theory that such exaggerated powers should be commonly associated in the popular mind with the hypnotist, even if they have no actual existence in fact. "There were two kinds of fascination among the ancients," Elworthy wrote, "the moral and the natural, and this belief is still held. The moral power was that exercised by the will. It was against the users of this that the special laws of the Romans were directed. These included all those who practised in-

[1] *Völkerpsychologie,* ii, p. 42. [2] *Op. cit.,* p. 36.

cantation and malignant arts. More terrible were, and still are, those in whom the faculty of the evil eye was natural, whose baneful look was unconscious, whose eye threw out *radios perniciosos,* which by a sort of mesmeric power acted upon the nervous system of the victim. It has always been recognised as a rule of good manners never to praise immoderately lest the speaker should *fascinate* against his will." [1]

The spell, then, is central for a right understanding of magic, and it is the phenomenon of hypnosis pure and simple. It is not difficult to trace other phenomena, commonly regarded as magical, to this source. It was but a short step to extend the spell from the living to the dead; this will explain necromancy, which is seen to be the hypnotising of invisible spirits instead of visible. Many of the rites and ceremonies of magic are elaborations of this one central theme; they are just the instructions to the spirits.[2] In course of time it was natural that the original purpose of these actions should be forgotten, and that they should have come to be regarded as possessing a direct and inherent efficacy of their own.[3]

Such in baldest outline is our theory. It will be convenient to endeavour to unfold and to examine it by reviewing some other theories in contrast with it.

The first theory which presents itself for consideration is that of Frazer. He writes as follows: [4]

"If we analyse the principles of thought on which magic is based they will probably be found to resolve themselves into two: first, that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and second, that

[1] *Ibid.,* p. 32.

[2] This comes out very clearly in those cases where the effigy of the intended victim was inscribed (sometimes *inside* the body) with the name of the person it was intended to represent. Every part in which this person was to suffer was thus marked.

[3] The worship of relics confirms this opinion. Relics come to be regarded as possessing power inherently, but this power is admittedly derived from a particular saint whose personality, however, in the popular mind has often receded into oblivion.

[4] *Op. cit.,* vol. i, pp. 52, 53.

things which have once been in contact with each other continue to act on each other at a distance after the physical contact has been severed. The former principle may be called the Law of Similarity, the latter the Law of Contact or Contagion. From the first of these principles, namely the Law of Similarity, the magician infers that he can produce any effect he desires merely by imitating it: from the second he infers that whatever he does to a material object will affect equally the person with whom the object was once in contact, whether it formed part of his body or not. Charms based on the Law of Contact or Contagion may be called Contagious Magic. . . . In short, magic is a spurious system of natural law as well as a fallacious guide of conduct; it is a false science as well as an abortive art. . . .

"At the same time it is to be borne in mind that the primitive magician knows magic only on its practical side; he never analyses the mental processes on which his practice is based, never reflects on the abstract principles involved in his actions. With him, as with the vast majority of men, logic is implicit, not explicit: he reasons just as he digests his food, in complete ignorance of the intellectual and physiological processes which are essential to the one operation and to the other. In short, to him magic is always an art, never a science; the very idea of science is lacking in his undeveloped mind. It is for the philosophic student to trace the train of thought which underlies the magician's practice; to draw out the few simple threads of which the tangled skein is composed; to disengage the abstract principles from their concrete applications; in short, to discern the spurious science behind the bastard art."

To this theory there would seem to be several grave objections. In the first place, it is highly misleading to say that the magician has any idea (even a subconscious idea) of law. For, if one spell fails, another is tried, and then another. It has been convincingly shown by Karl Beth that Frazer's contention that

magic (as contrasted with religion) is primitive science is untenable. Beth points out that, on the one hand, we have no right to suppose that the priest has no idea at all that the same event will follow the same cause just because he employs prayer instead of a spell. On the other hand, he rightly insists that the magician's belief that he has to deal with a contrary opposing power, which it is his object to overcome, shatters the idea of the uniformity of nature. Moreover, he shows the inherent inconsistency in Frazer's own position, and pertinently asks: "If magic is indeed to be set in a line with science, and if religion is to be contrasted with them both through the absence in it of any idea of logical causation, how comes it about that it is, in fact, the more intelligent persons who progress from magic to religion?" [1]

The truth seems to be that Frazer appears to overlook the central importance of the spell. If the latter is central in magic, then the symbolism of the magical act is not so difficult to explain. On the one hand, we may regard it as serving the purpose of making perfectly clear to the spirit who is being 'spell-bound' what it is intended he shall do. Such a method of speaking by signs is entirely in accordance with primitive intercourse between man and man; it would inevitably operate in the traffic between the seen and the unseen worlds. On the other hand, these symbolical actions would be highly agreeable to the agent, in that they would provide him with ample opportunity for 'letting off steam.' As time went on, the latter motive alone might account for some ceremonies. For example, at a certain garden fête a few years ago, a stuffed effigy was made of Mr. Lloyd George, at a time when that politician was very unpopular in certain quarters. A considerable amount of money was raised by charging threepence for the privilege of kicking the effigy!

There is another serious objection to Frazer's position. He provides us with a suggestion as to the

[1] *Religion und Magie* (Zte. Auf.), p. 94.

mental process underlying the conception of magic, but, as he only mentions it casually in passing, it would seem that he scarcely realises the significance of his own suggestion. He speaks of it as identical with the " principle of make-believe, so dear to children." This is a psychological blunder. The principle of ' make-believe ' is, in the language of psychology, phantasy. And the essence of phantasy is that it achieves nothing in fact but only in imagination. It compensates for the absence of reality. No doubt, as we have seen, phantasy will operate as a subsidiary factor in the realm of magic as in other realms, but it seems to be impossible to explain magic simply and solely in terms of phantasy. Thus, to take an example of Dr. Marett's, the young man who has been jilted will cast the portrait of the faithless one on to the fire. Hereby he secures, in the realm of phantasy, a certain amount of satisfaction, but, as Marett has insisted, we have nothing really magical in such an act as this. Marett indeed would describe such forms of activity as ' rudimentary magic.' This is perhaps misleading, for they are examples of pure phantasy, and phantasy has not more vital connection with magic than with other forms of activity.

Once more, the principle of ' make-believe ' or phantasy cannot really account for the artificial and far-fetched symbolism which is frequently found in magical practices. Take as an instance of such symbolism one quoted by Frazer as pertaining to the Kei Islands. When the men are away at the war, the women anoint certain stones and fruits with oil and place them on a board in the open air. Meanwhile they sing as follows: " O Lord sun and moon let the bullets rebound from our husbands . . . just as raindrops rebound from these objects which are smeared with oil." It seems impossible to believe that such artificial symbolism is carried out simply for the satisfaction in phantasy which it provides. But if, as we should hold, it is performed in order to give unmistakable instructions to the spirits which are hypnotised

by the spell, then it becomes perfectly intelligible. It is doubtless true that under these circumstances phantasy would operate in some degree to produce satisfaction, but the point I wish to make is that it is totally unable of itself to account for symbolism of this kind.

There is a further problem which any theory of magic has to explain, and that is how it is that such a palpably absurd system of beliefs ever came to have so firm a hold on the human mind, a hold which Frazer does not exaggerate when he applies to it the phrase *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*. The answer which he would give to the problem is that, in point of fact, results do follow upon magical acts, as, given time, they are bound to do. "A ceremony intended to make the wind blow or the rain fall, or to work the death of an enemy, will always be followed, sooner or later, by the occurrence it is meant to bring to pass; and primitive man may be excused for regarding the occurrence as a direct result of the ceremony, and the best possible proof of its efficacy." Unquestionably, there is much truth in this contention. Our present-day experience in connection with modern superstitions will tell us this. Many still believe that if a picture falls, there will be a death in the house, or that thirteen is an unlucky number. They do so, as Bacon reminded us, because men mark when they hit, and forget when they miss.

True as this undoubtedly is, it scarcely provides an adequate foundation for such an enormous superstructure as the vast and complicated system of magic. The foundation is considerably broadened if, in addition to the foregoing considerations, we have a *vera causa* to which the magical act can be referred back. Such is provided by the phenomenon of hypnosis. Here, not in imagination but in reality, certain effects follow from definitely ascertainable causes. One individual has definite powers of controlling another, and producing either beneficial or harmful effects upon

him, by casting a spell upon him. Any individual possessed of such power will quite naturally come to be greatly feared, and by an easy transition of thought will be believed to have authority over the denizens of the unseen world, who command even the winds and the waves that they obey them.

There is a further consideration which lends support to this supposition. There is little doubt that certain natural phenomena of a powerful and awe-inspiring kind have a hypnotic effect upon man. Such are the earthquake and the thunderstorm, which have the power of holding man spell-bound. These would quite naturally, therefore, come to be believed to be inspired by unseen wizards, akin to those visible magicians met with in the intercourse of everyday life. The control of such phenomena as these by the latter could, therefore, be achieved only by a battle of hypnotists, in which the visible triumphed over the invisible. This would clearly be a hard and difficult performance, and we should expect it to be but rarely accomplished.

There is evidence to show that such a conflict of wizards was believed to take place. In fact, whenever a spell fails to achieve its object, it is invariably held that this is due to the existence of a more powerful counter-spell. Hence if one spell fails another is tried. That the gods are subject to the sorcerers is widely believed. Thus in India at the present day it is believed that the Hindoo Trinity of Brahma, Vishnu and Siva can be controlled by spells. There is a saying everywhere current in that country: "The whole universe is subject to the gods; the gods are subject to the spells (*mantras*); the spells to the Brahmans; therefore the Brahmans are our gods." [1] There is, moreover, evidence to show that it was held that the gods used spells to constrain each other.

In order to elucidate the hypnotic theory of magic

[1] Monier Williams, *Religious Thought and Life in India* (London, 1883), pp. 201 sq., quoted by Frazer, *Golden Bough*, vol. i, p. 226. The same conception is a commonplace in Egyptian magic.

more clearly, let us pass on to consider a rather different theory of magic, namely, that of Dr. Malinowski. "This is never sufficiently emphasised," the latter writes, "the most important element in magic is the spell. . . . To the native, knowledge of magic means knowledge of spell, and in an analysis of any act of witchcraft, it will always be found that the ritual centres round the utterance of the spell." [1] So far, at any rate, Dr. Malinowski would find himself in complete agreement with the hypnotic theory, wherein the spell is the alpha and the omega of magic. Malinowski enumerates what he regards as the three typical elements associated with the belief in magical efficiency. First, the imitating by natural sounds (such as the whistling of the wind, and the roar of the sea) of the desired aim. Next, the setting forth of this aim in words which invoke, state or command it. Thus the sorcerer will mention all the symptoms of the disease which he is inflicting. Thirdly, there is an element in almost every spell to which there is no counterpart in ritual—i.e. references to mythical ancestors from whom the spell has been derived. We must not suppose, however, that such stories are accounts of how the rites originated; for magic never originated; there was never a time when it was not.

Magic arises, according to Malinowski, out of actions performed in which an end is frustrated, when man in a series of practical activities 'comes to a gap.'

"The man under the sway of impotent fury or dominated by thwarted hate spontaneously clenches his fists and carries out imaginary thrusts at his enemy, muttering imprecations, casting words of hatred and anger against him. The lover aching for his unattainable or irresponsive beauty sees her in his visions, addresses her, and entreats and commands her favours, feeling himself accepted, pressing her to his bosom in his dreams. The anxious fisherman or hunter sees in his imagination the quarry enmeshed

[1] *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 68.

in the nets, the animal attained by the spear; he utters their names, describes in words his visions of the magnificent catch, he even breaks out into gestures of mimic representation of what he desires." [1]

It is plain to see that here we have another phantasy theory of magic. But Malinowski has already told us that the spell is central in magic. How does he link it up with the phantasy elements? For we have seen that the two are by no means to be identified. It cannot be said that his attempt to do this is altogether satisfactory. Put briefly, his theory is that as the emotion associated with the phantasy-acts gradually dies away, the actor begins to feel better, and so tends to believe that the actions which he has performed have been efficacious. Here surely is a statement which each can test for himself by introspection. The result of such introspection seems rather to point to the conclusion that when the emotion fades away in such cases, it is as likely as not succeeded by a condition of dullness and boredom, and by no means by one of satisfaction, associated with a sense of having achieved something. It would accordingly seem that in such experiences as these we have a very insecure foundation for the rise of the idea of the spell. Moreover, even granting the truth of Malinowski's contention, it would appear to follow that magical power would be associated with all and sundry rather than with specified magicians, since the kind of actions which he cites are commonplace, and such as every ordinary person would perform.

Dr. Otto has drawn our attention to the significance of symbolic actions of the sort which we have just been considering. The example which he gives is of the man on the bowling green who, in his desire for the ball to follow a particular path, " watches eagerly as it rolls, nodding his head, his body bent sideways, stands balancing on one leg, jerks over violently to the other side as the critical point is reached, makes as though to push the ball on with hand or foot." [2]

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 74. [2] *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 122 (E.T.).

But he rightly observes that there is nothing magical in such actions as these. For magic to arise, he insists, there is required the addition of a new ingredient, which we may call occult, or dæmonic power. It is just this power which our theory is able to supply. Once we are able to account for the existence of this, then the phantasy elements quite naturally come in as accompaniments. But of themselves they clearly cannot explain the existence of belief in magical power.

Another theory of magic with which it will be useful to compare the hypnotic theory is that of R. R. Marett. We have first of all to notice that Marett is careful to distinguish between genuine magic and those sympathetic symbolical actions which accompany it, but which may and frequently do exist entirely without it. He chooses indeed to speak of these actions as 'rudimentary magic,' but he hastens to point out that he is not identifying this with any social institution, and he is perfectly clear as to the gulf fixed between this and magic proper, or 'developed magic,' [1] as he calls it. The essential feature of the latter is what he calls its projectiveness, which is something altogether different from make-believe symbolism. How is the gulf bridged? Marett holds that in the make-believe symbolism of wrath, as when one brandishes a spear, or even merely shakes one's fist, there is a real projectiveness. The object of the demonstration experiences fear. "We know that as a fact to be symbolically tortured and destroyed by his enemy 'gets on the nerves' of the savage, so that he is apt really to feel torturing pains and die." [2] In other words, the gulf is bridged by suggestion.

"I submit that the projectiveness of the magical act is grounded, not merely in a subjective bias that 'fakes' its facts, but on one that is met half-way, so to speak, by the real facts themselves. I would even suppose that the kind of magic practised by man on man, since it lent itself especially to objective verifica-

[1] *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 41. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

tion, may very well have been the earliest kind of developed magic. . . . Were this the case, one would have to assume that the savage extended his sphere of operations by some dim sort of analogous reasoning. If, despite appearances to the contrary, magic really answered in the case of man, it would really answer in the case of the weather and so on." [1]

So far Marett's theory has taken no account of the spell. Indeed, in the foregoing scheme there seems to be hardly any need for it. Although one does come across what appears to be genuinely magical ceremonial without spell or incantation, yet the strength of the historical evidence is so great that Marett is compelled to acknowledge that the presence of the spell is "normal in the perfect and uncontaminated ceremony." He seeks to account for its origin as a descriptive mental accompaniment, which in course of time obtains a projective power, just as the symbolical acts, according to his theory, do. The position of the victim will be virtually one of *rapport*.

"If, then, the occult projectiveness of the magical act is naturally and almost inevitably interpreted as an exertion of will that somehow finds its way to another will and dominates it, the spell or uttered 'must' will tend, I conceive, to embody the very life and soul of the affair. Nothing initiates an imperative more clearly, cutting it away from the formative matrix of thought and launching it on its free career, than the spoken word. Nothing, again, finds its way home to another's mind more sharply. It is the very type of a spiritual projectile. I do not, indeed, believe that what may be called the silent operations of imitative magic are ultimately sign-language and nothing more. I prefer to think, as I have already explained, that they are originally like the fire drawn from an excitable soldier by the tree-stump he mistakes for an enemy, or, more precisely, miscarriages of passion-clouded purpose prematurely caused by a chance association; and that what might be called

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

their prefigurative function is an out-growth." Marett then proceeds to maintain that the idea of *mana* has its roots in this conception and experience of will-power. Here is something utterly divergent from anything of the nature of science, *pace* Frazer, but on the contrary mysterious and occult. It is this mysterious power which Marett believes to be the chief contribution of magic to religion.

The points of resemblance between the foregoing theory and the hypnotic theory are numerous. In each the magic act is regarded as being occult and in no sense scientific; in each the source of the act is to be found, in the first instance, in the relation between man and man; in each there is a state of *rapport* between the agent and the patient. In fact, Marett would ultimately reduce the magic act to suggestion, whereas we seek to reduce it to hypnosis. Let us consider what advantages, if any, the hypnotic theory has over Marett's suggestion theory.

We note, in the first instance, that the term 'semi-physical' has been frequently applied to the magician's power just as, in the days of Mesmer, it was the normal epithet to be applied to that of the hypnotist or mesmerist. It is this 'semi-physical' character of the magic act which is constituted by the symbolism of the magician. It can be perfectly naturally understood and explained if the magician is regarded as a hypnotist. Its character will vary according as the latter is acting more or less dispassionately like a medical practitioner, or, on the contrary, is, as it were, conducting his own case, and is therefore vitally concerned in it. Further, in the hypnotic theory, there is no awkward hiatus between ceremonial and spell to be joined. The two parts are invariably united in the normal functioning of the hypnotist. As one studies Marett's theory, I think that one is conscious that he never really does bridge this gap.

It will probably be objected to our theory that it presupposes the existence of animism, and that it is consequently almost certainly false, since in the

opinion of probably the majority of scholars animism is by no means the most primitive mode of thought, whereas magic, on the contrary, is a primitive mode of action. It is true that as we have roughly stated the theory, it has been made to rest upon a fully conscious animism. It need not, however, necessarily do so. It is perfectly consistent with that vague and inchoate form of animism which Marett has conveniently called 'animatism.'[1] Or we may even suppose that the idea of magical force was transferred from the human to the non-human sphere without even a vaguely animistic belief. Such, indeed, appears to be Marett's view. "If, despite appearances to the contrary," he writes, "magic really answered in the case of man, it would really answer in the case of the weather, and so on."[2] Once the question came to be thought out, it would obviously demand for its support an animistic hypothesis, but there is no reason to suppose that it was thought out for many generations. It is a human characteristic (inevitable to some extent) to act first, and to think afterwards—sometimes a very long while afterwards, if at all.

Is it, however, so certain, after all, that some sort of belief, which can only be described as animistic, is not the most primitive? We need to weigh carefully some words of Professor Gilbert Murray in this connection. He writes as follows: "The process of making winds and rivers into anthropomorphic gods is, for the most part, not the result of using the imagination with special vigour. It is the result of not doing so. The wind is obviously alive; any fool can see that. Being alive, it blows; how?—why, naturally; just as you and I blow. It knocks things down, it shouts and dances, it whispers and talks. And, unless we are going to make a great effort of the imagination and try to realise, like scientific men, just what really happens, we naturally assume that it does these things in the normal way, in the only way we know. . . . This kind of anthropomorphism—or as

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 14. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

Mr. Gladstone used to call it, 'anthropophuism'—'humanity of *nature*'—is primitive and inevitable: the sharp-cut type of statue god is different, and is due in Greece directly to the work of the artists." [1]

We have, perhaps, been too much inclined to overlook these simple considerations, and there can be no doubt that Professor Lévy-Bruhl has rendered great service in emphasising and unfolding their significance in his writings. It is well known that he has sought to show that, in the case of primitive man, his chief interest lies not in the logical and scientific connections between things, but rather in a mysterious power which he believes to inform all objects that exist. The primitive holds that this power exerts a mysterious influence upon everything, insomuch that it is never safe to leave it out of one's calculations. It is independent of space and time, however, and our senses cannot afford us any trustworthy evidence concerning it. Lévy-Bruhl has compendiously expressed the nature of this primitive form of thinking in his now famous Law of Participation, which he states as follows: "In the collective representations of primitive mentality, objects, beings, phenomena can be, though in a way incomprehensible to us, both themselves, and something other than themselves. In a fashion which is no less incomprehensible, they give forth and they receive mystic powers, virtues, qualities, influences, which make themselves felt outside, without ceasing to remain what they are." [2]

It may perhaps be doubted whether, in his eagerness to prove his point, Lévy-Bruhl has not somewhat gone astray. It is not to be denied that there is much truth in what he says, for the savage is essentially a believer in mysterious forces, and pays great attention to them. And it is probably true that the facts which Frazer has grouped together under what he calls the Laws of Association and Contiguity, which he asserts to underlie the thinking of primitive man, are better

[1] *Five Centuries of Religion*, p. 26.
[2] *How Natives Think*, p. 76.

understood if they are approached from the standpoint of the Law of Participation. At the same time, Malinowski is surely right in saying that the savage is by no means without a set of beliefs which can only be described as scientific. In connection with his arts and crafts he is in possession of a body of knowledge which is essentially of that order. No doubt the science is concrete rather than abstract, or, to express it differently, applied rather than pure, but the point is that it is essentially empirical and not mystical; it is not regarded as subject to the arbitrary influences of unseen forces. The evidence rather suggests that he turns to the latter only when he sees that his knowledge, and therefore his power also, is inadequate. If this be so, there seems to be no good reason for drawing a hard-and-fast line between him and the modern man, who, while believing in an ordered and scientific world, does not scruple to adopt a mascot, or to indulge in some other form of superstition, where he realises the limitations of his knowledge and of his control of the forces at work in the world.

But even if we are compelled thus to restrict somewhat the belief in the alleged unscientific nature of primitive man's thinking, it is clear that there is ample scope for magical conceptions to flourish there, since the Law of Participation certainly holds good over a large area of his field of thought. There is accordingly no difficulty in fitting the hypnotic theory of magic into the facts. The magician would quite naturally be regarded as one endowed with a special power of manipulating these mysterious forces if he seemed himself to be a centre of them; and by very reason of their ubiquity his power would tend to be the more highly regarded.

It seems, therefore, that our theory does not in the least demand for its foundation a definitely animistic belief. At the same time, it is true to say that when a full-blown animism did arise in any given community, it would serve to strengthen rather than to weaken magical theory and practice.

It is perhaps worth while to say something of the bearing of this way of regarding magic on the very difficult and keenly debated subject of totemism.[1] Whatever the obscurities of the question, it may now be taken as fairly generally agreed that totemism is essentially magical and not religious in origin. Thus Marett tells us that it is "relatively certain" that "in their origin totemistic observances had a magical rather than a strictly religious import. That is to say, their object was not so much to conciliate powers in plant or animal form, as to establish sympathetic control over classes of serviceable plants and animals regarded simply as such, namely, as clans or tribes very much on a par with human ones." [2]

Here at least he is in complete agreement with Frazer, who, in opposing the religious theory of totemism of which Professor Durkheim is the ingenious, if unconvincing exponent, wrote as follows: "Professor Durkheim finds the origin of exogamy in totemism, which he regards as a religion or worship of the totem. I have already pointed out that such a conception of totemism rests on a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of the institution as it exists in its purity, particularly among the Australian aborigines; and I am the more concerned to emphasise the mistake because I formerly committed it myself, and have drawn Professor Durkheim after me astray. Since my original treatise on the worship of the totem, to which Professor Durkheim refers for proof of the worship of the totem, was published, the evidence as to the system has been greatly enlarged, especially by the researches of Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, and when we consider all the facts and allow for the inevitable haziness and confusion of savage thought on the subject, the conclusion to which the facts point is that the relation between the man and his totem is one

[1] That there is probably some connection between magic and totemism is suggested by the widespread belief that the magician can transform himself into an animal. On this see Hubert and Mauss, *loc. cit.*, pp. 31 ff.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

of simple friendly equality and brotherhood, and by no means one of religious adoration." [1]

How difficult and precarious are all speculations on this subject is proved, if proof be needed, by the fact that Frazer himself has put forward no less than three different explanations of the origin of totemism.[2] The one which he now holds is, as is well known, what he calls the conceptual theory of totemism. According to this view, since primitive man does not associate together in his mind sexual intercourse and childbirth, the idea arises that a woman is impregnated at the moment when she first feels the movement of the fœtus, and she accordingly supposes that whatever impresses her fancy at that moment is the cause of her pregnancy. In spite of the grace and charm with which Frazer puts forward his theory,[3] he is hardly able to make it appear convincing. The probability on this point is surely that such ideas were in their origin ætiological myths to account for a kinship with animals, plants and other material objects which had come to be believed in for quite different reasons.

However this may be, we are not concerned to enter upon a full discussion of this vast subject here and now. Our present object is the more modest one of observing generally how far our view of magic is, or is not, compatible with the curious phenomena of totemism. We have already had occasion to see that primitive man experienced, as indeed man in all ages has experienced, a quasi-hypnotic power and influence in the awe-inspiring happenings of nature, such as the thunderstorm or the whirlwind. But it is also the case that he felt the same thing in the presence of certain animals, notably those which have something uncanny about them. Such are the hare, the fox, the toad, and snakes of every description. Nor must we forget the peacock, Juno's Bird. It is not difficult to see that,

[1] *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv, p. 101.

[2] They are conveniently summarised in *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv, pp. 52 ff.

[3] *Ibid.*, iv, pp. 62 ff.

given the existence of the magician as we have sought to understand him, his aid would inevitably be invoked to counteract these mysterious influences. And as his power waxed stronger it would come to be thought to extend not merely to the control of such forces and powers, but also to their appropriation by the wizard. This result would come about quite naturally if there is any truth at all in Lévy-Bruhl's Law of Participation, to which we have already referred. In this way we can understand how men came to be called by the names of animals and plants; it is a natural consequence of the belief that the individuals in question possessed their powers.

If we are right in this conjecture, then much light seems to be thrown upon the question of totemism by our theory. For, if we may trust the evidence of F. E. Williams, totemism certainly derives from human beings with the names of plants or animals. He writes as follows: "Now I have many times asked the native what he means by calling the plant emblem his ancestor. Sometimes he cannot give an answer, but very commonly he can, and then it is always the same: 'Our real ancestor,' he says, 'was a human being, not a tree; it was a man with a tree name.'"[1] It is quite true that Williams proceeds to say that, in some cases, it is believed that the name was thus acquired from the circumstance that the person who first bore it was born under the *heratu*, as the tree emblem is called, and, in other cases, other explanations are offered, or none at all.

As an instance of an alternative explanation we may take the following: "A clan of the Tain Daware named Giriri had for its original ancestor one Bono. But they were constantly using a certain hard wood called *Giriri* for building, and consequently took this for their *heratu* and their clan name." It cannot be said that there is any support for our theory in this evidence, although we have to remember that the

[1] "Plant Emblems Among the Orokaiva," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. xlv, p. 414.

theory is not on that account condemned. For, in the first place, the very inconsistency of the various explanations renders them suspect, and, in the second, it frequently turns out that the real reason is not the one explicitly given for any custom or belief.

When we turn to Williams's later work, namely, his book entitled *Orokaiva Magic,* we find there a good deal which in fact lends support to our contentions. In magic, rightly so called, he tells us, there is always what he would describe as a 'specific.' [1] That is to say, over and above the procedure and ceremonial of the magic, the meaning of which is usually fairly obvious (at any rate to the native), there is a mysterious and occult power believed to be contained in the particular substance used. The native who performs the magic has no knowledge of the nature of this. For this 'specific' a number of terms are employed. *Sivo* and *kore* are used to denote a good specific; *kai, inja and saruka* one that is bad. A sorcerer is called *kaiembo,* or *injambo*—i.e. one who uses *kai or inja.*

Williams is unable to suggest the reason for the use of any particular specific in the first instance. But, if our view be correct, he himself provides us with the evidence which affords a clue. *Inja,* he tells us, is the name of a particular kind of bush vine, and *saruka* that of a tree with a highly odoriferous bark. Upon the word *kai* his evidence is conflicting. In the Glossary we read that the word means 'a yam,' but the writer informs us in the text that he has never heard any explanation of it. In the light of this evidence it is surely at least plausible to suggest that men originally came to be called after trees or plants because it was believed that certain of them had the power of controlling the mysterious forces believed to be resident in them.

But the question must be faced as to whether there are any totemistic rites, the object of which is avowedly to appropriate the powers of animals and plants. The answer is that in the famous *Intichiuma* and allied

[1] *Op. cit.,* p. 176.

ceremonies of the Australian aborigines we seem to have what we require. The object of these rites is quite certainly to manipulate the power believed to reside in the totem for the use and advantage of men. These ceremonies having been described many times, it is not necessary for our present purpose to add another account of them here. A full description of them may be found in Spencer and Gillen's *Native Tribes of Central Australia,*[1] as well as in their later books. But we must not neglect to point out here a feature of them which from our present point of view is highly significant, and that is that these long and complicated operations (lasting sometimes as much as two whole days) must needs be performed *fasting*. In this way, we may surmise, auto-hypnosis would be induced, so that the desired end readily came to be believed to be already attained and realised.

Since we attempt no more than to throw out a few suggestions as to the possible bearing of our theory of magic upon totemistic practices, it will suffice to mention two other sets of phenomena in totemism which the hypnotic theory of magic seems to illuminate in particular. In the first place, there are the ritual operations performed among certain tribes for the acquiring of individual totems. The method of doing this generally employed among the Indians of North America, for example, is as follows: "About the time of puberty, as the time for initiation approaches, the young man withdraws into a distant place, for example, into a forest. There, during a period varying from several days to a few years, he submits himself to all sorts of exhausting and unnatural exercises. He fasts, mortifies himself, and inflicts various mutilations upon himself. Now he wanders about, uttering violent cries, and veritable howls; now he lies extended, motionless and lamenting, upon the ground. Sometimes he dances, prays, and invokes his ordinary divinities. At last he thus gets himself into an extreme state of super-excitation, verging on

[1] Chap. vi.

delirium. . . . If, in these circumstances, he sees, or, as amounts to the same thing, thinks he sees, while dreaming or while awake, an animal appearing to him in an attitude seeming to show friendly intentions, then he imagines he has discovered the patron he awaited." [1]

The phenomenon of auto-hypnosis is here unmistakable, and we seem to be again justified in supposing that it has played a part in the development of totemistic beliefs. It is, moreover, instructive to note here that among the Arunta tribe in Central Australia the word *Alchera* (which is used compendiously to describe a man's totem, the original ancestors of his totemic group, his association with them, everything that they possessed, everything they did, and the times in which they lived) is also used regularly for 'dream.' This striking fact is mentioned by Spencer and Gillen without comment.[2] For anybody conversant with modern psychology, however, it is one of high significance, and may be taken without doubt to show the part played by phantasy in the formation of totemistic beliefs. It thus becomes a permissible speculation to suggest that primitive man, in countries where totemistic practices prevail, at any rate, in his desire to secure for himself the powers of the lower creation, projected his fancies into the curious mould which we call totemism. In this way, his limitations were overcome for him, and his dreams were realised. As we have insisted above, it is impossible to account for the *origin* of the spell by any theory of phantasy. But, once grant the existence of the spell, and phantasy elements may legitimately be assumed to have come in afterwards, and to have influenced its nature and workings. Thus, it would seem, was it in the present instance.

We now turn to the consideration of the second phenomenon connected with totemism which we have set ourselves to consider. It is the curious one, to

[1] Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
[2] Spencer and Gillen, *The Arunta*, i, p. 306.

which Durkheim has drawn attention, that the totemic emblems, of which we may take the *churinga*[1] as a typical example, are regarded as more sacred than the totemic species itself. If these emblems are regarded as being endowed with magical power of special intensity because they receive that power from a person or persons regarded as eminently powerful and mysterious, we should be able quite easily to account for this fact, so curious at first sight. It is far more likely that this is the reason than that they are so regarded, as Durkheim suggests, because they are the artificially selected badges of the tribe wherein the concentrated virtue and power of the tribe is supposed to reside. There is, in fact, a definite belief among the Arunta tribe that the first *churinga* was made by Numbakulla—i.e. ancient, mythical beings, evidently regarded as the supreme embodiment of power.[2]

This is something which, on our theory of magic, is quite intelligible. The magician, we suppose, was believed originally to be able to extract the power and virtue from animals, plants and the like; more than this, he was believed to have the ability to keep and store that power in material objects, and to dispose of it according to his whim and fancy. The *churinga* may well have been, therefore, a receptacle for the storing of such power. In this way it would naturally come to be used for purposes of magic.[3] It would be a kind of Leyden Jar, highly charged with mysterious forces,[4] and thus come to be regarded as more sacred and mysterious than the totem itself.

Frazer has suggested[5] that these *churinga* were originally 'houses of the soul,'[6] and he cites definite evidence to show that the magician was widely

[1] One species of *churinga* is the well-known 'bull-roarer.'

[2] Spencer and Gillen, *The Arunta*, i, p. 104.

[3] For instances of magical uses of the *churinga*, see *The Arunta*, ii, p. 408.

[4] The actual word *churinga* seems to be used for 'magical power' (Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes*, p. 293).

[5] *Folklore in the Old Testament*, iii, p. 510.

[6] Cf. Isa. iii. 20.

believed among primitive peoples to be able to catch souls by abstracting them from the bodies of their owners, and storing them away. In this way he would, for example, interpret the otherwise completely unintelligible passage from the book of the prophet Ezekiel:

"Son of man, face the women of your country who only prophesy from what they feel; give them this prophetic word from the Lord Eternal: 'Woe to the women who tie amulets on everybody's wrist and mantle folk of every height in veils, to get hold of human souls! You would get hold of human souls among my people, to make a profit from your trade? You are degrading me among my people for a handful of barley and some bread from your clients; you cheat my people, and they believe your cheats—your spells invoking death on honest folk and promising life to the dishonest! Therefore the Lord the Eternal declares: I am against these amulets you use to snare poor human souls; I will strip them off and let the souls go free whom you would fain control; I will tear off your veils and rescue my people from your sway—to let you know that I am the Eternal. Since your cheats and spells have dismayed honest folk whom I never dismayed, and encouraged the dishonest, till they would not give up their evil life and be saved, there shall be an end to your vain visions and incantations; I will rescue my people from your sway—to let you know that I am the Eternal.'"[1]

Frazer comments on this passage as follows: "The nefarious practices of these women, which the prophet denounces, apparently consisted in attempts to catch stray souls in fillets and cloths, and so to kill some people by keeping their souls in durance vile, and to save the lives of others, probably of sick people, by capturing their vagabond souls and restoring them to their bodies."[2] After quoting a number of instances of soul-trapping taken from various parts of the world,

[1] Ezek. xiii. 17–23 (Moffatt's translation).
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 511.

Frazer proceeds: "Such practices may serve to explain those proceedings of the Hebrew witches against which Ezekiel fulminated. These abandoned women seem to have caught vagrant souls in kerchiefs which they threw over the heads of their victims, and to have detained their spiritual captives in fillets which they sewed to their own elbows."[1]

We may perhaps legitimately doubt whether this belief was, in the first instance, definitely spiritistic, as it is in this passage from Ezekiel. There hardly seems to be evidence among the Arunta, for example, that it was so. It is more likely that Durkheim is right in holding that the power believed to be resident in the *churingas,* and other similar objects, was conceived as an impersonal *mana,* rather than as the manifestation of the influence of an indwelling spirit.[2] But the point which we are here concerned to make is that this mysterious power of the *churinga* (which we have selected as typical of the class of mysterious objects), whether regarded as personal or impersonal, is most simply accounted for by the theory of magic which we are endeavouring to uphold. It is a natural corollary of the belief that the magician can hypnotise the forces of nature in all their variety, because he himself is pre-eminently endowed with mysterious power.

After this somewhat lengthy digression let us return to our theory. It is clear that once magic has, so to say, become 'a going concern,' it will naturally tend to incorporate into itself all departments of human life. The power of the wizard will be extended to cover not only that special kind of influence which we call hypnotic, but other kinds of power as well. He will accordingly come to be regarded as a storehouse of wisdom and authority, so that men will come to consult him on all the important matters of life. Hence by a natural and easy process he becomes the prophet, or soothsayer, the witch doctor, and, as we have seen, even the king. Because of his possession

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 513. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

of this power he will be able to dip into the future, and to forecast things to come; he will have knowledge of the mysterious workings of medicines and poisons; his power will even be able to discern the secrets of love potions and philtres. We shall see in a moment more fully the reasons for this transition.

We have thus far considered the magician in the main objectively. That is to say, we have looked at him from the outside, as it were, and sought to trace his influence in society. We have seen him as a dominant personality. And such indeed he is. Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that it does not follow from this that when we examine him subjectively, or from the inside, we shall find him necessarily, nor indeed perhaps even generally, a really strong and fully integrated personality. On the contrary, there is much evidence to show that the successful wizard or witch is usually the reverse—pathological in the extreme, and liable to dissociation. The dominant instincts may be highly developed, and yet at the same time there may coexist in the personality other predispositions which tend to disintegration. In fact, it is true to say that the more any one instinct is overdeveloped at the expense of the rest of the personality the greater will be the likelihood of dissociation. And it is this character of the wizard, and still more of the witch, which is the secret of their alleged power of soothsaying, and which is the link between magic and divination.

Dr. Jung has shown,[1] in his examination of the case of the girl whom he designates S. W., strong, if not conclusive reasons for thinking that the mediumistic phenomena in this instance (and therefore possibly in all instances) are due to dissociation of personality. S. W. was a young girl of 15½ years of age, when first Jung attended her, and she was under his observation for a period of two years. Before he had come across S. W. she had heard of table-turning, and had experimented with it, first of all in fun. She at once

[1] *Analytic Psychology*, pp. 24 ff. (E.T.).

showed herself to be very 'sensitive.' "She could divine and reply to simple questions, thought of by a member of the circle who was not a 'medium,' if only the latter would lay a hand on the table, or on her hands." After the first two séances, 'spirits' appeared by the dozen, but careful examination makes it clear they could all be subsumed under two types—the serio-religious type, of which S. W.'s grandfather was the chief representative, and the gay, hilarious type, represented by a certain individual going by the name of Ulrich von Gerbenstein, who gradually ousted the former from being the 'control.' "The first produces exclusively sanctimonious religiosity, and gives edifying moral precepts. The latter is, in one word, a 'flapper,' in whom there is nothing male except the name. We must here add from the anamnesis that at 15 the patient was confirmed by a very bigoted clergyman, and at home she is occasionally the recipient of sanctimonious moral talks. The grandfather represents this side of her past, Gerbenstein the other half; hence the curious contrast. Here we have personified the chief characteristics of her past. On the one hand the sanctimonious person with a narrow education, on the other the boisterousness of a lively girl of 15 who often overshoots the mark." [1]

In keeping with this view is the phenomenon of anæsthesia in witches, commonly known as the 'witch's mark,' or the '*signum diaboli*.' The following account of the significance at one time attributed to this is derived from one, Bernard of Batcomb, whose *Guide for Grand Jurymen* is quoted by a certain Puritan divine, Dr. Increase Mather by name, who was Principal of Harvard, in his book, *The Wonders of the Invisible World*, published in 1662: "A witch in league with the Devil is convicted by these evidences: (1) By a witches *mark*, which is upon the baser sort of witches; and this, by the Devils either sucking or touching of them. Tertullian says,

[1] *Ibid.*

It is the Devil's custom to mark his. And note, that this mark is *Insensible,* and being pricked it will not bleed. Sometimes it's like a *Teate*; sometimes but a *Blewish Spot*; sometimes a *Red* one; and sometimes the flesh *sunk*; but the witches do sometimes cover them." It is not difficult to recognise here the now familiar phenomenon of local anæsthesia in certain pathological conditions. Thus our theory of magic finds somewhat unexpected corroboration.

We must now examine more closely the bearing upon our theory of the highly important primitive conception, known as *mana,* which is evidently intimately associated with magic. In so doing, we shall implicitly at the same time be treating of analogous conceptions, such as *orenda, wakonda,* and the like. The classical account of the conception of *mana* was given many years ago by Dr. Codrington in his book, *The Melanesians.* "The Melanesian mind," he wrote,[1] "is entirely possessed by the belief in a supernatural power or influence, called almost universally *mana.* This is what works to effect everything which is beyond the ordinary power of men, outside the common processes of nature. . . . But this power, though itself impersonal, is always connected with some person who directs it; all spirits have it, ghosts generally, some men. If a stone is found to have a supernatural power it is because a spirit has associated itself with it; a dead man's bone has with it *mana* because the ghost is with the bone; a man may have so close a connection with a spirit or ghost that he has *mana* in himself also, and can so direct it as to effect what he desires; a charm is powerful because the name of a spirit or ghost expressed in the form of words brings into it the power which the ghost or spirit receives through it. Thus all influence depends on the impression made on the people's mind that he has it; he becomes a chief by virtue of it. Hence a man's power, though political or social in its character, is his *mana*; the word is naturally used in accordance

[1] *Op. cit.,* p. 118.

with the native conception of the character of all power and influence as supernatural."

It is somewhat unfortunate that Codrington thus uses the word 'supernatural' to describe *mana,* for that is a word which, whatever its ambiguities, has quite definitely a religious connotation. No doubt in the primitive Melanesian mind, magic and religion are apt to be seriously confused, as they are in the minds of all ignorant and spiritually undeveloped persons; but it is plain that if we substitute the word 'abnormal' for it in the above account we shall do equal justice to the evidence which he gives us. If we make this substitution, then it becomes possible to suppose that the rise of the conception of *mana* is derived from dominant human personalities, and is accordingly magical and not religious in its origin at all. Such, indeed, as we have seen, is Marett's view, for he holds that it has its roots in the conception of will-power. Codrington, indeed, in his account of it, appears to think that it is a power primarily derived from departed human beings; but it is at least more probable that it originated before any idea of departed spirits had arisen at all.

Mana, therefore, may well have nothing distinctively religious about it. That it came to be confused with religion, however, will cause us no surprise. For once religion is debased from its true meaning of worship and adoration, and comes to be regarded simply under the form of enlightened self-interest, and traffic with the gods, the power associated with the latter will not seem to be essentially different from the power *ex hypothesi* already familiarly experienced as *mana.*

We shall attempt to show later on the important part played by the psychological process known as perversion in the formation of religious beliefs—a factor usually altogether ignored in attempts to understand the nature of religion. Meanwhile, it is important for us to notice that it is dangerous and misleading for us to suppose (as many tacitly do suppose) that we can gain a right understanding of the true

nature of religion by accepting as evidence concerning it the religious views of the average man. We know that even in the case of civilised man this is a method which brings nothing but misunderstanding. How much more will this be the case with savage or primitive man! Even if the majority of Melanesians, for instance, would agree in saying that *mana* is essentially a religious conception, this is no valid evidence that it is so. Their idea of religion may be, and indeed almost certainly is, debased. Thus there is no doubt that the majority of Englishmen would agree in saying that the main purpose of attending church (whether they themselves think that it is achieved or not is immaterial from our present point of view) is to 'get good.' It is nevertheless true that those pre-eminent ones whom we have agreed to call saints would condemn this proposition with one voice as an entirely inadequate and inaccurate statement as to the nature of worship.

Before we could rightly accept as evidence the statement of a Melanesian, or of any other individual, we should, in strictness, need to know something about the man's character, and how far he was struggling to live up to the light he possessed. It is because we are unable to obtain this information, from the nature of the case, as a general rule, that it is so difficult to obtain trustworthy evidence concerning the nature of religious experience. The least we can do, however, is to bear this consideration continually in mind, as it will make us duly cautious in estimating and sifting any evidence relating to religious phenomena.

We suppose, therefore, that *mana* is in essence and origin a magical conception, and withal one which nicely exemplifies the hypnotic theory of magic. Such a hypothesis does full justice to the facts which Codrington has collected. If, moreover, we try, as he does, to explain *mana* in terms of animism pure and simple, we reach a far less satisfactory solution of the problem than if we regard it as a more or less

abstract force.[1] As Beth has said,[2] it may best be likened to a fluid, or energy, which exerts physical and psychical power. The simile is instructive from our present point of view, for the same terms have been used (as we have already pointed out) to describe the hypnotic process in the early days when it was first investigated. Indeed, they are still used in popular speech in this connection.

In the foregoing exposition of the hypnotic theory of magic we have endeavoured to show the considerable element of truth underlying the pretensions and claims of the magician, and that those who hold magic to be a bundle of hallucinations and hypocrisy are far from having rightly apprehended the matter. In the course of this exposition, we have said that the powers of the magician come to be believed to be extended to the control of invisible spirits. Whether or not such spirits in fact exist, or, admitting their existence, influence our human life, makes, of course, no essential difference to our theory. All that we require is that they should be believed to exist, and to exert this influence. At the same time, if it should turn out that this belief is well founded, then it will follow that not only subjectively but also objectively the magician has truth in his claims.

This is not the place to attempt to discuss this question at length. Two things, however, may be said here about it. In the first place, it is clear that there is nothing inherently irrational in the belief in the influence of invisible spirits, whether good or evil, upon our terrestrial life. And secondly, it is to be remembered that those who have had most experience of life among savage peoples are least ready to condemn it. "We know in ordinary experience," writes Canon Maynard Smith in this connection, "how a man of strong will can dominate a man of weak will,

[1] Hocart claims that it is only in the Banks and Torres Islands that *mana* is impersonal, and that elsewhere in the Pacific it is "out and out spiritualistic." (*Man*, 1914, p. 46.) It may nevertheless be true that the impersonal form of the belief is the more primitive.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 216.

and we know how susceptible people are to evil influence who have degenerated through vice or drink. If we also believe in another world with beings in it possessed of wills—and it is difficult not to believe this if we believe in our own immortality—it is certainly not irrational to believe that an evil spirit may influence a man, whose powers of resistance have been sapped, and produce results which may be labelled indifferently hysteria or possession."[1] The most which, in fact, we can say against such a belief is, Not proven; and that is a judgment which we are compelled to make concerning many beliefs which few persons think of questioning.

[1] *Frank, Bishop of Zanzibar*, p. 116.

Chapter III

RELIGION

We must now turn our attention from magic to religion. I propose to approach the latter from the point of view of instinct. It is not, indeed, the fashion in these days to believe in the existence of a specific instinct of religion.[1] This is at any rate partly due to a revulsion against the loose, popular use, or rather misuse, of the word 'instinct.' Thus it is frequently used where habit is referred to, as in the sentence, "A child ran across the road, and the driver instinctively applied his brakes." Again, we often come across such a sentence as this: "She knew instinctively what he was thinking," where obviously we are concerned with intuition. A glaring example of this loose language is found in a book entitled, *The Religious Instinct,* where we read of 'the causation instinct'! Even writers who might reasonably be expected to rise above these inaccuracies sometimes yield to the temptation to misuse this unfortunate word. One might perhaps yield to the temptation oneself for a brief moment, and say that man seems to abuse the word 'instinct' almost instinctively!

However, *abusus non tollit usum,* and it is possible to make a reasonable and valid defence for the view that there is a religious instinct. It is, in fact, my belief that this way of regarding religion best covers all the data to be correlated. It is, indeed, sometimes urged in objection to this view that to call religion instinctive, or an instinct, does not really explain it. This is, to a large extent, true. But it is not by any means a fatal objection to such a use of the term. It may well be that religion is something primary and

[1] There are, however, some scholars who do so, e.g. W. P. Paterson, *The Nature of Religion,* pp. 98–104; W. R. Inge, *Faith and its Psychology,* pp. 42, 201. R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion,* pp. 10–16, gives a qualified adherence to this view. Cf. also the article by E. O. James in *Essays Catholic and Critical,* pp. 23-5.

ultimate, and therefore incapable of explanation, or of being reduced to simpler terms. The mistake that so many writers on religion seem to make is that in explaining it they merely succeed in explaining it away.

A more forcible objection is that made by many psychologists, who maintain that it is more satisfactory to hold that religion is a sentiment based upon a variety of instincts, rather than to trace it back to a single specific instinct. We must postpone a full consideration of this point of view until after we have had an opportunity of examining the positive arguments in favour of the position which we seek to adopt. At this stage we may content ourselves with pointing out that we do not, of course, deny the existence of a religious sentiment, which is something beyond dispute. The crucial question which has to be determined is whether this sentiment arises wholly as a result of acquired experience (as, for example, the tobacco habit does), or whether it is based upon a specific innate tendency leading man to seek and to worship God, a tendency well expressed in the familiar words of S. Augustine at the beginning of his *Confessions*.

If it is asked precisely what stimulus is posited in connection with the religious instinct, we are entitled to answer that it is possible to regard religion as an instinct without being able to point to any one specific stimulus. It is generally agreed, for example, that the tendency to acquisitiveness is instinctive; yet it has no one stimulus, or situation, which arouses it. The same may well hold good in the case of religion. There are, however, writers who feel able to point to a more or less definite stimulus in connection with religion. Such an author is H. R. Marshall, who says: "Given the stimulus which on its mental side involves the perception of our incapacity to cope with the problems of life, the recognition of our weakness, the feeling of doubt as to our course of procedure, then immediately appears the general mental attitude of

submission and dependence and restraint, coincidently with the religious expressions." [1] Whether this is a satisfactory account of the matter may perhaps be doubted. It seems to be more natural to suppose that, religion being what it is, the immanence of God will make any object or situation potentially a stimulus for the instinct. But unless we are pantheists we have to admit degrees of immanence, which involves the consequence that some situations are far more powerful than others to stir the religious impulse. If we are to find a name for that quality which seems to make them powerful, we can scarcely improve upon the *mysterium tremendum fascinans* of Otto, although he does not himself in so many words regard religion as being instinctive.

We shall have occasion to examine Otto's position later, and to point out what appear to be hesitancies and even inconsistencies in it. For the moment, we have to establish, as far as we can, the tenability of the theory that religion is instinctive. It will assist us if we take as the basis of our enquiry a definite standpoint concerning the nature of the instinctive element in human nature. I therefore propose to take the five criteria of an instinct put forward by Dr. James Drever in his book, *Instinct in Man,* not because they seem to be infallible (which they do not), but because they give us a starting-point. The criteria are as follows:

(1) Irreducibility by introspective analysis to simpler components.

(2) Arousal of impulse and emotion, with its specific and unmistakable expressive signs, by specific objects or specific kinds of objects, prior to individual experience of those objects.

(3) Manifestation in the early months of child-life.

(4) Wide diffusion in the animal world.

(5) Occurrence in exaggerated forms under pathological conditions.

[1] *Instinct and Reason,* p. 225.

How do these criteria accord with the theory which regards religion as instinctive?

(1) is, as we shall see more clearly later on, a criterion of much importance in its bearing on the dispute as to whether religion is an instinct or a sentiment only. For it seems to be evident that the quality of irreducibility to simpler components is one of the most striking features of religion. It fits in perfectly with the view that it is instinctive.

(2) is difficult to apply to religion unless we modify it somewhat, for, as we have seen, the specificity of stimulus is not very obvious in the case of religion. But in view of the fact that the same applies to acquisitiveness, this need not perhaps disturb us unduly. Moreover, the latter part of this criterion which asserts that the impulse must be aroused prior to the experience of the objects concerned, though frequently stated to be one of the characteristics of instinct, is plainly at variance with the facts. Thus, as McDougall has insisted, the nest-building or the migratory flight of birds does not cease to be instinctive, although these actions are performed year after year. Nor does it follow from the conception of instinct that it must be stirred the first time the organism is in the presence of the stimulus. The existence in the human species of the instinct of mating, or, as Drever calls it, courtship, plainly demonstrates this.

(3) is open to a similar criticism. Unless we are slavish adherents of the Freudian doctrines, it is, for example, impossible to hold that the mating instinct is stirred in the early months of child-life. Whether or not the religious instinct is stirred under these circumstances is not revealed by any decisive evidence, but he would surely be over-bold who categorically denied that this criterion was applicable to religion.

(4) is plainly destructive of our thesis, if it is a valid criterion. It is on this ground that McDougall, for example, denies that religion can be regarded as

an instinct.[1] It seems, however, to be overlooked that even in the animal world the number of instincts is not uniform in all the various species. For example, the instinctive life of a lion is surely something quite different from that of a crab. It would be true to say that each has not the same number of instincts. It is difficult, therefore, to see on what grounds we can rule out the belief that man has an instinct, or instincts, peculiar to himself. In fact, McDougall has not consistently held to this criterion of an instinct himself, for he tells us that he inclines to the opinion that laughter should be reckoned among the primary instincts in man.[2] But this is a form of activity which is plainly peculiar to man among the animals. If, therefore, we are allowed to make an exception in the case of laughter, it is impossible to exclude a similar exception in the case of religion.

(5) is a criterion of which religion affords an excellent example. Indeed, on this account some writers even go so far as to assert that religion is a purely morbid product. The evidence against this point of view is, however, decisive. For, if it were tenable, the cure of a person suffering from some form of religious mania, or perversion, should result in the disappearance of his religion. The facts show that this is not the case. The pathological symptoms are removed, but the religion remains.

It is sometimes objected to the view which holds to the existence of a religious instinct that religion lacks the note of urgency which is characteristic of instinctive action. It is, however, necessary to make a distinction here. It may be admitted that the religious instinct is not comparable in this respect to the group of instincts which are summed up under the headings of self-preservation and sex. But there are other recognised instincts, such as curiosity, for example, which do not bear this characteristic in any obvious degree more markedly than does religion.

[1] *Social Psychology*, p. 89 (13th edn.).
[2] *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 164 ff.

Moreover, since religion is, *ex hypothesi,* the latest of the instincts to be evolved, it is to be expected that it will bear this mark of urgency less clearly than more primitive types of instinctive reaction.

If we turn to consider this question from the point of view of the knowledge involved in instinctive action, we find much which tends to confirm the possibility of our hypothesis. It would plainly take us too far afield to attempt to discuss the intricate problem of the precise *differentia* of intelligence. As we have seen in the first chapter, we may justifiably assume that there is no hard and fast line separating it from instinct. At the same time, that there is an important distinction between them is obvious. Broadly speaking, it seems to be true to say that instinctive knowledge is of the unconscious, or the sub-conscious variety. When an organism exhibits what we should call 'intelligence,' we are in the presence of fully conscious, though not necessarily self-conscious, knowledge. The last quality of knowledge is seemingly reserved for man alone. It is, however, of the utmost importance to observe that operations which are, without a doubt, characteristic of intelligence are nevertheless also characteristic of the unconscious mind. We may illustrate this point by taking two instances which are universally admitted to be marks of intelligence, namely the power of discrimination and the power of synthesis by similarity. It is easy to show that both of these are also marks of unconscious mentality.

Consider first the power of discrimination. It is a well attested fact that a hypnotised subject is possessed of a power of hyperæsthesia whereby he is able to make the most minute discriminations in his surroundings, discriminations which would probably escape his notice entirely in waking life. Clearly, therefore, this characteristic is also a property of the unconscious mind. Secondly, consider the power of synthesis whereby a highly intelligent person is able to see similarities between phenomena which at first

sight are not related, as, for example, Newton saw the similarity between the falling apple and a falling moon. It is evident that ideas of this kind are not reached as the conclusion of a chain of conscious reasoning. Any 'reasoning' there may be is subconscious. The idea flashes into the mind suddenly from the unconscious. It follows, therefore, that even the highest quality of intelligence is also a property of unconsciousness in some sense. When this quality emerges in the organism, its effect is to make the latter more plastic to experience. But this plasticity is bought at a price. The price is that the power to perform detailed and difficult actions without effort or thought—which seems to characterise instinctive action in some of the lower animals—has disappeared. Nor is this surprising; for rigidity is the mark of instinct in such organisms as ants and wasps, and rigidity and plasticity are contradictories. There appears to be an analogy to this situation in the case of the performance of habitual actions by man. Once a person begins to 'think' how to do anything which normally he performs as a matter of habit, he fails to perform the action perfectly, and he may even be unable to do it at all.

At times there seems to exist a yet further handicap where self-conscious intelligence is present. Not only may the organism be unable to perform an action, to which it is prompted by instinct, with accuracy, or in such a manner as to secure satisfaction for itself; it may even be unable to say what the goal is to which it is being instinctively driven.

It seems, then, that as the proportion, or degree of intelligence increases in an organism, instinct changes its character. In the early stages of evolution, it appears to consist in a more or less wholly unconscious power to perform specific and sometimes highly complicated actions; in the later stages it is simply an impulsion to pursue a general goal. When we come to man, where the highest degree of intelligence of all is manifested, this change in the character of

instinct is complete. But as a compensation for the loss of the power of naïve instinct, man has the still more precious power of clearly envisaging his end, and of harmonising all the lesser ends of the several instincts into a single whole. That this is a true account of the facts seems to be suggested by a single instance taken from man in a primitive state. It is a well-known fact that among the bushmen of Australia, for example, there is a capacity for finding their way through the trackless bush as unerringly as a migrating bird finds its way across the seas.[1] Men of this description have never developed their powers of self-conscious thought, and so are able to live a great part of their life almost on the level of naïve instinct.

Is it possible to penetrate any further into the nature of instinctive knowledge? With a good deal of hesitation I venture to suggest that it is. The well-known phenomena of post-hypnotic suggestion seem to throw some additional light upon the subject. Let us consider as an example of this the case of a man who, under hypnosis, is told that at the end of fifteen minutes he will take off his coat. He is wakened, and at the appointed time he performs the prescribed action. But he will not know the reason why. If he is asked, he will most likely say that he does not know, but that he felt impelled to do so. If he does give a reason, it is never the right one, but a 'rationalisation.' Now what we have in a case like this seems to bear some resemblance to instinctive action in the lower animals. The man performs the act because he feels impelled to do so. He performs it mechanically as we say, without knowing why, and yet all the time he is conscious of what he is doing, in a sense. It is at least possible that when, for example, a bird feels impelled to build a nest, or to incubate, there is a similar blindness and 'mechanicalness' about the action, while nevertheless it knows what it is doing in the same sort of way as the

[1] Experiments made with carrier pigeons prove conclusively that birds sometimes lose their way.

hypnotic patient knows, when he carries out a post-hypnotic suggestion. There is, no doubt, an important distinction between the two cases, since the man has the power of forming a concept of the goal to which he feels impelled—a power which is probably to be denied to the lower animals. Moreover, although quite complicated trains of action have been carried out in fulfilment of post-hypnotic suggestion, perhaps none of them are the equal of the more complex instinctive performances of some of the lower animals. Nevertheless, there seems to be a reasonably close analogy between the two cases, which makes it worth while to bring them into juxtaposition.

We may perhaps best express the application of the foregoing considerations to the matters with which we are here especially concerned in the form of a myth, after the fashion of Plato. In the beginning, the Creator was the Benevolent Hypnotist, who planted instincts in His creatures, as those whom we know as hypnotists plant suggestions. He said to man: "Be fruitful and multiply," and the instinct of sex came into being. He said to him: "Have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth," and the instinct of self-assertion came into being. He said: "Thou shalt worship the Lord, thy God," and the instinct of religion came into being.

These things being so, or at least 'something of the kind' being true,[1] we are able to estimate the significance of man's search for God. Since we have seen that in man, guided as he is by the light of self-consciousness, instinct is manifested at first only as a general impulsion towards a more or less dimly conceived goal, we can understand how it is that he is liable to misinterpret the meaning of his inner strivings, and, in particular, of his urge towards the divine. Oftentimes he feels this as a vague restlessness, which he does not understand. But we know that it is a reaching out after God, since, when God is

[1] Plato, *Phædo*, 114e.

found, it straightway ceases; for, as Canon Quick has recently pointed out,[1] the only means of discovering what is the true object of any of our strivings is to find out what it is that finally brings satisfaction. If, therefore, this restlessness is stilled in the presence of a situation apprehended as numinous, then it is plain that it was, in fact, a yearning for God.

Thus we see that in respect of his instinctive equipment man is at a disadvantage as compared with the lower animals. His instinct of religion does not lead him unerringly to God, as the instinct of migration in a bird leads it unerringly to its home across the seas. This is a fact of experience which impressed itself mournfully upon the mind of the prophet Jeremiah: "Yea the stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed times; and the turtle and the swallow and the crane observe the time of their coming, but my people know not the ordinance of the Lord."[2] Nevertheless it could hardly be otherwise, unless man was to be little more than an automaton. The price which he has to pay for the gift of full self-consciousness is the possibility of going astray. The Creator has given him instincts, indeed, which serve as signposts pointing out the road. But his must be the effort required to read them aright, to follow the course which they indicate and to make the necessary decisions when they bring him to cross-roads.

Without prolonging our enquiry at this point, we may, I think, provisionally assert that religion is instinctive, and see how far this theory can take us in our attempt to understand its true nature. As a definition of instinct, let us take that of McDougall: "We may define an instinct as an innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive (to pay attention to) any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which find expression in a specific mode of behaviour in relation to that

[1] *Catholic and Protestant Elements in Christianity*, p. 67.
[2] Jer. viii. 7; cf. Isa. i. 3, where Isaiah speaks in a similar vein.

object."[1] In accordance with this definition, we shall say that religion is an innate disposition in the human species which, at any manifestation of the divine, leads man to experience the emotional stirring and the impulse to action which we call worship or adoration.

Before we proceed to test this way of regarding religion by applying it to the facts, there are three observations which seem to be appropriate. First, as to the nature of the goal, which in this case we have called 'the divine.' This will doubtless be called in question; we shall be challenged to define our terms, and if we reply that religion is something *sui generis*, and consequently incapable of definition, we shall be accused of shirking the issue. And yet, in fact, no other course seems to be possible. For by the Divine we mean the Ultimate Reality, the *ens realissimum*, and we may at least shelter ourselves behind the great authority of Plato in asserting that it is ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, and therefore incapable not only of definition, but even of description. It is "dark with excess of bright." Plato, no doubt, did not identify this Ultimate Reality, the Form of the Good, with the term 'God,' but this was owing to the fact that he never succeeded in adjusting his religious ideas to his metaphysics, as Professor A. E. Taylor has shown.[2] This fact need not, however, prove disconcerting to us, for twenty centuries of Christian theology have made it a universal postulate to hold that the God of philosophy and the God of religious experience must in the end coincide.

Secondly, the question will inevitably arise, What is the specific form of activity to be associated with the functioning of the religious instinct? The answer must be that perhaps McDougall's definition emphasises unduly the specificity of the instinctive response. Consider, once more, the instinct of acquisition. It is hardly possible to say that there is any specific mode of behaviour which invariably marks its operations.

[1] *Outline of Psychology*, p. 110.
[2] *Plato, the Man and his Work*, p. 232.

The same applies to other instincts; for example, the instinct of self-assertion, or of self-preservation. We need not therefore abandon the view that religion is instinctive if we cannot point to any one form of typical behaviour therein. It is in the tendency to seek certain goals, so we should claim, rather than in the disposition to perform certain motor actions, that the truest understanding of instinct can be gained.[1]

Thirdly, our view will commend itself to those who seek to make religion the centre of their lives. All the saints agree that the experience of God is ineffable and incommunicable. He can be apprehended, but not comprehended, as the mystics say. Much confusion is needlessly brought into discussions on the nature of religion because frequently they are conducted by those who have but little first-hand religious experience, or at any rate by those whose primary concern in life is not with religion. It is surely as unwise to expect from such persons a valid account of the nature of religion, as it would be to look for an adequate expression of opinion concerning the nature of music from one who is tone deaf, or in a large measure unmusical.[2] It is, for example, from this point of view that exception must be taken to the position adopted by Durkheim when he writes: "What essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the Exodus from Egypt, and a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life?"[3] We may perhaps rightly be led to wonder what anybody who could ask a question of that kind can know about religious worship.

Religious people will, I believe, one and all echo

[1] Nevertheless, there exist characteristic actions in the case of religion, notably, kneeling, prostration, and, perhaps above all, lifting up the eyes to heaven. (Cf. Our Lord's life.)

[2] Cf. A. E. Taylor's article in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, pp. 40, 41 and 80.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 427.

the concise remark, made by one who was not only a great scholar but also a devoutly religious man, the late Baron von Hügel, when he said, "Religion is adoration." Such adoration, we claim, is best to be understood by saying that it is instinctive in man. This view is represented in Browning's fine and oft-quoted lines:

> If such his soul's capacities,
> Even while he trod the earth—think now,
> What pomp in Buonarotti's brow,
> With its new palace-brain where dwells
> Superb the soul, unvexed by cells
> That crumbled with the transient clay!
> What visions will his right hand's sway
> Still turn to form, as still they burst
> Upon him? How will he quench thirst
> Titanically infantine,
> Laid at the breast of the Divine?

We must now undertake the task of seeing how far this view of religion as being instinctive enables us to understand its meaning. We turn first to the vexed question of the definition of religion. It is notoriously one of the most thorny problems in the field of thought. We seem therein to be on the horns of a dilemma. If we adopt what may perhaps be called the H.C.F. method, we arrive at something so thin and vague as to be practically valueless—at any rate for all those who take religion seriously, and who, we have suggested, are alone entitled to pass final judgment on such a matter.

Such a method of procedure, for example, vitiates the conclusions of such a writer as Durkheim. "Leaving aside all conceptions of religion in general," he writes, "let us consider the various religions in their concrete reality, and attempt to disengage that which they have in common; for religion cannot be defined except by the characteristics which are found wherever religion itself is found. In this comparison, then, we shall make use of all the religious systems which we can know, those of the present and those of the past, the most primitive and simple as well as the most recent and refined; for we have neither the right nor

the logical means of excluding some and retaining others. For those who regard religion as only a natural manifestation of human activity, all religions, without any exception whatsoever, are instructive." [1]

A similar attitude is adopted by a very different type of scholar, Professor Julian Huxley. "The method of science," he tells us, "is to look round and find what are the types of Gods who actually have been or are being worshipped (or, if you prefer it, what various ideas of God human beings have held); to classify and compare these Gods and these ideas; to analyse them in terms of all available kinds of knowledge—knowledge of sociology, of history, of psychology, of the non-human sciences; and, as a result of all this collection, classification, comparison, and analysis, to try and understand not what man *ought* to have worshipped and felt in worshipping, but what it is which man *has* actually experienced in his religious moments, and what he *has* actually worshipped." [2]

We are, however, apparently impaled on the other horn of the dilemma if we attempt to define religion in terms of what we choose to regard as its higher manifestations; for not only is this an arbitrary method of procedure, but we also are nonplussed by the existence of religions which have no God at all.

If, however, we apply the category of instinct to these varying phenomena, it throws a flood of light upon them. We then have a scientific criterion by which abnormalities may be tested and registered, and by which order can be brought out of chaos. We assert, therefore, that religion is the instinct to seek and to worship the divine. Here we have, as has been already said, something ultimate. It is because religion is thus primary and irreducible that so many definitions of it prove to be circular, or, at any rate, they perforce define the unknown by the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 24. [2] *Religion Without Revelation*, p. 139.

equally unknown, by including in the definition such terms as ' God,' ' the divine.'

Having this *πού στῶ*, we can then begin to set in order the phenomena which appear to cause the most difficulty. There is first the fact of the existence of religions with no God. On the instinctive theory of religion these present no difficulty. They are simply examples of what psychologists are wont to call ' deflection.' The instinct for God has, for example, been deflected in primitive Buddhism into a philosophical way of life,[1] in much the same kind of way as the parental instinct in a woman may be deflected into nursing the sick, or the instinct of pugnacity in a man is deflected into mountaineering. In Spinoza's *Ethics* we have an excellent example of the deflection of the religious instinct. It is impossible to read that great work without perceiving in it the fire of religious passion of him who has not without truth been described as a ' God-intoxicated man.' And yet there is, in fact, no God to be found therein. The instinct for God which inspired that passion has been deflected into the channels of philosophy.[2]

Once more, this principle enables us to appreciate the significance of crude forms of religion such, for instance, as totemism. They should, on this theory, be regarded as perversions of the religious instinct, analogous, for example, to the perversions of the sex instinct. That is why attempts to explain and understand the true significance of religion by paying chief attention to such phenomena are bound to be unsatisfactory, and produce results which to a keenly religious person are futile in their inadequacy. If we were to attempt to understand the significance of sexual love simply by making a study of all the varying objects on which the sex instinct, in its various forms, has fastened itself, and then taking as

[1] That it is essentially religious is not open to doubt. " Buddhism is not Atheism: it only deifies the ' aprivative ' " (W. R. Inge, *op. cit.*, p. 44).

[2] J. S. Haldane, *The Sciences and Philosophy*, p. 339, says roundly that religion " is only philosophy under another name."

the essence of sex the highest common factor, we should not get very far. We should not, in this case, find much illumination in pondering upon the fact that whereas one man experiences sexual emotion when he sees a pretty face in a member of the opposite sex, another experiences it whenever he sees a boot or a banana. We can only understand these phenomena by frankly recognising some of them to be perversions of an instinct. In like manner, we submit, we can appreciate the meaning of many religious phenomena only by regarding them as perversions. The fact that a man has experienced religious emotion when he saw a cabbage is hardly more perplexing (or more illuminating) than the fact that another man feels sexual emotion when he sees a cauliflower.[1]

Our knowledge of psychology teaches us that an instinct is perverted when what Freud calls the 'pleasure principle' is stronger in any individual than what he calls the 'reality principle'; or, in other words, when a person is led astray from hard facts by selfish desires and imaginations. If our view of the religious instinct is substantially correct, then we may say that this instinct is essentially unselfish and altruistic, in this respect being most closely paralleled by the parental instinct. This being the case, it will from the first have to wage war against egocentric impulses, and when these gain the upper hand, the result will be a perversion in some degree of the instinct of religion. It is in this way, we would suggest, that such a form of belief and action as religious totemism took its rise. We have already had occasion to see that totemism is essentially and in origin magical and not religious. As Sidney Hartland has said: "The totem is never, when totemism is not decadent, prayed to as a god or a person with powers which we call supernatural."[2] If our view is the

[1] Only those who have had some practical experience of pathological cases in psychology will believe what curious forms perversion of the sex instinct may take.

[2] Article, "Totemism," *E.R.E.*

right one, then religious totemism is not only decadent magic, but also decadent religion.

We seem to be able, in fact, to trace in connection with religion the various forms of instinct transformation which psychologists have distinguished in the operation of other instincts. It will be worth while to consider them here very briefly, although we have to bear in mind that these various forms of instinct transformation are, to a certain extent, arbitrarily distinguished, and that different psychologists have named and described them somewhat differently. We shall here follow the list given by Dr. R. H. Thouless in his *Social Psychology*.

We have first of all the phenomenon known by Freud, and to most psychologists, as repression, wherein the mind tends to exclude thoughts and desires which for any reason are painful. It is well recognised now that religious bigotry and fanaticism afford examples of this. It is likewise a tenable theory that the noisy atheist, or the militant agnostic, is driven on his course by the repression of his instinct for God.

Secondly, we have the phenomena of regression. This is, in the words of Thouless, "a condition in which a suppressed instinctive tendency finds expression in primitive forms." Such regressions give rise to what are known as perversions. It has not, so far as I am aware, been claimed that we find such phenomena in religion; but it is my belief that it is a legitimate claim, which adequately accounts for many religious phenomena otherwise hard to explain, and which strengthens the view that religion is instinctive.

Another form of instinct transformation is canalisation. Under these circumstances an instinct is allowed a partial outlet. Thus the law of monogamy is such a canalisation of the sex instinct. How far canalisation is legitimate in religion, and under what circumstances, it is not to the point to discuss here. But it seems to be clear that there are quite certainly many forms of canalisation in connection with religion,

whether legitimate or illegitimate. It is, for example, a form of canalisation which permits religion to hold sway on Sundays, but not on weekdays, or which suffers it to rule in the home but not in the business, or which maintains that Christianity is necessary for England but not for Africa.

The next form of transformation is what Thouless prefers to call deflection, rather than, with most writers, sublimation, on the ground that it is begging the question to assume that any deflection is socially desirable, and also immaterial from the point of view of pure psychology. We have already seen examples of such deflection of the religious instinct in philosophy and in religions in which there is, strictly speaking, no God.

A fifth form of instinct transformation is what Thouless, following Professor Bovet, calls objectification. Here a person satisfies an instinct by watching somebody else perform the actions appropriate to it, instead of performing them himself. This is what a football crowd does on a Saturday afternoon in relation to the instinct of pugnacity and other instincts as well. This also seems to account for a good deal of nominal churchgoing, and perhaps best explains why people enjoy what they call ' a good sermon ' without making the slightest effort to perform the actions enjoined therein.

The opposite of objectification is what has been called subjectification. It is, as Thouless truly remarks, " not a very clear conception," but it appears to consist in the inturning of an instinct on the subject instead of reaching outwards to the appropriate object. We may perhaps find in this phenomenon the explanation of the delusion, far from uncommon, that the individual is God.

Lastly, there is what is known as Platonisation, which, as the phrase ' Platonic love ' implies, consists in the restriction of the natural instinctive forces to the mental plane. It differs from deflection in that in the latter the natural object of the instinct is no

longer recognised. Here the object is recognised, but the normally appropriate action is not performed. This is what we have in Platonic love. There can be no doubt that we have here a principle which accounts for a great deal of religion. God is believed in, and to that extent we have religion, but no attempt is made to carry out the worship of Him which the instinct naturally demands.

It seems to follow, from what we have said, that the conception which regards religion from the point of view of instinct, is, to say the least, one which promises to be fruitful. It enables us to surmount a number of difficulties in connection with its definition, which otherwise are virtually impossible to solve. It would have been possible to pursue this line of thought at greater length, but perhaps enough has been said to make our point clear. We must now go on to consider how far this conception can help us to interpret the meaning of religious experience as a whole.

If religion is, as we are maintaining, instinctive in man, then the tendency to seek and to worship the divine is the feature common to all religious experience, although the fact may be obscured by the perversion of the instinct. But it is clear that the content of the knowledge gained in any individual religious experience will be intimately bound up with the life of the experiencer, and accordingly liable to error. For this is the case with all other forms of experience which are the fruit of instinctive strivings. Religious knowledge will not, in other words, be less liable to error than other kinds of knowledge. A 'revelation' need not necessarily be infallible, since it will be susceptible of misinterpretation in precisely the same way as any other form of immediate experience. The recognition of this fact brings with it two important consequences, which are curiously opposite. It will, on the one hand, make it impossible for any prophet to claim infallibility simply on an *ipse dixit,* as many have so claimed in the past. On

the other hand, the genuineness and the possibility of 'revelation' will be seen not to be invalidated, as such, simply because the contents of experiences claimed to be revelations turn out to be untrue.

This has far too lightly been assumed to be the case by writers on religion. The error may equally well be due to the misinterpretation of a genuine experience of God. What we require in such cases is a careful examination of the circumstances of the life of the recipient of the revelation, and this is precisely what those who have left to the world accounts of their revelations frequently have not thought fit to give us. It becomes, therefore, a highly precarious matter to estimate the value of such revelations.

The commonsense of the Christian Church has, as a matter of fact, always refused to accept any revelation at its face value. Two criteria have usually to be applied to any alleged revelation. In the first place, it has been tested by its fruits—i.e. its fruits in morality. Has it affected the life of the person who has had the particular religious experience in question? If it has had no effect, or an effect which on grounds of morality can be condemned, then such a revelation is not to be trusted. In the second place, it has to be asked whether the revelation coheres with the body of established religious knowledge. If it does not, then it is not necessarily rejected straightway, but it is definitely regarded with hesitation and suspense of judgment. In this, religious experience is being treated in the same way as any other kind of experience.

When we come to deal with the specific form of religious experience known as conversion, there can be little doubt that the instinctive theory of religion harmonises well with the phenomena. This aspect of religion has been so fully investigated that it is not necessary to dwell upon it here. But it is worth while to point out that if what we have in conversion is the release of the forces of a repressed instinct of religion, then we are in the presence of something which has

very close analogies in the case of other instinctive forces. James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*,[1] quotes the case of a man who was suddenly converted to the instinct of acquisitiveness. This man had been born the heir of a large estate, which he squandered with riotous living. In a state of penury he sat down one day on the brow of a hill overlooking what had once been his property. At the end of a number of hours he sprang up from the ground; a sudden resolution had seized him. He would regain all that he had lost. He set to work immediately, earning anything he could, and rejecting no offer of work, however menial, the while he never spent a single penny more than was absolutely necessary. He died an inveterate miser, worth £60,000.

Another problem on which the instinct theory of religion throws light is the absence of religion, or at least the apparent absence of it, in certain persons. In very small children there seems to be no understanding of what is meant by the word 'God,' or of the fundamental religious activities, such as prayer and worship. This may well be due to the fact that the instinct for God has not fully awakened. James testifies to the suddenness with which instinctive impulses may awaken in a child. Yesterday, for example, the baby sat quite still; to-day he is seized with an irresistible impulse to creep. So, it seems, it is in the case of religion. The impulse to seek God may awake at different times in different individuals. It is, however, fairly generally agreed that the age of puberty is the one in which the tendency to seek and to worship the divine becomes really powerful for the first time, in the majority of instances.

The absence of religion in certain adults may perhaps be explained in accordance with what James called the law of the transitoriness of instinct. He did not, indeed, assert, as some have wrongly said, that all instincts were necessarily transitory. He admitted that such instincts as those of self-preservation and

[1] P. 178.

feeding are in no sense subject to the law of transitoriness, and, of course, the same may hold good of religion. Yet those who have essayed the task of the shepherd of souls will sometimes be tempted by their experience to wonder whether, after all, there is not some truth in this in relation to religion. There seem to exist persons with no sense of God or religion whatever. It may be that such people have missed their opportunity, and unless and until another one arises, they are cut off from the possibility of any genuinely religious experience.

This seems to be a suitable point at which to consider the instinctive theory of religion in relation to Otto's teaching about the 'numinous,' as he has called the religious experience, in a now famous word. In his great book, *Das Heilige,* Otto explicitly differentiates between the numinous and the instinctive. In seeking to unfold his meaning, he takes an analogy from the level of instinct. The instance which he gives is the sex instinct. He points out rightly that friendship, love, erotic poetry and song, and such like, must not be confused with the actual inward experience of the erotic. Even so, he tells us, must conceptions concerning God and the spiritual life be carefully distinguished from the experience of religion itself. But he hastens to add that there is an important distinction between religion and sex. The latter is instinctive, and presses up from below; the former is suprarational, and descends from above. It is difficult to extract any precise meaning from this distinction; we have a spatial metaphor of a delusive kind. What does it mean to say that religion is "on the opposite side" of reason from instinct?

Otto nowhere enlightens us. On the other hand, when he is not concerned to make this distinction, the truth slips out unawares in his language. For example, in dealing with S. Peter's celebrated "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord"—a saying which, as he justly remarks, is numinous rather than ethical —he speaks of this response as being made "almost

instinctively." Again, in another passage he speaks of the numinous emotion "rising from the deeps below consciousness," [1] while on the page following he likens it to a mechanical reflex. And at the close of his book, where he is discussing the tendency to see in Christ the mediator and the propitiator, he speaks of it as "a natural religious instinct," due to the stimulus of the numinous.

Moreover, in such a passage as the following, it is surely difficult to deny that religion is regarded as instinctive. He writes as follows: "We call the source of growth a hidden 'predisposition' of the human spirit, which awakens when aroused by divers excitations. That there are 'predispositions' of this sort in individuals no one can deny who has given serious study to the history of religion. They are seen as propensities, 'predestining' the individual to religion, and they may grow spontaneously to quasi-instinctive presentiments, uneasy seeking and groping, yearning and longing, and become a religious *impulsion,* that only finds peace when it has become clear to itself and attained its goal. . . . But here, if nowhere else, the 'fundamental biogenetic law' really does hold good, which uses the stages and phases in the growth of the individual to throw light upon the corresponding stages in the growth of his species. The predisposition which the human reason brought with it when the species Man entered history became, long ago, not merely for individuals but for the species as a whole, a *religious impulsion,* to which incitement from without and pressure from within the mind both contributed. It begins in undirected, groping emotion, a seeking and shaping of representations, and goes on, by a continual onward striving, to generate ideas, till its nature is self-illumined and made clear by an explication of the obscure *a priori* foundation of thought itself, out of which it originated." [2]

The fact seems to be that if Otto would frankly

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 67.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 120.

apply the category of instinct to religion, it would greatly clarify his thought. As it is, he speaks of religion in terms of instinct, without admitting to himself that he is doing so. What he calls the ' numinous ' is to be regarded as the stimulus which stirs the instinct of religion. If we regard the matter thus, then we are able to elucidate what is so perplexing in Otto's book, the precise relation of the rational to the non-rational in religion. We are able to see that the numinous is non-rational, in the first place, in the same way as any given instinctive stimulus is non-rational, because it is ' given.' In this respect religion is different from no other form of experience. In the second place, Otto is no doubt right in saying that, in the case of religion, the stimulus is non-rational in a higher sense, in that we have there an immediate expression of the divine. At the same time, if, as has been already said, God is immanent in creation, then every stimulus will in some degree be a revelation of Him, and it will be accordingly beyond our understanding. It may even be true that Tennyson was right when he said:

> Flower in the crannied wall,
> I pluck you out of the crannies ;
> And hold you there, Little Flower, in my hand ;
> But if I could understand,
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is.

It seems, then, that we may perhaps claim that Otto's position is scarcely distinguishable from the one which we are putting forward.

We must now retrace our steps to consider the question which we postponed for fuller consideration, namely, whether religion should be regarded as a sentiment only, and not as an instinct as well. Although there is unfortunately still some ambiguity of language in this matter, yet since the publication of Shand's standard book, *The Foundations of Character,* the word sentiment has come fairly generally to mean an emotional system, consisting mainly of the emotions of fear, anger, joy and sorrow, centred upon an

object, whether concrete or abstract. Two such sentiments, according to Shand, are innate in man, namely, the parental and the mating sentiments; the rest are all acquired by each individual through experience. It is, however, more general to hold that those which are innate should be regarded as instincts, and only those acquired as a result of experience as sentiments. Shand does not take this view, simply because he confines the term instinct solely to the performance of motor actions. We use the word sentiment, therefore, to apply to *acquired* emotional habits. It is in this sense that religion is commonly regarded as a sentiment. Shand himself scarcely mentions the subject of religion in his book, but in one place at least he speaks of it as being a sentiment.[1]

In considering the question before us, it is necessary once more to remind ourselves that we do not, of course, deny the existence of a religious sentiment. It is clear that, unless we think that religion is an illusion, the religious sentiment must be regarded as the master sentiment, incorporating in itself all other aspects of life by means of the reason. This indeed is widely admitted. Moreover, it is curious to observe how near some writers, who speak of religion as a sentiment only, come to speaking of it as an instinct. Thus, for example, Julian Huxley, who appears to hold the sentiment theory of religion, and who reduces it ultimately to a sense of holiness, writes as follows: "Is not this sense of sacredness like the feeling of hunger or the emotion of anger, or the passion of love, something irreducible, itself and nothing else, only to be communicated by words to others who have the same capacity, just as the sensation of colour is incommunicable to a blind man?"[2] Again he says: "The normal man has an innate capacity for experiencing sanctity in certain events."[3] And again: "Not only does the normal man have this capacity for experiencing the sense of the sacred, but he

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 57 (2nd edn.). [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 153.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

demands its satisfaction."[1] It would be difficult surely to say more plainly that religion is to be regarded as instinctive in man without actually using the word.

Let us re-consider, therefore, what can be said in favour of the theory of a religious instinct. In the first place, it is to be noticed that there is no other sentiment at all comparable in its degree of universality to the religious sentiment, saving those sentiments which are almost beyond question based upon specific innate instincts. Thus the sentiment of parental love which is practically universal in the human species is based, primarily at least, upon the parental instinct. It is surely inconceivable that it should be otherwise. It is something primary and irreducible to lower terms. But if we contrast such a sentiment as this with other widespread sentiments which are apparently not based on specific instincts appropriate to themselves, the difference between the two becomes obvious at once. We may illustrate this point by taking the sentiment of love for gambling. Here we have something which is widespread; so much so, indeed, that it is even spoken of as an instinct by some writers. Yet there is in truth no comparison between the universality of religion and the universality of gambling in mankind. There seems to be no particular difficulty in believing that there are multitudes of the human race who have never felt any very special appeal to them in gambling. Such people are unable to understand why it becomes such a craze to some. He would, however, be a bold person who would assert that the same holds good of religion. Man, *quâ* man, is incurably religious, but he is not, *quâ* man, an inveterate gambler.

This leads on to another argument in favour of a religious instinct. It cannot, like other sentiments not derived from specific instincts, be analysed into simpler terms. It is easy, for example, to point out the various instincts which support the gambling sentiment. They are, I suppose, the instincts of

[1] *Religion Without Revelation*, p. 160.

acquisition, of combat and of curiosity. These suffice entirely to account for it; nothing essential to gambling is omitted once they have been posited as its basis. But it is quite impossible thus to analyse religion.[1] We may say of this or of that instinct that it is operative here—in fact, all the instincts may be brought into play—yet when we have named them all there is still something to be accounted for and explained. There is, indeed, in religion, as in other primary instincts, an irreducible something which obstinately resists all attempts to reduce it to lower terms.

Again, the behaviour of savage, and of undeveloped man in the matter of religion does not at all suggest that it is derived primarily from anything so complex as a sentiment. It is far more natural to understand it as an immediate response to a situation apprehended as numinous. Unfortunately, the evidence on this point which would be decisive is not available, for we cannot recover, and still less enter into, the state of mind of primitive man; and further, among civilised peoples, at any rate, it is impossible for any to grow up altogether untouched by religious influences from other people. But if it were possible, I believe that the religious response would nevertheless be made. On the sentiment theory it would not be made. It is noteworthy that those who most ardently support the latter theory always base their position chiefly upon arguments derived from a consideration of religion in a highly developed state. It is thus easy for them to speak of the religious sentiment as a man's attitude to ultimate reality as a whole, or to use some similar phrase to indicate its significance.

But in the case of savage and undeveloped man this is surely just what the religious sentiment is not. It only becomes this when the instinct upon which (as we claim) it is based has been rationalised—i.e. when its implications have been thought out by the mind

[1] It is of primary importance to notice that those who analyse it to their own satisfaction are not 'religious' persons.

and adjusted to the rest of experience. It is unfortunately only too true that the vast majority of persons even in a civilised community are not possessors of a religion which is even approximately like an attitude to reality as a whole. It seems to me that in the present discussion we need to get away at times from these ideal views of what religion ought to be, and indeed is, and to pay more attention to the religious habits, sentiments and beliefs of the average person. The more we do this, as I think, the more tenable does the view which traces the source of religion to a specific instinct seem to be.

It is from this point of view that we must meet the objection that to derive religion from a specific instinct is to make it something departmental, which is the reverse of the truth. Ideally, no doubt, religion is not departmental, but all-embracing and catholic in its sweep.[1] But the fact has to be faced that in the vast majority of instances it is nothing if not departmental, just one interest among many.

What is the reason for this? It is partly due, as we have already shown, to the process known as canalisation. It is also partly due precisely to the fact that religion takes its rise in the experience of each individual from a specific instinct. It was only when the religious experience of man came to be largely rationalised that he began to see the essential catholicity of its nature. Thus, to take a familiar example, it was not until the religion of the Hebrews had been rationalised to the extent that it was seen to be inseparable from ethical righteousness that it was also seen that the God of the nation must also be the God of the whole earth. And even now the process of rationalisation is not complete even in the case of the highest and noblest minds, for the God of religious

[1] There is, however, a sense in which religion must renounce its very claim to catholicity, if it is to be true to itself. In the words of Von Hügel, "It cannot become its own fullest self, without, not merely occasioning the love of the Cross in other departments, but also taking the Cross upon itself." See his discussion of the matter in his *Selected Letters*, pp. 93-95.

experience is not yet equated with the God of the philosophers. That He will one day be so equated is regarded as almost axiomatic. If there be a God at all, then few would deny that He must also be the ultimate Truth and Reality.[1]

But the fact remains that the identification has not yet taken place, and to that extent, and for that reason, religion is of necessity departmental even in the minds of the highest and best thinkers, to say nothing of the mind of the average man. The instinct theory of religion frankly recognises and explains this fact, while it does not, on that account, condone it. The light of the body, as our Lord taught us, is the eye. Nevertheless, as He also insisted, our whole body should be full of light. If God should choose to enter the soul always by the same narrow door, that need not prevent Him from holding sway over the whole demesne; nor can we argue from His so entering that He makes no claim to do this.

If, then, the view that there is an instinct of religion is true, what bearing, if any, has this upon the question of the truth and the validity of religious experience, or, as perhaps we should say, on the belief in the existence of the Object of religious worship? It must, of course, be recognised at once that we cannot argue, *sans phrase*, from the existence of a religious instinct to the existence of God. And in truth, in the present state of obscurity in which our knowledge of the working of the unconscious mind is shrouded, it is plainly impossible to arrive at any very satisfactory answer. If the day ever comes when we are able to bring to light these hidden mental operations, and to express them in the language of conceptual thought, then we may expect to be able to understand a little what is the nature of instinct, and so perhaps to give something like an answer to the question before us.

[1] C. C. J. Webb has shown the unsatisfactory nature of attempts to distinguish between the God of religion and the ultimate reality.

But we must not fail to notice that if the Lamarckian view of instinct as originating in the interplay of ' lapsed intelligence ' and natural selection should turn out to be true, then we must say that the existence of a religious instinct adds no fresh evidence at all to the arguments for the existence of God. Such a view, however, involves a belief in the inheritance of acquired characters, which at one time was held by very few biologists, but which now shows signs of a return to popularity. But even granting this, the position is a highly speculative one, upon which it is impossible to build. And if we exclude this opinion as to the origin of human instinct, then, unless we are prepared to say that the world is irrational, we are compelled to admit that there is *some* Object to justify this attitude. Indeed, perhaps we may even go so far as to say that, even assuming the truth of the ' lapsed intelligence ' theory of instinct, only those variations which are in accordance with the true nature of things will tend to persist, always supposing that the world is rationally ordered. In this case we shall reach much the same conclusion by a somewhat different route.

This point was made from a somewhat different angle some years ago by S. A. McDowall in a book which attracted much attention at the time it appeared —*Evolution and the Need of Atonement*. The writer was at considerable pains to show that the fact of the appearance of moral and spiritual phenomena goes to show that a ' higher ' environment exists in order that such activities may be carried out. For example, just as the environment which calls out gills as a response must be a gill-demanding environment, so must it be, *mutatis mutandis*, with spiritual qualities. " We are not strictly justified," he wrote, " in saying that the environment is spirit, any more than we are justified in saying that the environment of our illustration is the essence of gill ; but biology will support us to the extent we have stated, and neither common sense nor philosophy will offer much objection if we conclude

that that which evokes such a spiritual response is of the nature of spirit, essentially spiritual." [1]

This indeed will not take us as far as we might wish in determining the nature of the Object of religious worship, and yet it is doubtful if any other road takes us farther, or even so far. It has, for instance, often been pointed out that even granting the existence of a First Cause, we do not necessarily find there anything which can be described as an object of worship. The same will inevitably apply to "the God of the philosophers and the savants" of Pascal. But here at least we do have what the situation requires, namely, an Object of *worship*; and in truth, it seems likely that this is the real ground of man's persistent belief in God—of his 'incurable religiousness,' and not the copious reasonings of theologians or of men of science.

Nevertheless, the actual validity of the belief could not be maintained by reasonable people, if to believe in an Object of religious worship could be shown to be contrary to the assured findings of science, supposing such a state of things could be conceived. Moreover, the Nature, or Character, of this Object of religious worship can only be elucidated by conceptual thinking. Hence the importance of the rational superstructure built upon the foundation of this instinct.

It has sometimes been objected that the grave disadvantage about all theological reasoning and conclusions, is that these findings give us something so utterly unlike the God of religious experience. It is difficult to see any force in this objection. The Object of religious experience is not unique in looking very different to the naïve experiencer and to the theorist. The same applies to objects of all experience. To the eye of naïve experience a yellow primrose is a yellow primrose, as it was to Peter Bell; but to the eye of the physicist it is a swarm of whirling electrons, or what not, and to the biologist it is something different

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

yet again. As Balfour pointed out at length in his Gifford Lectures, the levels of concrete experience and of abstract thought never, in fact, do meet, nor even look like meeting.

We may say, then, that the religious experience gives us an Adorable Object. More it cannot give us without the aid of rational concepts. The truth of such concepts, as we have already stated, will have to be tested by the usual methods whereby scientific concepts in general are tested. The instinct of religion, in other words, will not guarantee the truth of all the ideas which may be stirred in relation to it. We may take an analogy from the instinct of curiosity. It is true to say that the whole edifice of science is built up upon the foundation of that instinct; yet it is clear that the instinct does nothing to prove the truth of theories to which it gives rise. All that it seems to guarantee is that there is something to know, and, perhaps we may add, worth while knowing. In like manner we can perhaps say that the religious instinct involves the fact that there is Something to be worshipped, and, if the world is rationally constituted, worth while worshipping. "It would, in fact, be a manifestation of a sardonic irony, of which it would be unjust and ungrateful to suspect the world-order," writes Dr. Paterson, "if it should prove to be the case that while hunger can depend on its sop and thirst on its draught, there is nothing answering to the craving of the soul that has hungered and thirsted for the living God." [1]

If there is any truth in the foregoing considerations, it becomes possible to adjust the boundaries between religion and magic. An immense variety of opinions as to how this adjustment should be made has existed in the past. In general we may say that they fall into three classes. First, there are those which make magic prior and religion secondary. This priority is usually regarded as logical rather than chronological, though it may be both. Secondly, there are those

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

who hold that religion is prior, and magic derived. Thirdly, some maintain that both religion and magic are derived from some rudimentary form of belief which is to be identified with neither. According to this view, which seems to be gaining ground, religion and magic have been evolved like stars from pre-existing nebulæ. The opinion which we are seeking to uphold plainly falls into none of these classes. Instead of seeking to derive religion from magic, or *vice versa,* and instead of attempting to reduce both to a common denominator, it shows that both of them exist in their own right, as it were, and are essentially distinct, although they have certain common features.

The great objection to the first view, which is that held by Frazer and other anthropologists, is twofold. In the first place, it is unsatisfactory in theory since it misconceives the nature of religious worship. According to this view, man turns to prayer, when he finds that magic is fruitless. But this view of prayer reduces it to a mere coaxing and cajoling of supernatural powers; and although it is doubtless true that a good deal of unworthy religion has been of this character, it is quite impossible to suppose that any truly religious person would accept it as an adequate representation of the nature of prayer. From magic to religion along this path, it is possible to assert with confidence, there is no road. In the second place, this view of the relation of magic and religion is hardly more satisfactory in the realm of fact than it is in that of theory. For the facts go to show that the failure of one kind of magic leads not to religion, but to the trial of some other form of magic.

The second class of opinions, whereby it is held that magic is a degenerate form of religion, is not one which is widely held to-day, but it has had a good many advocates in the past. It was, at one time, the orthodox opinion upheld by the champions of religion. Magic, according to this theory, represents an illegitimate form of dealing with the gods, due to the perversity of men. Quite apart from the fact that

this view has regard only to what is known as black, or evil, magic, it is one for which it is easier to make a claim than it is to support it by evidence.

The third view which derives both religion and magic from a common background to be identified with neither of them has many advocates to-day. It is, for example, put forward with much force by Karl Beth in his book, *Religion und Magie*. Beth maintains that there lies behind both magic and religion what he calls "a magico-religious idea of power," which is pre-animistic in character. By means of this man feels himself to be in sympathetic contact with the mysterious forces of the world. He perceives inwardly that these mysterious forces operate within him as well as without, and they give him a sense of kinship with the universe. Out of this primordial feeling, according to Beth, both religion and magic developed in course of time. When man took the attitude that he contained within himself these powers, and that he was able to wield and to control them, then he was a magician. When, on the contrary, he took the view that these powers were vast and beyond his grasp, and that he could only bow the head submissively before them, then he was religious.

The great difficulty of such a view as this is that it does not really adequately explain how man first of all conceived the idea that he was able to exert and wield the mysterious life-force, as the magician believes himself able to wield it. As Dr. F. B. Jevons wrote many years ago: "To read some writers . . . one would imagine that the savage, surrounded by supernatural powers and a prey to supernatural terrors, one day conceived the happy idea that he too would himself exercise supernatural power—and the thing was done." [1] It is precisely how man ever came to take such a step that calls most insistently for explanation.

To turn to our own theory, the distinction between religion and magic is clear and well defined. They

[1] *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 35 (6th edn.).

are seen to have their roots in different psychological processes. At the same time, we are able to see notable points of similarity between the two, and it is these points of likeness which have caused so much confusion to arise as to the relation between them. The first point of resemblance between them is the element of mystery which is common to both. That religion ends in mystery is not denied. There is also an element of the occult in magic. As we have seen, it is, in fact, an essentially different kind of mystery, and yet it has enough superficial resemblance to the mysteriousness of religious worship to be confused with it in the minds of the populace, which, as Aristotle taught us long ago, is not good at making distinctions. The mysteriousness of magic consists essentially in the occult knowledge of the magician. As Dr. Heiler has reminded us, religious experience even in the most degraded forms is never magical in this sense.[1]

Again, we see that religion and magic have a further point of contact in that they both appeal strongly to the instinct of submission. In the case of magic, this submission is essentially blind and unintelligent. Not so, however, is it in the case of religion. As we shall seek to show later, when we come to consider the question of the meaning of 'grace,' it is clear that religion in its higher forms consists in an enlightened submission in contradistinction to a blind grovelling before the occult. It is, in fact, true to say that, although the instinct of submission can never be eliminated from religion, the more fully developed the religion, the more rational and enlightened does the submission required of the worshipper become.

[1] See *Der Katholizismus*, p. 168.

Chapter IV

GRACE

HAVING secured the distinction between magic and religion, and shown wherein each consists, we can pass on to consider exactly what it is that we mean when we use the word 'grace.' It is one of the primary purposes of this book to distinguish carefully between magic and grace. The charge is frequently made, sometimes very loosely and lightly made, against the Christian religion that its view and conception of grace is sometimes virtually indistinguishable from magic. It is our purpose to endeavour to estimate how much truth there is in this charge.

Magic and religion, then, we have distinguished. What precisely is the relation of grace to the two? The answer which fits in with the foregoing argument is that the most satisfactory way of understanding grace, name and thing, if we may so express it, is to say that it is the element of suggestion in religious experience. We must, however, beware in a discussion of this kind of being slaves to a word. Words are coined to denote experiences, and since forms of experience merge into one another in a kaleidoscopic manner, and also undergo development and change, words seldom have the clear-cut meanings that we may wish they had. We are, in fact, not infrequently confronted with two different experiences which are denoted by the same word, or, conversely, by the same experience denoted by two different words.

In seeking to understand the meaning of 'grace,' therefore, we have to bear this fact in mind. If we do so, we shall realise that we may find data for our problem of understanding 'grace,' even when the word itself is not used. Such, indeed, is what we do seem to find in the Bible. Broadly speaking, we may say that the Hebrew word *chēn,* and the Greek word χάρις, seem to be used to denote the general attitude

of benevolence that God shows to man. We shall, therefore, not go far astray if we say that the word 'grace' may rightly be applied to cover all God's dealings with men.

Such being the case, we contend that we should apply the word 'grace' to the element of suggestion in the divine workings; and since we have seen that suggestion is the appeal to a primary instinct, grace will be the stimulation of the religious instinct, or, of course, of any other instinct aroused in association with it. We may take an example from another instinct to show how one instinct, when stirred, may incite another to activity. It is well known that the instinct of pugnacity is frequently aroused in connection with the parental instinct both in the lower animals and in man. Even an ordinarily timid animal will fight fiercely to protect its young. In like manner, the instinct of pugnacity may be aroused in connection with the religious instinct, as we know full well. No wars have been more fierce than religious wars; no disputes are more venomous than religious disputes. In one great religion, Islam, we see the instinct of pugnacity formally invoked in the service of religion. Not altogether dissimilar is the teaching of parts of the Old Testament.

Are we, then, compelled to believe at this time of day that all the acts performed under the influence of the religious instinct are, or have been, truly the operations of divine grace? It is true that the writers of the Old Testament unflinchingly make this claim, but how can we reconcile it with the truth of the Christian revelation? If we are rightly to understand the meaning of grace, and to gain a scientific view of it, I believe we must hold that actions which to us seem less than Christian are nevertheless due to divine grace. The difficulty of doing so is real, but perhaps it is only the counterpart of an analogous difficulty in another sphere. This is the problem generally known as that of physical evil. It is a pressing difficulty in any theodicy to be able to say why God allows

accidents and disasters of various kinds, which, having been permitted, must in some sort be the outcome of His will. The answer which is usually given is that He allows such happenings because He has laid down for our good general laws, and that if He were to suspend the operation of these laws in particular cases, harm rather than good would result. Such, as is well known, is the line of argument usually employed to meet this problem.

In like manner we may say that God works according to law in what we are accustomed to call spiritual things. God is not the author of confusion but the author of peace here as elsewhere. For this reason He has made our spiritual nature in a particular way, precisely as He has made our bodies in a particular way, so that He operates upon our souls in accordance with general principles, and one of these principles or laws is the process which we have come to know as suggestion. 'Grace,' in other words, in the spiritual realm is analogous to 'Providence' in the natural realm. As men respond rightly to God's gracious influences, so are they led on to higher things, as the Old Testament history plainly shows.

Nevertheless, it is true to say that this process—which we see most conspicuously and lucidly portrayed in the Old Testament—would never of itself have led men to the fullness of spiritual attainment. In order for this to be achieved it was necessary for something more than grace to come to men. It was necessary for God Himself to become man, in order not merely to harmonise by suggestion the instinctive forces of man's nature, but also fully to enlighten his mind. Such seems to be the idea in Newman's famous lines:

> And that a higher gift than grace
> Should flesh and blood refine,
> God's presence and His very self,
> And essence all divine.

We shall return later to a consideration of the meaning of the Incarnation in the light of our theory. For

the present we are content merely to make clear the precise meaning which we seek to attach to the word grace. If we define it as we have done, it will follow that what we call 'faith' will be the subjective aspect of 'grace.' It will be receptivity in relation to stimulus. In the broadest sense of the term, it will denote such receptivity in relation to any instinct-stimulus. Thus the lions roaring after their prey are in a true sense displaying faith. The Psalmist seems even to hint that they are displaying a rudimentary religious faith, for, he tells us, they "do seek their meat from God." Faith should, however, only be called religious when it is stirred in either direct or indirect association with the religious instinct. Such faith may, of course, exist in varying degrees. It may be able to move mountains, or it may boggle at mole-hills. In the latter case, it will always be found that there is a conflict between various instincts, which conflict weakens the appeal of the religious stimulus for one reason or another. Thus when the rich young man in the Gospel story went away sorrowful because he had great possessions, his response to the appeal of Christ to his instinctively religious nature was negatived by the powerful appeal of the instinct of acquisition, which had most likely been fostered for many years.

It may be asked how this conception of faith is consistent with the undoubted fact that faith can be, and often is, not just the momentary response to a stimulus, but a permanent attitude of mind. There is, however, no difficulty in this, on what we may perhaps be allowed to call the instinct-response theory of faith. For although for purposes of scientific analysis and study we necessarily think of these instinctive responses as if they were more or less isolated units, in fact they are closely inter-connected. As a result of such inter-relationship there are formed what Shand has usefully called sentiments, i.e. objects, whether abstract or concrete, upon which a number of instinctive forces habitually impinge more or less

powerfully. In such a case, when one of the instincts thus concerned is aroused, it tends to stir with it all the other instincts associated with the formation and maintenance of the sentiment. The permanent attitude of receptivity on the part of these instincts to the stimulus of the sentiment will be, in our terminology, a species of faith. And so the permanent attitude which we are accustomed to call religious faith will be receptivity to the stimulus of the God-sentiment founded upon the religious instinct, together with a greater or lesser number of others. The greater the number of the latter, the greater will be the faith.

For what we call 'a man of faith,' nearly all the objects of his experience will be linked up with his religious instinct, which will accordingly be in a constant state of stimulation. On the other hand, for a man whose religion is merely nominal, the thought of God will be stirred in his mind only by objects conventionally regarded as religious, such as the singing of hymns, or the reading of the Bible. It will never occur to him that God has any practical connection with commerce, or sport, or the multifarious interests commonly regarded as secular. In the case of our Lord, we find our conception of faith perfectly exemplified. During His earthly life, every activity, so far as we can tell from the Gospels, immediately suggested to him 'the Father.' It was for this reason that whereas *we* are surprised when we witness some great example of religious faith, such as the faith of the martyrs, our Lord was surprised not by the faith, but by the unbelief of men. As the eternal Son of God faith was so natural to Him, that it seems as if He found it almost impossibly hard at times to realise why everybody had not this faith. Thus we read that, in connection with the very terrifying incident when the boat in which He was with the disciples nearly capsized owing to the storm, what seemed to impress Him most was that they had not been able to relate what had just happened to the Father in

Heaven. He does not appear to have expected that they might be afraid under such circumstances.

It will follow from what we have said that the Christian tradition has been right in speaking of faith as a 'gift'; it cannot be stirred by an 'act of will.' The stimulus must always be there first in order to arouse it. Grace, in a word, is inevitably prevenient. S. Augustine was right in this, at all events.

Let us now turn to the Old Testament and consider briefly how this conception of grace fits in with what we find there.

It is usual to trace back the beginnings of Hebrew history to the call of Abram. In the account we are given in Genesis xii. what we seem to find is the religious instinct stirred primarily in connection with the parental instinct. His call from God was associated in his mind with the promise that he should become a great nation. Of the spiritual experience of Isaac we are not told much, but when we come to Jacob, it is not difficult to see how the religious instinct is stirred in his case in very definite association with certain instincts. "And Jacob vowed a vow, saying, If God will be with me, and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, So that I come again to my father's house in peace; then shall the Lord be my God . . . and of all that thou shalt give me I will surely give the tenth unto thee." [1] In such an experience as this we see religion operating in conjunction with the instincts of self-preservation and of acquisition.

We pass on to the great Moses, who stands out as the possessor of a more profound spiritual experience than any of his forefathers. In his case we see religion stirred in conjunction primarily with the herd instinct, in the noble form of patriotism. Here we have the beginnings of an altruistic religion, and we are led on to a decisive event—the deliverance of the Hebrews from Egyptian bondage. Religion and patriotism are now firmly united. Henceforth Yahweh is the God

[1] Gen. xxviii. 20–22.

of the Hebrews in a peculiar and intimate sense. It was thought that in return for obedience to Him worldly prosperity would follow, so that the instinct of acquisition also was by no means in a quiescent state. It took the Hebrews several hundreds of years of bitter disillusionment before they realised the falsity of this latter belief. Closely associated with the herd instinct, in the religious experience of the Hebrews, was the instinct of pugnacity. Yahweh was a God of war, the leader of their armies, who would surely put to flight their enemies. And so Joshua, Samuel, and all the Judges were not only religious leaders, but also commanders-in-chief.

When we come to Elijah, we find a still further development. The idea of God is enlarged by an additional rational element; the idea of Yahweh as the One and Only God emerges for the first time clearly to light. Yet the old instinct of pugnacity is still powerful, and the prophets of the false gods must be done away. With Amos, a still further advance is made, and the idea of Yahweh is moralised for the first time, and linked up with the eternal law of righteousness. This advance was maintained, and associated with the spirit of patriotism by Isaiah. And so we pass on to the Fall of Jerusalem and the Captivity.

Here a terrible conflict began in the hearts of the Hebrews. Their instincts of acquisition and of self-assertion, which had never been dormant in their previous history, received a terrible blow, insomuch that the foundations of their religious belief began to totter. The God who had been worshipped in such close conjunction with these instinctive forces seemed to them to be betraying His nature, and denying His promises. And yet the effect of this bitter conflict, of which we see many reflections in the Psalms and Wisdom literature generally, was a profound deepening of the spiritual life of the Hebrews. Such prophets as 2 Isaiah and the author of the book of Jonah led them on to a higher synthesis. In such writers we

find religion at its highest in the Old Testament, because it is most comprehensive. It was not operating primarily in conjunction with one or two instincts, such as those of pugnacity and acquisition. An attempt was made to synthesise all the instincts in a religion of love and sacrifice, and so we have a foreshadowing of the new revelation which was yet to come.

Nevertheless, these men were but voices in the night. They soon died away, and a deep and silent darkness settled down for many years upon the Hebrews; the stimulus was not heeded. Under the Maccabees there was a return to lower levels of patriotism and pugnacity. It was at any rate living and altruistic, if narrow, under Mattathias, Judas Maccabaeus, and the Hasidim. But before long the Pharisees and the worldly Sadducees were the leading influences in the life of the nation, and acquisitiveness and self-assertion were the dominant forces associated with religion.

Such in bald outline is the story of the operations of God's grace upon the Hebrew people. What was the upshot of all this religious experience? In the case of the most earnest seekers after God it was to produce storm and stress in the soul, and not peace. How acute might be this conflict we know full well from the instance of the devout young Pharisee, Saul of Tarsus. The Old Testament scheme of sacrifices and religious duties somehow failed to harmonise the forces of his soul. Try as he would, Saul fell hopelessly short, and yet the Law was associated in his mind with all that was best and noblest in life. It was the very embodiment of family and national pride, over and above its great religious sanctions. It must succeed. But no; the more he tried, the more he seemed to fail. There was, of course, this Jesus of Nazareth, who offered men peace; but He was a religious upstart. So he was inclined to think, and then there would come back to him, with a strange, compelling force, the face of the dying Stephen. That stirred his religious instinct as nothing had done before; it was the numinous which he had experienced

in full force in the moment when he gazed upon that face, and heard his dying words.

And so the conflict went on for years, the power of this great religious experience being inhibited, in accordance with a well-known law, by habits of long formation. The repressed instinct, however, gradually gathered more and more force, until it suddenly burst into consciousness on the famous journey to Damascus. "It is hard for thee to kick against the stimulus"; so might we read the words he heard in the moment of his conversion, if we are permitted to substitute for the Greek word its Latin counterpart. The substitution is suggestive in the light of our theory. Saul had been kicking against the powerful stimulus given to his religious instinct by Jesus of Nazareth.

As he looked back upon this experience in after years, he was able to find language to describe this conflict. It was a battle between grace and works, or, what we now see to be the same thing, between faith and works. In other words, it was a conflict between his religious instinct stirred by Christ and the instinct of self-assertion and pride. It was not grace in general that he felt he had resisted, but the grace of Christ. This stimulus which He had provided was sufficient and alone sufficient to pull together the warring forces of his soul.

Dr. Temple pointed out some years ago, in an article in *The Pilgrim,* that the Old Testament must needs fail, like every other legal system, because the Law of Reversed Effort was bound to come into play. The instincts of fear and self-abasement are of necessity over-stimulated by the very attempt to gain righteousness. Effort must give way to faith, but faith in what? No object was sufficient, no stimulus was sufficient, until Christ came. So far, so good. But S. Paul's teaching about grace, as is well known, goes to great lengths. In the famous ninth Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, for example, it is spoken of as an irresistible force, and something surely different from the more gentle and gradual process of

suggestion which we have sought to equate with grace. It will be objected, no doubt, that it is difficult to see how it can be made to fit in with our theory.

The answer seems to be that it does not so fit in, and that for a very good reason. It is language which savours of magic rather than of grace. It is the language of compulsion and not of attraction, and, moreover, it is language which it has been found almost impossibly hard to reconcile with the character of God, as understood by Christians; in truth, one may safely say that the problem has proved to be insoluble. The solution, we contend, must be sought not in the realm of metaphysics, but in that of psychology; in fact, it may be found in the personal religious experience of S. Paul. As soon as the story of his conversion is carefully examined, it becomes evident to the critical eye that here we have something of the hypnotic order. There is no conscious response to an external stimulus in the account of the conversion. There is, on the contrary, an altogether involuntary submission to an internal force. S. Paul seems to himself to be as clay in the hands of the potter. He has no more power of resistance than a hypnotic patient. How genuine was the dissociation is evidenced clearly by the three days' blindness which followed upon the experience; this is obviously an instance of the phenomenon known as psychogenic blindness.

Are we, then, to say that God played the rôle of magician at the conversion of Saul of Tarsus? Hardly; for the simple reason that the experience was due, in the first instance, as the Bible record reminds us, to the fact that he had been "kicking against the stimulus." That is to say, the precise form it assumed was in no way due to God's initiative, and had Saul not deliberately rebelled against the light when he saw it, his conversion would have been able to be effected by the normal operations of grace. But, Saul being what he was, it was impossible, so far as we can see, that his conversion should have come about in any

other way. It is therefore highly misleading to think of God here as though He acted like a magician; for the magician invariably takes the lead and deliberately induces a hypnotic state in order to achieve his ends. It would be far more accurate to liken God on this occasion to a psychotherapist, who is driven to employ the method of hypnosis in order to put to an end a long-standing conflict, and to bring about peace and harmony in the soul.

It must, however, be frankly admitted that S. Paul himself failed to realise this, and, under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise. Nevertheless, had he been able to realise it, there can be little doubt that he would have said some things rather differently. It is true that he never allowed himself to be carried away to the extent of supposing for a single moment that God's grace was always irresistible. Here he shows his greatness. His mind was large enough to see that God's methods of working are not all of one type. Unfortunately some of his followers and interpreters were not equally great, and fell into the trap which he himself avoided.

It will perhaps be thought by some that we are ignoring the tendency which characterises the subject of every great religious experience to over-emphasise the divine side of the operation, and that accordingly we lay too much stress on some of S. Paul's language. I think the answer must be that the three days' blindness of itself is sufficient guarantee of the true nature of the experience. Nor must we forget that we have a good deal of later Christian experience, as, for example, in the Methodist movement, which when examined goes to support our contention.

What we find in Methodism in fact nicely illustrates the position which we seek to maintain, for in the case of John Wesley the experience of 'conversion' dominated him to such an extent as to lead him to ignore, as S. Paul did not ignore, other forms and methods of God's working. It is true that he repudiated in theory the Calvinism of Whitfield and

other Methodists, but there is no doubt that in practice his preaching did much to foster it. "In spite of the perfect outward calmness and self-possession," writes F. M. Davenport, "Wesley was probably the most terribly impressive preacher that England ever knew. It would be hard to mention a man whose influence over an audience can be so perfectly described by the word 'awful.' If it were not such a hateful word when applied to so complex and so noble a personality, one would say that it closely approached the hypnotic. . . . His demand for instantaneous decision fell with terrific force upon the plastic mental and nervous organisation of his hearers." [1] What is this but to say that Wesley in his preaching was the magician dominating both individuals and crowds by the spell of his powerful personality? How powerful it must have been becomes all the more evident when we remember that there was nothing new or creative in Wesley's thinking. All his most distinctive doctrines were borrowed from others.

Our position, then, is clear. The doctrine of irresistible grace reduces the latter to magic. In New Testament theology we find it in S. Paul's writings alone, and when we consider that great Apostle's experience, it seems to be fairly certain that the two are closely related. This conclusion is confirmed when we also bear in mind the personal history of the other most zealous protagonists of the doctrine, namely, S. Augustine of Hippo, Martin Luther, and John Calvin, who, one and all, underwent sudden 'conversions.'

In the celebrated account which the first-named gives of his own conversion in his *Confessions*,[2] there appears that same element of irresistible, and even of irrational compulsion, whereby he was led to ascertain the divine will by opening the Bible at random, and reading the first passage upon which his eyes fell. Nor

[1] *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, pp. 168, 170, quoted by S. G. Dimond in *The Psychology of the Methodist Revival*, p. 192.

[2] Book viii, ch. 12.

was the matter essentially different in Luther's conversion, when the thunderstorm burst suddenly upon him at Stotternheim. "A fearful flash of lightning darted from heaven before his eyes. Trembling with fear, he fell to the earth, and exclaimed, 'Help, Anna, beloved saint! I will be a monk.'"[1] It is plain to see that men to whom experiences such as these came were obviously at the time when they happened in a state which can only be described as one of dissociation.

In the case of Calvin, owing to the scantiness of the evidence, we are not on such sure ground. But what evidence there is points in the same direction. He tells us that he was led to renounce his Papal opinions *subita conversione*,[2] but it is impossible to say with certainty what he meant to imply by that expression. Again, his sudden decision to remain with Farel at Geneva was made, he tells us, "*ac si Deus violentam mihi e coelo manum iniiceret.*"[3] From these scanty hints perhaps we may see some signs of dissociation. At all events, the case of Calvin in connection with the matter under discussion is somewhat different from the other two, in that he explicitly avows that his doctrine of grace is based upon that of Luther. It is therefore sufficient for our purpose if we have been able to establish the existence of the phenomena of dissociation in the case of the latter.

It is obvious that, if these things are so, then they must be carefully borne in mind in any examination of the vexed question of S. Paul's relation to the Mystery Religions. The controversy has swayed this way and that, and perhaps no certain and assured result has emerged even yet; but if our previous argument is sound, it is not a great matter whether he was influenced by the mysteries or not. For even if we admit that he was so influenced, and that his sacramental doctrine was accordingly tainted with magical ideas, and irresistible grace, nobody would claim that

[1] *Life of Luther*, by Julius Köstlin, p. 31 (2nd edn., E.T.).
[2] *Praef. ad Psalmos*, Op. xxxi. [3] *Ibid.*

the whole of S. Paul's teaching on irresistible grace can be derived from this source. We have seen, however, that his personal religious experience must certainly be regarded as powerfully influencing his teaching. In other words, the doctrine of magic, or irresistible grace (for we may equate the two), is found quite certainly in his non-sacramental teaching, and we know that this was derived from his personal experience. It is far from certain that we find such a doctrine in his sacramental teaching. But even if we do, may we not quite naturally trace it back to the same source? In this case, the controversies concerning his relation to the Mysteries take on a different tone; they cease to be of first-rate importance.

We are now in a position to examine the view, often put forward in the past, and recently revived by Bishop Barnes, that the doctrine of special sacramental grace reduces the latter to magic. It is urged that if we believe that Christ mediates His presence through the elements in Holy Communion, we are regarding that service in a magical manner, since we hold that ' dead matter ' (the phrase is used by Bishop Barnes) is endowed with spiritual properties as a result of the employment of a correct form of consecration. A similar view was propounded by the late Dr. Rashdall in his Bampton Lectures, when he inveighed against what he called the ' semi-physical ' conception of grace.

That magical conceptions have intermingled with the sacramental teaching of the Church no responsible student would, of course, wish to deny, although it is at least possible that such conceptions have clustered far more thickly round Holy Baptism than round the other great Sacrament,[1] which seems to have attracted more than its due share of attention from scholars in this respect. But what we have to determine is not whether popular and ill-informed devotion has outrun the limits of sound doctrine, but whether, or not, it is

[1] Cf., for example, the practice of intra-uterine Baptism in the Roman Church. See Heiler, *Der Katholizismus*, p. 223.

possible to hold intelligently a doctrine of what we may perhaps call objective sacramental grace. I think our distinction between magic and grace will serve as a useful guide through this peculiarly dark labyrinth, the gloom of which has been intensified by much darkened counsel.

First, we have to remember what is all too often forgotten, that there is a genuine basis for magical claims. We have seen that they do correspond to a real form of experience. This point is, for example, entirely overlooked by Dr. Barnes, who says that "pretensions to such magical skill are, of course, baseless." [1] Magic is by no means to be identified with pure religion, but it is not on that account illusory.

Further, if the essence of the magical rite is, as we have seen, the spell, then matter is believed to be endowed with special properties as a result of the spell, which commands the unseen spirits. Doubtless such ideas have crept into popular Christianity, but, as Dr. Temple has reminded us, no responsible theologian supposes that the sacraments do anything to constrain God.[2] Plainly it is a misconception, which serves only to confuse the issue, therefore, to apply the word magic to sacramental doctrine, as it has been expounded by the recognised theologians of the Church. It has unfortunately not been an uncommon experience to find some belief attacked in a travestied form, and then for the impression to arise that the belief itself has been overthrown.

When we turn to our view of grace, we are able to see more precisely the significance of the sacramental claim of the historic Church. We have said that grace is essentially the same as suggestion. If, therefore, Christ should choose, whenever the Holy Communion is celebrated by the Church, to use the elements as instruments of suggestion, we should have a theory which is not only in accordance with sound thinking, but also one which does justice to the experience and

[1] *Should Such a Faith Offend?* p. 320.
[2] But cf. Heiler, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

belief of the Church throughout the ages. Precisely how we may think of the working of such suggestion we shall endeavour to show later. It will suffice at this point simply to state our position.

Bishop Barnes, indeed, himself seems to incline to the view that the essence of grace is suggestion, as the following passage will show: "He gives Himself to the worthy recipient of His grace. He does not limit Himself to any particular mechanism, nor does a mechanism exist by which He is of necessity received by an unresponsive soul. We add to this fundamental belief the psychological fact that when men truly join together in common worship their religious enthusiasm is quickened. The whole is then greater than its parts. By the process of 'suggestion' mind acts upon mind. Spiritual emotion is caught; developed and strengthened; returned. One man whose thought is centred on our Lord is inspired by one aspect of His personality. Another catches his inspiration and joins it to his own perception. And a third adds his reverent love to the common stock of emotional insight which all share."[1] In this passage, the Bishop definitely identifies grace with suggestion, although the particular view of suggestion which he holds is not the one which has been put forward in this book; it seems to be not essentially different from the one held by Rivers, who taught that the process of suggestion arises first of all in connection with the herd instinct.

But the point to notice about the theory of Dr. Barnes is that, even on his own showing, it is not true that a mechanism does not exist by which Christ "is of necessity received by an unresponsive soul." For it is plain that even on his purely subjective view of grace it is possible for an unresponsive soul to be influenced. A person coming to a service in which the crowd temper was high (as, for example, in the concluding service of a Mission) might well be influenced powerfully, although he had come originally in an unresponsive state. Even, therefore, on the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 224.

minimal theory of grace, the latter may legitimately be regarded as prevenient.

But on the view of grace and suggestion which we have put forward we can readily see that grace is by no means purely subjective. It is true that at one time Baudouin's theory that all suggestion is essentially auto-suggestion gained many adherents, but the tide seems to be turning against it now, and the evidence seems to show that McDougall is probably right in maintaining the opposite view that all suggestion is hetero-suggestion. Such a view is, of course, demanded by our theory of it.

We turn to consider the charge brought against the sacramental theory of grace that it is 'semi-physical' and akin to magic, and that we have no reason to suppose that God works in this way. If there is anything in the suggestion theory of grace, as we have expounded it, then we are obliged to say that this charge is ill founded for two reasons. The first is that the 'semi-physical' element is entirely secondary in hypnosis, and therefore, on our theory, in magic. It cannot be entirely abolished, of course, any more than in other forms of human experience; but it may be said with truth to be reduced to a minimum in many cases of hypnosis. In fact, the more successful the hypnotist, the less does he depend upon physical means. A mere word is able to plunge a susceptible person into profound hypnosis. It was only in the earliest days of research in this field that the epithet 'semi-physical' was employed; it has long since disappeared from writings on the subject.

The charge is ill founded for a second reason. The physical element is, as a rule, more prominent in the normal process of suggestion than in hypnotic suggestion. It follows accordingly that if the sacramental view of grace lays emphasis upon this element, so far from being thereby rendered magical, it will conform fully to the normal experience of non-sacramental grace. We can, in fact, turn the tables on our objectors, and say that to speak of God as not working

by 'semi-physical' means is the precise opposite of the truth. The normal operations of grace invariably take place through physical stimuli appealing to natural instincts. It may be the beauties of sunset and dawn, or the terrors of wind and tempest, or the unfathomable mysteries of the starlit sky, that first stir the innate tendencies which bind man to God. It may be, as Bishop Barnes tells us it is in his case, "when the sunshine ripples over a cornfield or when the wind blows over a grass-green upland." [1] However it may be, these external stimuli are in all cases the normal channels for the first outpourings of divine grace in the soul. And when, as time goes on, other instincts are in turn aroused under the presidency of the religious instinct, we find the same dependence on external physical stimuli. If the phrase *must* be used, all the normal operations of divine grace are 'semi-physical'; but we can now see that this is an entirely different thing from saying that they are magical.

The reverse is rather true. If the essence of magic is the spell, and the key to the understanding of the spell is hypnosis, then it is not inaccurate to say, as we have already suggested, that there is less and less dependence on the physical stimulus as the power of the hypnotist (or the magician) increases. In obstinate cases, when the subject is not susceptible, it is true that recourse is had to 'passes' and other physical stimuli in order to induce the required state. But once the hypnotist has secured dominance over his patient, a single word or a snap of the fingers is sufficient. The physical stimulus has reached the vanishing point. And the lesson for us to notice here is that this vanishing point is not found in sacramental theory or practice at all. It is rather found in non-sacramental experiences, such as that of sudden conversion. For example, suddenly, and for no apparent reason, S. Paul is stricken to his knees. His companions are amazed, for the stimulus is primarily internal, and not external at all. It is not even 'semi-physical.'

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 319.

But nobody would claim that here is the normal method by which God works in the human soul, unless he were a rabid Methodist. Such instances are plainly shown by experience to be exceptional. We are therefore safe in asserting that the 'semi-physical' is the normal, and that the purely spiritual (if that be conceivable) is the abnormal. The former is the method of grace; the latter is the tendency, if not the whole method, of magic. If the charge of magic is to be brought against the doctrine of grace at all, therefore, it must be brought against it in its non-sacramental, and not in its sacramental form.

Let us now return to a consideration of the meaning of the Incarnation in the light of this theory. The difficulty will, no doubt, have arisen in the reader's mind that, after all, we cannot reduce the Incarnation of the Son of God merely to suggestion. This is undeniably true, but our contention is that we cannot appreciate rightly the effect of God's working upon us except in the light of concepts with which we are familiar from our own experience. God's working must of necessity transcend those concepts, but so far as they go they are valuable guides, and indeed the only guides that we have for the understanding of it. In the Incarnation we have "a higher gift than grace," as Newman put it; we have God Himself living under spatio-temporal conditions. Grace was working upon men from the beginning, since God left not Himself without witness at any time. In the manifold glories of nature, and especially through those whom we have agreed to call prophets, God's suggestions have taken effect upon man. And yet God was only partially revealed. It was a severely limited grace. To use the language of the Old Testament, He was revealed as a voice to Adam in the garden; as a back to Moses in the cleft of the rock; as an arm to the Hebrews at the Red Sea. In the Incarnation these broken lights were gathered up in "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the *face* of Jesus Christ."

We can express this in a rather different way by saying that there are two factors which must be kept in mind, and not one only. We are concerned with grace *and* truth, or, in another phrase, grace and light. If grace is, as we believe, to be correlated with instinct, then truth will be correlated with intelligence. In the Incarnation we have fullness of grace *and* truth, for indeed the fullness of the one cannot be obtained without the fullness of the other. "And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father), full of grace and truth."[1]

Since from the first in man intelligence in some degree co-operates with instinct, as we have seen, there will be no case in which 'pure' grace will work, apart from any truth. The most rudimentary stirring of the religious instinct in primitive man will reveal to him some truth, however little. But for practical purposes, this amount of truth is negligible, and we have the phenomenon which we, looking back from our higher standpoint, are wont to call superstition, which is approximately 'pure' grace. It is the glory of the Incarnation that we have therein a full revelation of the truth about God, so far as that truth can be apprehended by finite man, under the conditions of space and time as we know them. And it is precisely because we have this knowledge that the 'grace' of Christ transcends all other grace. In so far as our knowledge of His teaching about God is defective or faulty, His power of harmonising our instinctive nature will be hampered. In other words, we shall receive His grace in vain. For full and final salvation we need to appropriate the fullness of both truth and grace up to the limits of our several capacities.

It seems to be beyond question that truth alone will not save us. It is all too familiar from our experience

[1] Jn. i. 14; cf. Jn. i. 17, and also the distinction between 'grace' and 'knowledge' in 2 Pet. iii. 18. See the "Additional Note on the Meaning of the Word 'Grace'" at the end of this chapter.

that we can know the better and choose the worse. The Jewish Law revealed this fact, and revealed it most painfully to the earnest seeker after God. The Law was light without grace, or, as we might put it, it was light without heat. Its powerful light as it shone into man's heart was awful in its coldness; it did but produce despair. On the other hand, it is clear that grace (in the narrow sense) will not suffice alone either. It is, of course, admitted that we never do find grace in complete isolation from truth, as we have said; just as, in strictness, we do not find truth in complete isolation from grace. It is this fact, taken in conjunction with a reaction against the Hebrew over-emphasis on truth, which can enable S. Paul to say that we are saved by grace. It is a pardonable exaggeration. But the writer of the Fourth Gospel is more accurate when he reminds us that in Christ we find fullness of both grace and truth.

If we are to speak with scientific exactness, then, we must say that grace alone will not save. When we have grace in comparative isolation from truth, we are faced with superstition, as we have seen. This is what we do find in a certain amount of popular Christianity. We find it in the Roman Catholic who goes to Mass regularly with scarcely any knowledge at all of the facts of the life of the Incarnate. We find it in the Anglican who brings her child to be baptised without the slightest understanding of what she is doing. In these cases, there is no grasp of truth, and yet there is some grace, although it be a minimum. On the other hand, when we have truth without grace, then we cease to have anything that can be called religion at all.

If there is any soundness in this theory of grace which we have put forward, it will enable us to circumvent all the involved problems in the theology of grace, which took their rise with S. Augustine. That he was perfectly right in insisting on the prevenience of grace we have already had occasion to see. But he began the raising of insoluble problems when he

introduced what we may perhaps describe as the *tertium quid* theory of grace. In any event the difficulty could hardly have been solved by the aid of the old faculty psychology; but the confusion was made needlessly worse by introducing grace as a kind of third party between God and man. The disorder that resulted is analogous to the infinite confusion created in epistemology by the use of the word 'idea' as if it were an independent entity between the knower and the object. It is analogous, but it was still worse, for at any rate the philosophers did not posit the existence of various species of ideas as the theologians began to multiply different varieties of grace.

Our theory shows clearly that to speak of grace in this kind of way is to court inevitable failure to understand the relations of God and man. The endless disquisitions of the Schoolmen on the subject were bound to lead, as most modern thinkers would, I suppose, hold that they did lead, to a cul-de-sac. By positing the existence of grace as a *tertium quid* they had then to decide to which side of the God-man relation it was to be assigned. And here they were faced by a dilemma. If they assigned it to man, with Pelagius, then salvation seems to be rendered unnecessary. On the other hand, if they assigned it to God, what was to become of man's freedom? The only plan to adopt seemed to be to posit different species of grace, designed to meet the varying requirements of the situation, much as different keys are provided to meet different locks. S. Augustine began this process by his distinction between 'sufficient grace' and 'efficacious grace.' And so the manufacture of different kinds of grace went on through all the wearisome controversies of Thomism and Scotism, of Jansenism and Molinism, and they led, as they were bound to lead, to nothing. How truly the key metaphor, which we have employed to describe the mediæval view of grace, holds good, is well illustrated by the 'congruent' theory of Suarez, who sought to save both God's foreknowledge and man's freedom

by saying that when the divine decree determined that assent be not given to grace, although the grace supplied was itself adequate enough to be ' efficacious,' it was not ' congruous,' i.e. appropriate to the actual dispositions of the soul concerned, and so was, in fact, not efficacious. In other words, God provided a key which did not fit the lock.

The only *tertium quid* which we need to posit between God and man is Christ, and we know full well that, unless we are very careful, we shall get into serious difficulties even by doing this. If we insist rigidly on it, we are landed in Arianism. Even here, we have to show that the third party has no existence independently of the other two. How much more shall we err, therefore, if we attempt to make grace a third party. In fact, the result of the Schoolmen's attempt to do this was to make grace into a distinct entity, insomuch that it is often difficult to trace any real connection between it and the facts of the Incarnate life of Christ at all. The element of truth, or light, was almost completely ignored. When, moreover, it came to a discussion of the nature of sacramental grace, the problem became, if possible, even more insoluble, by the introduction of an additional factor still. There were now four factors, the mutual relations of which had to be determined, namely God, man, grace, and the matter of the sacraments. Can it be wondered that the problems raised found no solution which has commanded general assent?

It will perhaps be worth while to test what we have said concerning the nature of grace by seeking to apply it to the two dominical sacraments of Holy Baptism and Holy Communion. There can be little doubt that modern thinkers are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain any theory of Infant Baptism which does not evacuate it of any power to confer grace. We may, for example, take such a writer as Canon Quick, who, in his book, *The Christian Sacraments,* has drawn a valuable distinction between

the symbolic value of sacraments and their instrumental value. The former element is purely declaratory in its significance, he tells us, whereas the latter is efficacious. In the case of Baptism the writer expresses the opinion that the emphasis should be rather on the former than on the latter. He asserts indeed that the significance of that rite is not merely symbolic of the new birth into the Christian family, but when one comes to study his language it is difficult to see precisely what it is that is effected in Infant Baptism. He writes as follows:

"The main sum of the foregoing argument is the plea that a sound theology of Baptism requires us to-day to emphasise the symbolic rather than the instrumental aspect of the sacrament, while at the same time we must not allow the instrumental to be wholly absorbed into the symbolic. The Fatherhood of God, of which it is the sacrament, is a truly universal reality; and the washing, regeneration, and resurrection, which the sacramental action signifies, constitute in fact a process which only ends in heaven and cannot therefore be intelligibly thought of as wholly complete in the moment when the sacrament is performed. Nevertheless, Baptism is itself a critical and decisive moment in the process of which it is the symbol. It marks and characterises the soul as God's child and member of His family, so that all its subsequent growth in God's grace is but an eliciting or bringing to light of what its baptism implied." [1] But Quick nowhere enlightens us as to how it is possible to think of this 'decisive moment'; he simply asserts that it is decisive, and leaves it at that.

If, however, we follow the clue that grace is another word for suggestion, and that the essence of suggestion is that it is the appeal to the instinctive forces of the psyche, a promising field of thought is opened before us. We need not, indeed, expect to be able to grasp fully the meaning of the new birth in Christ, any more than we can understand the nature of physical birth.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 179.

We shall be prepared to find ourselves in the presence of something which is essentially mysterious in both cases. At the same time, if we bear in mind that we are concerned with the instinctive forces of life, and that these forces are bound up with what we are now accustomed to regard as the unconscious mind, we shall not find it inherently absurd or impossible to imagine that in Baptism a real impression is produced upon the infant. We shall be better able to estimate the significance of this later on when we come to deal with the work of the Holy Spirit.[1] It will suffice here to point the way which seems to be opened out to us.

That the grace of Baptism, in the case of infants, is of a rudimentary kind, we need not, of course, deny. It will, so far as we can see, be almost 'pure' grace, without much admixture of truth or light; yet we should be in error if we were to assert in consequence that the grace conferred in Baptism is magically conceived. We have sought to show that the essence of magic is hypnosis, wherein a more or less developed human mind suffers dissociation in response to the appeal of the instinct of submission. There is no such dissociation implied by supposing that grace is conferred upon an infant in Baptism, simply because we are concerned with a mind that is not yet associated. It would be as misleading to speak of the operation here as magical, as it would be to call an infant an ignoramus because it lacks knowledge. In each case we should be guilty of an anachronism.

It is presumably because the mind of the Church has divined that the grace of Infant Baptism is but little infused with truth that the custom has arisen of demanding the co-operation of godparents. It is the part and duty of the latter to teach the child; in a word, it is their part to supply the truth, and to add it to the grace, in order that the latter may have full sway in the child's personality.

We must now return to consider more closely the

[1] See pp. 208-211 for a fuller treatment of the problem of the grace of Infant Baptism.

bearing of our theory of grace on the meaning of the Holy Eucharist. We have spoken of the consecrated elements in the service as 'instruments of suggestion.' That they are such instruments in some sense would indeed be denied by nobody. But it is questioned (*a*) whether Christ Himself so uses them, and (*b*) if He does, what precisely is His relation to them. Before we deal with these problems, and consider what light our theory has to throw upon them, it is worth while to observe how far the expression 'instrument of suggestion' applies to a body as we ordinarily know it in human personality. When we consider the matter, it becomes evident that there is a large number of the activities performed by the human body which are accurately described by that phrase. When we speak or write or communicate with one another by symbols in any form, it is plain that our bodies are no more and no less than 'instruments of suggestion.' There are, however, other bodily functions, such as the processes of sensation, perception, and thought, as well as those commonly regarded as being merely organic, which equally clearly cannot be brought under the heading of suggestion.

The interest and importance of all this from our present point of view is that in speaking of the consecrated elements in the Eucharist as the Body and Blood of Christ, few theologians would claim that our Lord performs by means of them the functions of sensation and perception. Even if we are able to follow S. Thomas [1] in making such a claim, it appears to be certain that we cannot push it to its logical conclusion and apply it to all the organic functions of the body. It seems to be safer to restrict our Lord's activity to that class of activities which, in fact, are covered by the phrase 'instruments of suggestion.' This seems to be in a line with Christian experience as well as with the theological probabilities of the case.

There are some, however, who would dispute the

[1] *S.T.*, iii, Q. 76, Art. 7.

validity of the claim even in this restricted form. Bishop Barnes, for example, appears to hold that if a man believes, the same result will follow from a participation in the Eucharist, whether Christ is specially active there or not; and, conversely, if a man has not faith, then nothing will happen to him as a result of that experience. There does not seem to be adequate ground for such a position. That faith is powerful is, of course, admitted. We have already defined it as receptivity to stimulus. When there is no such predisposition of receptivity, the stimulus will be weakened in its effect; but we may not on that account write it down as non-existent. An example from our Lord's earthly life will make this point quite clear. When the crowds thronged Him as He was on His way to heal Jairus's daughter, although innumerable people jostled against His body, yet only one had faith, and so was able to receive the full advantage of such contact. Nevertheless, it would be untrue to say that nobody, except this one woman, had any distinctive experience of contact with Christ. All those in the crowd had it in some measure.

Whether there *is* any special manifestation of Christ's presence and power in the Eucharist, because He does so produce the stimulus, plainly depends upon two factors: (*a*) His ability to use the elements as instruments of suggestion, and (*b*) His will to do so. Is there any means whereby we may determine the answer to these questions? The answer to the first would seem to depend upon Christ's relation to God. If we believe in the Incarnation, as expressed in the orthodox definitions of the Church, there is no difficulty in affirming the fact of His ability. The sacraments are familiarly recognised to be extensions of the Incarnation. So far as we have any clue to the answer to the second question it is to be found both in what He did and said in the same night in which He was betrayed, and also in the consensus of Christian experience. It is not our intention to attempt to discuss this well-worn subject of controversy now

in any general way. Our object is rather to enquire whether the position which we are seeking to uphold can do anything to assist us in elucidating the problem.

We assert, then, in accordance with our theory, that in the Eucharist the religious instinct is stirred, and other instincts in conjunction with it. Are we to hold that it is stirred simply by way of association with an event of past history, or is the service itself 'numinous'? The former answer is that given by Zwinglianism, as well as by Receptionism in its various forms; the latter is given by all Real Presence theories. The great drawback to this first answer, as Quick has recently shown,[1] is that it restricts 'grace' in the sacrament to the perception of a particular meaning in it, whereas it seems to be true that the benefits we receive by participation in it are not solely due to a meaning apprehended by our minds. In the language which we have been using, the Receptionist view in reality over-emphasises the element of truth in the Eucharist to the practical exclusion of what may be properly called grace. By so doing it not only "brings nothing but disappointment"[2] to those whose spiritual life is at low ebb, as Quick truly remarks, but in addition it does violence to Christian experience. We seem to be driven, therefore, to say that in the Eucharist the stimulus to the religious instinct is not provided solely by the remembrance of a past event.

The instinct-suggestion theory of grace throws light upon the meaning of the Eucharist in another way also. There appears to be no other religious act or form of worship which is so wide and comprehensive in its sweep. In it and through it appeal is made to practically all the primary instincts, as we hinted some pages back. We can illustrate this by taking the list of primary instincts which McDougall has given to us. He has, as is well known, enumerated thirteen such instincts, to which he has given the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 212. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 213.

following names: parental, combat, curiosity, food-seeking (hunger), repulsion, fear (self-preservation), herd, self-assertion, submission, mating (sex), acquisition, construction, appeal. Some of these instincts find satisfaction directly in the Eucharist, while others are expressed indirectly by some form of deflection, or to use the more common term, sublimation.

We may, I think, say that no less than seven of these instincts find a direct outlet in the worship of the Eucharist. The instinct of combat is aroused in the appeal to share in the sacrifice of Christ, there set forth continually; the instinct of curiosity is stirred by the essential mysteriousness of Eucharistic worship, and its dramatic development, leading to the climax of the Consecration. Both submission and self-assertion are strangely blended in the devout communicant who kneels to receive the life of Christ in abject lowliness and contrition—a life which forthwith enables him to stand upon his feet and walk in newness of life and confidence. Repulsion is experienced in the thought of the worshipper's sin which brought Christ to the Cross, there mystically set forth; while the appeal to hunger and the instinct of the herd is found in the common meal in such an obvious manner as to need no comment.

It would surely be difficult to find any other rite which thus comprehensively and powerfully attracts man's many-sided nature by a direct appeal to so many instincts. In addition to this, however, there is indirect appeal to most of the others, if not all. The parental instinct, with its fount of tender emotion, is most surely touched in this commemorative sacrifice; the sex instinct is lifted up in the supreme passion of the devout communicant. Fear indeed is cast out by perfect love, and the more spiritually developed is the communicant the less will be that element, it is true; but the reason for this will be that the instinct of preservation is so fully satisfied in the sharing in, and enjoyment of eternal life. The three remaining in-

stincts,[1] namely, acquisition, construction and appeal, it would perhaps be somewhat unreal and artificial to fit into Eucharistic worship, although the task is not impossible. In view, however, of the fact that they stand somewhat on the fringe of man's instinctive life, if we may so express it, it seems scarcely worth while to make the attempt. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe how perfectly the Eucharist is adapted to meet the needs of the main body of fundamental instincts, fairly generally admitted by competent psychologists.

Thus we have in this service experience of "the manifold grace of God." But we have not only grace; we have also truth. Precisely how these two elements are blended in the Eucharist will depend upon circumstances. Their respective proportions will vary according to the manner in which the service is conducted, as well as in accordance with the character of the communicants concerned. When, for example, Holy Communion is celebrated in a tongue unknown to the majority of the worshippers (as in the Latin Mass), there may be a minimum of truth; but ideally there is a full measure of it. Hence the reading of a passage from the Gospels has from very early times formed an essential part of the rite. Moreover, the abuses of the service have invariably arisen when the element of truth has for any reason been obscured.

It is well known that it was the intention of the Reformers in the sixteenth century to re-emphasise that element. They largely failed for the very reason that the Mediæval Latin Mass succeeded. They failed because to insist on the element of truth or light is to make big demands on the worshipper. The Mediæval service made no such demands; therefore it succeeded to the extent that at any rate people did attend the service. After the Reformation they largely ceased to attend it at all in 'reformed' countries. It must

[1] Assuming, as we do, the existence of a religious instinct, it is scarcely necessary to point out how the appeal is made to this in the Eucharist.

not, however, be forgotten that there is some degree of 'light' inherent in the very ceremonial of the service itself which conveys some meaning even to one entirely ignorant of the life and teaching of Christ. This is brought out in Walter Pater's famous description of a primitive Eucharist in *Marius the Epicurean*. Although the Pagan Marius knew nothing of these things, he was strangely moved by the simple and impressive ceremonial which he saw. Still more, of course, is the symbolism expressive of 'truth' to one instructed in the Christian faith. The larger a person's grasp of that faith, the fuller will be the light revealed by the action of the service. There are, indeed, as has frequently been pointed out, all the great moments of the Christian revelation reflected in the Eucharist.

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON THE MEANING OF THE WORD 'GRACE'

No doubt it will be thought by some that we are straining the Johannine language a little by giving it a meaning which was not in the mind of the writer. This is not to be denied; it was clearly impossible for him to have had in mind distinctions which have only emerged recently as a result of the researches of modern psychology. Yet there seems to be no good reason why we should not apply these and similar distinctions to Holy Writ, if they help us to understand more fully the experiences recorded there. Otherwise all other attempts to apply modern knowledge to the problems of religion are also precluded, with the result that the science of theology is perforce at a standstill. Nevertheless, if it is earnestly desired to reserve the use of the term 'grace' to the totality of the divine operations upon man, on the ground that this meaning is hallowed by long-accustomed usage, as well as by much Biblical language, I, for one, should have no cause to complain, provided that another suitable

theological term can be found to denote the particular element in religious experience which we have called 'grace.' But since no such term seems to be available, and since there is in the Bible at least some justification for dividing God's working into 'grace' and 'truth,' it seems to be legitimate for our particular purpose to restrict the meaning of the word as we have done.

A somewhat similar problem arises in the realm of pure psychology over the use of the word 'emotion.' There are some who wish to employ this word to denote the whole state of mind (cognitive, affective, and conative) of the person who experiences what we call an emotion. Other psychologists, on the other hand, prefer to reserve the word to denote simply the affect, or feeling element, in this experience. In the same kind of way we are seeking to limit the meaning of the word 'grace,' instead of allowing it to have the wider meaning which makes it synonymous with the totality of God's dealings with men. There is really no question as to which usage is right or wrong (unless, perhaps, we are Fundamentalists). The only question we have to decide is which use of the word best enables us to interpret the meaning of Christian experience.

Chapter V

THE LIFE OF JESUS CHRIST

We are now in a position to study the life and teaching of our Lord in the light of the foregoing theories, and to see if the latter are able to render us any assistance in the understanding of them. That there is nothing magical in the teaching of Christ would be generally admitted, yet there can be little doubt that He had it in His power to have become the greatest magician that the world has known, if we are permitted to understand magic in the way in which we have hitherto done in this book. For our Lord was, on any theory of His person, a dominant personality. By sheer force of that dominance He could have wielded a magical power second to none.[1] And when we read the Gospels with this thought in our minds, we find that from the first moment of His public ministry He was beset by the danger of being regarded as a common magician.

As we follow the course of the Gospel story, we are able to see the steps which He took to counteract that tendency, which, if it had not been checked, would have proved altogether fatal to His work. Thus, according to the Marcan account, His first public act was to teach in the synagogue at Capernaum. While He was teaching, it would seem that a madman entered the synagogue and began to cry out. That he was a dissociated personality is certain; it is not material to our present purpose to enquire whether this dissociation was caused by evil spirits or otherwise. It was a dangerous moment for our Lord. Not merely was His teaching being interrupted —that would not have been a serious matter—but the lunatic, with the clairvoyance characteristic of the dissociated personality, had divined who our Lord was. Quite apart from the fact that testimony coming from such a source was scarcely to be desired, we

[1] Cf. Klausner, *Jesus of Nazareth*, p. 270.

know that it was foreign to Christ's method to teach men directly in this way, inasmuch as such direct teaching invariably leads to shallowness of thought and to misunderstanding. Our Lord is therefore compelled to use His dominant power to unify this dissociation. It would not accordingly on our theory be surprising to find Him regarded as a magician, for the man's relation to him was precisely that of patient to hypnotist, although, of course, our Lord had not induced the dissociation, but, on the contrary, was putting an end to it.

There is definite evidence in S. Mark's account that it was as a magician that Christ was regarded. The word φιμόω, which is put into His mouth, is one regularly employed in the terminology of current Hellenistic magic for the binding of spirits by spells. Precisely what word our Lord used here must of course be a matter of speculation. There is, nevertheless, I think, a probability that this particular word represents not so much what was in His mind as what His hearers thought, for we find it used again in the account of the stilling of the storm. It is, however, surely impossible for us to believe that our Lord thought of Himself on that occasion simply as an ordinary spellmonger. All the probability is that the actual words that He used were misinterpreted by those present because their minds were unable at that stage to rise any higher than the level of magic.

Further, one of the words frequently used to describe the impression which our Lord made by His words and actions is the word ἐξίστημι. But this is the word which is employed in the Acts to describe the doings of Simon Magus, who was precisely a common magician. I think we may infer from this that the tendency so to look upon Christ was never far away. We shall see, as we study the Gospel story, that our Lord seeks to counteract this dangerous tendency chiefly in three ways. First of all, He shuns crowds and popular displays. In the second place, He tries to avoid all appearance of the occult by telling

people constantly after they had been healed by Him that their own faith had saved them. Thirdly, He gives a large place to teaching in His ministry, and in particular to teaching by parables. As we shall see, parables were nicely calculated to destroy the atmosphere of magic. They appeal not to the instinct of submission, as magic does, but to the instinct of curiosity, which is largely the antithesis of the former instinct.

Our Lord's ministry was, then, in no sense a demonstration of magic, although it might well have been had He chosen to make it so. It was, as the writer of the Fourth Gospel reminds us, a matter of "grace and truth." We must therefore go on to consider if what we have said on these and their relation to one another is able to help us to gain a fuller understanding of the supreme Life.

The right method of approach for the understanding of the meaning of 'grace' in Christ's ministry is given us by the writer of S. John's Gospel when he says: "And of his fulness have we all received, and *χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος*." The most natural interpretation of these last words would seem to be "grace taking the place of grace," i.e. one grace following upon another. This points to the wielding by our Lord of a steadily increasing power over His disciples. Such, on our view of grace, is exactly what we should expect to find. This power, exerted by our Lord over His followers, increases as one instinct after another is brought into line with His purpose; or, to put it differently, as one instinct after another is integrated in the personality of each of the disciples. In the case of the Apostles, at any rate, this process reached its climax on the Day of Pentecost, as we shall see in due course.

This procedure of integrating the various instincts in a personality is, of course, a perfectly normal one, and we can observe it in operation altogether apart from religion. It is, however, fairly generally admitted by psychologists that there is no power as good as

religion for achieving this purpose. This is commonly expressed by saying that the religious sentiment is the supreme power for harmonising the various instinctive forces in human nature. It is our contention that in the Christian religion we find this task perfectly fulfilled, as it is not so fulfilled anywhere else. This process of integration (when it is carried out under the presidency of the religious instinct) takes place by a dual operation of what we have agreed to call grace and light. When it takes place under other conditions, we should have to say that it is due to the combined effect of instinct and intelligence, under the direction of some other sentiment. It will clarify our thought perhaps if we seek to observe this procedure in course of operation.

In any given organism instinct is stimulated by experience; as soon as this has occurred in the human species (and we are here concerned solely with that), immediately light dawns by means of what we call memory. When the stimulus is repeated, the action that ensues, instead of being purely instinctive, partakes of the nature of intelligence also. Gradually, as the action is frequently repeated, the amount of intelligence increases, and what we call knowledge comes into being. When an action is performed not 'blindly,' in response to an instinctive impulse, but with foresight and calculation, then we may say that the instinct concerned has been 'rationalised.' It is true that this word is somewhat overworked, but there seems to be no other which can be suitably employed here. For full and complete 'rationalisation,' however, we seem to require not merely foresight and calculation, but also the understanding, at least in some degree, of the nature of the instinct itself in relation to other instincts. When this stage is reached, we enquire concerning the why and the wherefore, and we obtain in this way the knowledge that is called philosophical and scientific. It is the possession of this knowledge which enables a man to correlate the different aspects of experience mediated through the

various natural impulses, which is the mark of an educated person. If, in addition to the possession of this knowledge, a person's instincts are formed into a harmonious whole, we have not merely an educated person, but also a good character—in a word, we have a truly developed personality.

An example will, perhaps, make our meaning clearer. In the case of a small child a few weeks old its instinct of hunger leads it to suck the bottle and the breast. It has but little intelligence, because it has but little experience. As it grows older, it learns to distinguish between different kinds of food; it learns to feed itself and to choose its own food within certain limits; it learns, possibly through bitter experience, what is the right quantity to eat. By this time the hunger instinct is becoming rationalised. But further progress in this direction must be made by adjusting the claims of this instinct to those of the others which go to make up the raw material of human personality. It has, for example, to learn to correlate the demands of this instinct with that of submission to its parents. If it eats more than a certain quantity, or at forbidden times, it learns what it is to incur the parental displeasure, and this introduces the claim of yet another instinct, namely, fear. Experience shows that the capacity of co-ordinating these various forces is not acquired simply as a result of the possession of knowledge. As Aristotle taught us long ago, mind moves nothing. The only way in which this can be done is by one instinct, or more, taking the lead, and the rest falling into line after it. When this happens we have the unification of the personality by means of a sentiment. And, as has been already said, the religious sentiment is more successful than any other in carrying out this task.

We pass, then, to a consideration of the life of Christ in order to see how this process took place in the case of the first disciples as a result of their companying with the Lord Jesus. We shall find there, when we have eyes to see, a remarkably vivid descrip-

tion of what we call, in the somewhat unpleasant jargon of psychology, the integration of personality, or, in the more familiar and also more pleasing language of religion, the salvation of their souls.

If we turn to the Gospels simply to see what impression our Lord made on His hearers, apart altogether from the question of considering the meaning of what He said or did, I think we are surprised to find how frequently mention is made of what that impression was. The average reader of the Gospels will fail altogether, I believe, to realise its significance. Moreover, the great importance of taking careful note of this impression has unfortunately been almost entirely overlooked by N.T. scholars. In this connection we may well ponder the words of Dr. Biene which he wrote in relation to an altogether different context. "One should observe the manner in which a person either intentionally or unconsciously behaves in conversation," he writes, "with just as much thoroughness as we observe anything which he frankly discloses in speech. . . . An expression of the face, a glance, a smile, a gesture, a turn, an involuntary movement, etc., is clearly always a reflection of some conscious or unconscious reaction in the psychic life, and it may in certain circumstances be just as free from ambiguity as, or even more significant than, any speech whatever." [1] The impression, we are told, was uniformly one of amazement. Four words, including their derivatives, are used to describe this effect. They are *ἐξίστημι*, used ten times; *θαυμάζω*, used twenty-two times; *ἐκπλήσσομαι*, used ten times; and *θαμβέω*, used five times.

Dr. Otto has expressed the opinion that the last-named word denotes what he has called a specifically 'numinous' quality. When we study the actual instances in which it is used in the Gospels, we are likely to agree with him. It seems to be probable also that the other three words above mentioned have also at times the same numinous significance. Assuming this to be

[1] *The Psychology of Murder*, p. 18 (E.T.).

the case, what we find when we study the records is a series of numinous 'moments,' when the Divine was specially manifested in our Lord's incarnate life. These 'moments' are, in our terminology, as near an approach as one can have to pure 'grace,' i.e. they were direct appeals to the religious instinct. Our Lord, however, never leaves an impression of this kind, as we shall see later, without following it up with teaching—i.e. light. If He had done so, then the numinous quality would almost certainly have been misinterpreted, and He would have come to be regarded as a mere magician by many. We have seen, for example, that in the numinous 'moment,' when He healed the lunatic in the synagogue, some regarded Him as a magician. Their religious instinct, that is to say, was dormant, and the instinct of submission (which, in association with the occult, is the chief element common to religion and magic) being stirred, caused them to confound the two. It is not a little remarkable that even the teaching which was given on these occasions was itself numinous, for we read many times that the audience was 'amazed' at His teaching.

In the case of those who assimilated the teaching, it appears from the records that our Lord vouchsafed to them a further numinous 'moment' or 'moments,' followed in each case as before by more teaching. In the case of those who did not assimilate the first teaching—e.g. the Pharisees—no more numinous moments of a fresh kind were revealed. They would obviously have been of no avail. It seems that here the religious instinct had been inhibited by other instincts, or more frequently perhaps, it had been inhibited by habits formed on the basis of that self-same instinct, in accordance with the well-known law of the inhibition of instinct by habit.[1] On the other hand, when the teaching was assimilated by the free functioning of the religious instinct, the latter became gradually 'rationalised'—i.e. the disciples progressively under-

[1] See W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii, p. 394.

stood better who Christ was, while, as we shall see, the other instincts in their nature were gradually brought into line. In a word, a Christ sentiment was formed, on the basis of the religious instinct, which brought them a true knowledge of God, and a true harmony in their souls.

We turn then to the account of our Lord's life in the Gospels. We shall follow mainly the Marcan version, though occasionally we shall supplement it by material taken from one or other of the remaining Synoptic Gospels. The first event which S. Mark records in the ministry is the call of Simon and Andrew. S. Luke gives us an addition to the story, however, which bears the mark of verisimilitude, and which aids us enormously in understanding the true significance of the event. It will be remembered that he tells us of the great draught of fishes, which nearly caused the little fishing boat to sink; whereupon Simon was seized with holy fear and fell down at Jesus' knees, saying, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord."

Otto is surely right in seeing here a truly numinous moment. It was the first revelation of Christ's glory which was vouchsafed to men.[1] It appears to have been reserved solely for Simon and Andrew. When it occurred it was almost pure 'grace.' It had to be rationalised by teaching. But we observe that it does not appear to have provoked any tendency to regard our Lord as a magician. This is an important point which must not be overlooked; for when a similar event occurred shortly afterwards, our Lord evidently was so regarded by some, as we have said, when we referred above to the healing of the madman in the synagogue. The mind of Simon (and, for all we know, of Andrew) was not perverted or overlaid by evil habit. He was one of the pure in heart, able to recognise the divine when he saw it.

It will perhaps be thought strange that if this incident had the importance which we seek to attach to it,

[1] Saving, perhaps, the miracle in Cana of Galilee.

it does not appear in the Petrine Gospel. If, however, as Canon Streeter first suggested, that Gospel was written to supplement teaching when the Christian message began to be preached to men who knew nothing of the earthly life of Christ, it is not impossible to see why this incident should have been omitted. It was so central in S. Peter's experience that it would naturally from the first have formed part of his teaching, and so would be commonly known wherever he had preached.

The next incident recorded by S. Mark need not detain us, since we have already spoken of it. It is the account of the healing of the lunatic in the synagogue. Our Lord was evidently regarded by many as a magician. Nevertheless (as the presence of the word θάμβος serves to remind us), it was a truly numinous moment for those who had eyes to see it, and even the teaching itself which accompanied the healing seems to have been possessed of a numinous quality. That is to say, it was a second numinous moment of the same kind, so far as Simon and Andrew were concerned, while for the rest of those present it was the first numinous revelation. We do not overlook the fact that it is accompanied by a full measure of teaching. We are told that the rumour of this experience spread like wildfire, so that our Lord at once went into synagogues in other parts of Galilee.

The crowds become so great that He is obliged to retire. He manages to slip unobserved into Simon's house in Capernaum,[1] but the news soon leaks out that He is back again, and a huge crowd collects. He seizes the opportunity to give them some more teaching. Even here, however, He finds Himself unexpectedly faced with a sick case—a paralysed man, let down through the roof by his four friends. He is therefore compelled, by considerations of mercy, to give another numinous revelation of a kind obviously liable to be misunderstood. Our Lord was evidently aware of this danger, for He had used very

[1] Mk. ii. 1.

strong language to impress upon the last person he had healed (the leper) that he was to tell nobody.[1] However, in order to counteract the tendency to regard Him as a magician, He directly stimulates the religious instinct by telling the palsied man that his sins are forgiven. Indeed, He stimulates also a good deal of discussion and argument by this thought-provoking statement, and so an atmosphere is induced which was the very reverse of that in which magical ideas flourish.

It is not only by word, however, that our Lord teaches and provokes thought, but even more perhaps by action. A forcible lesson was provided by His mixing with the disreputable people of the society of that day and place. Here the instinct of repulsion was aroused—surely an admirable antidote to any tendencies to regard Him as a magician. This is the very antithesis of blind submission. Moreover, He does not fast, and, more thought-provoking even than that, He does not keep strictly to Sabbath observance. It was these lessons by action which brought Him into open conflict with the religious leaders of the time. For by doing these things He was appealing to the religious instinct, and at the same time coming into collision with the habits which they had built upon the foundation of that instinct. For they had formed habits of exclusiveness; of adherence to strict rules of fasting; of rigid Sabbath observance. These things were, as we say, in their bones. They were so deeply rooted (to change the figure) that they choked the numinous experience which had come to them in the person of Christ. This was all the more tragic, in that the Hebrews alone among the nations had never allowed their religious instinct to be deflected into other channels, and the Pharisees were by tradition and descent the backbone of Jewish religious life. It was because the Jews possessed this characteristic so stubbornly that they were a continual source of political trouble, and so utterly unintelligible to the

[1] Mk. i. 44.

average Roman official, like Pontius Pilate, whose religious instinct had long since been perverted into formal emperor worship.

"Had the Jews," writes Dr. Headlam, "like the other nations, been content to give up their religious exclusiveness, their consciousness of their destiny, and their moral ideals, they might have lived a corrupt, a prosperous, and a decadent life under a foreign despotism." [1]

A climax was reached when our Lord healed a paralysed man (i.e. a man not dangerously ill) on the Sabbath. Here was another numinous experience, closely parallel to those which had gone before; but by this time the religious instinct in the Scribes and Pharisees was in a state of complete inhibition so far as Christ was concerned. They watched Him with a hard and critical eye, ready to pounce upon an opportunity of condemning Him. It is perhaps not an accident that when our Lord said later, "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation," [2] the same word, παρατηρέω, is used, in its substantival form, for 'watching.' Be this as it may, our Lord tried to overcome the inhibition in what seems to be the only possible way, by appealing to the moral law of righteousness, which for every Jew was indissolubly bound up with the religious instinct. He appeals to them by enquiring whether or not it was lawful to do good on the Sabbath. The appeal, however, was in vain; the inhibition was complete, for custom and habit had now been reinforced by personal resentment. They straightway took counsel with the Herodians (whose religious instinct was inhibited by politics) how they might destroy Him. The light that was in them had become darkness. The breach with the synagogue was complete. Christ henceforth proceeds to form a synagogue of his own; He chooses the Apostles.

At this point we are told that a deputation [3] of

[1] *Jesus Christ in History and Faith*, p. 48. [2] Lk. xvii. 20.

[3] I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, First Series, p. 13, thinks that we may not infer this, however.

Scribes "came down" (presumably from Jerusalem) and revealed the awful darkness of their souls by accusing Him of being in league with evil spirits. It was in relation to them that Christ uttered the terrible words about the unforgivable sin. These men had received the grace of God in vain; no further revelation was possible for them. They had shut themselves into the outer darkness. About this time, S. Mark tells us, our Lord's family came upon the scene, evidently as He was teaching with a group of people round Him, sitting on the ground. They cannot get near to Him to speak to Him, and so they send a message. Our Lord's well-known reply, that whosoever shall do the will of God is His brother, and sister, and mother, is evidently due to a desire on His part to teach them the hard lesson that the religious instinct must hold sway even over the sacred instincts of family life.

Meanwhile, our Lord continues His teaching, and we have the first recorded parable, that of the Sower. It is evident that this gave a strong stimulus to the instinct of curiosity. In other words, it drew men from the sphere of 'pure' grace to that of light. For the instinct of curiosity is less compatible with the instinct of submission than are most. By its very nature it seeks light, and therefore does not easily accord with pure grace. The tendency of the crowd is always to seek grace without regard to light. As Plato said long before, the crowd is never a philosopher. Our Lord, however, seeks to combat this tendency by the use of parables, entirely simple and unemotional, but strangely thought-provoking. It is commonly urged that our Lord was in no sense original in adopting this method of teaching, since it was a common one among the rabbis, to say nothing of its occurrence in the Old Testament. This statement is true but profoundly misleading, as anyone can see who peruses the parables of the Jewish rabbis. For the essential feature of Christ's parables is that, in the majority of cases at least, their meaning is not obvious at once;

in other words, they are thought-provoking. On our view it was for this reason alone that He confined Himself to this method of teaching the crowd. The conventional rabbinical parable would have failed entirely to serve His purpose, for its meaning lay on the surface, and any casual listener could pick it up.

How strange this simple, first parable must have seemed to its first hearers has been well brought out by Dr. Headlam. "I would ask you to consider," he writes, "the circumstances under which the parable of the sower was spoken. It was clearly intended to reveal the mystery of the Kingdom. The expectation which Jesus aroused by His proclamation, by His teaching, by His personality, by His miracles, had created a great stir among the people. His apparent unorthodoxy must have accentuated the perplexity. A great crowd, mostly of common people, had collected together, anxious for explanations, and they hear the story of a man going out to sow seed. What bewilderment this must have caused! It was not in the least what they wanted or what they expected. They wanted to know when and how the kingdom would come. Was Jesus going to lead them against the Romans? It was difficult to see how this story could answer their questions." [1] If, however, we bear in mind the great danger to our Lord that He should come to be regarded as a magician, whether political or otherwise, it is not altogether difficult to understand the reason for the manner of His teaching, and light is thrown on those words which have so sorely perplexed the writers of the commentaries: "Unto you is given the mystery of the kingdom of God: but unto them that are without, all things are done in parables: that seeing they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest haply they should turn again, and it should be forgiven them." [2]

The danger was not so great in the case of the disciples, as these words clearly indicate. They were

[1] *The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ*, p. 253. [2] Mk. iv. 11, 12.

not therefore in the same need of this stimulus to curiosity. They were picked men, picked, as it would seem, precisely for the reason that they were the sort of people not easily to be side-tracked. In the language of psychology, they were prepared to rationalise their religious instinct. Hence it was safe for our Lord to explain this and other parables to them privately.

There is, indeed, definite evidence which seems to show that our Lord was accustomed to use two different kinds of parables; for after the parable of the lord returning from the marriage feast[1] S. Peter enquires: "Lord, speakest thou this parable unto us, or even unto all?" It would seem that the Apostle had divided our Lord's parables into two classes in his own mind, namely, those for the Twelve, and those for the general public. If this was correct, then we may surely say that the former class was easy to understand (since the disciples were not so greatly in need of protection against magical ideas, especially after a time); the latter class, on the other hand, is represented by the perplexing kind, which we have seen were specially characteristic of our Lord. On this particular occasion, it would seem that S. Peter was not quite sure in which class to place this parable. It seemed easy to comprehend, and yet he was not quite sure whether he had rightly appreciated its meaning. Be this, however, as it may, there is no question that our Lord invariably spoke to the general public by parables. "Without a parable spake he not unto them."[2] Nor is there any doubt that He explained His teaching to the Twelve. It is therefore *a priori* to be expected that if He did use parables in teaching the disciples, He would sometimes, at least, have employed a different kind of parable.

We come next to an incident of great importance and significance. The disciples had apparently assimilated a considerable amount of teaching—teaching

[1] Lk. xii. 41. [2] Mk. iv. 34.

about the Kingdom. The first numinous experience had been, to some extent at least, rationalised. But so far our Lord does not seem to have given much teaching about *Himself*. On the contrary, He seems rather to have avoided it. The incident in the synagogue at the very beginning of the ministry, when the madman cried out that He was the Holy One of God, points clearly to this view. But now the time has come for a further lesson—a lesson about Himself. It was given in the stilling of the storm. We read that the Apostles said to one another, "Who then is this that even the winds and the sea obey him?" Their thoughts were turned definitely from the Kingdom to the personality of our Lord. The effect of this strange and numinous experience was to fill them with awe, and to make them ponder, possibly for the first time, and certainly as never before, the problem of Christology!

It will perhaps be thought that even granting what has been said it is impossible to believe that our Lord could have planned beforehand to give such a lesson as this, for He could hardly have known that a storm was going to arise. Possibly this is true, in which case we must suppose that our Lord took the opportunity when it arose, and that had He not intended thus giving a turn to their thoughts, He would somehow have acted differently. A close study of the Gospel history makes it quite evident that our Lord never acted in a haphazard fashion, but carefully thought out and planned His work. It is, however, possible that our Lord foresaw the storm.[1] There is that curious piece of information which tells us that the Apostles took Him, "even as he was,"[2] in the boat. It is not easy to know what to make of this. May it not possibly mean that He went across the water without being properly prepared with an outer coat? And may it not be that our Lord was in a hurry

[1] His language about discerning the face of the sky clearly suggests the possibility of this.

[2] Mk. iv. 36.

to go because He was desirous of giving this lesson, and He saw the storm coming, although they did not? However this may be, the lesson was given, and a fresh stage in the training of the Twelve began.

Our Lord, we are told, was disappointed at their lack of faith. But on the hypothesis which we have adopted, it will be urged, there was no reason why He should have expected them to have faith, since this was the first time they had received the new lesson. But our Lord's real thought seems to be unveiled by the significant word, πεφίμωσο, which is translated "Be still."[1] It will be remembered that this is the same word which occurs in the story of the healing of the lunatic in the synagogue; and we pointed out in dealing with that incident its associations with magic, and also that we should probably refer it not to our Lord's own language, but rather to what was in the minds of the crowd. The same remarks apply here. In face of this stupendous happening, the disciples yield to the temptation to see in our Lord a wonder-worker; and in that sense they have not faith. Their attitude, in other words, is one of blind credulity, which is entirely inconsistent with the frame of mind of true faith. From the beginning we have seen that our Lord did all He could to undermine this attitude. Hence His expression of disappointment at their state of mind. On the one hand, they did not trust Him enough; on the other hand, they trusted Him too much, because they trusted Him with the easy credulity which the crowd is always prepared to mete out to the magician.

There followed close upon the heels of this experience another numinous 'moment,' unique in the Gospels—the healing of the maniac, Legion. Although the exact place where this occurred is somewhat uncertain, it seems to be clear that our Lord was upon heathen, i.e. non-Jewish, soil. This will account for the fact that the man is bidden to spread the news of his healing—a request nowhere made before. If our

[1] Mk. iv. 39.

Lord was not Himself intending to proclaim His message there in person, there was not the same danger in His being regarded as a magician. For it was only when men came into actual contact with Him that this way of regarding Him could develop to a dangerous extent. In this incident the Apostles had the unusual experience of seeing our Lord worshipped. Coming immediately after the stilling of a storm, and while they were for the first time, as we have suggested, pondering the mystery of His person, this must have made a considerable impression upon their minds—the more so since the unfortunate man addressed our Lord as "Jesus, thou Son of the Most High God." [1]

Our Lord and His disciples cross the Lake once more in response to the earnest entreaties of the inhabitants of the locality to which Legion belonged. No sooner had they landed, as it would seem, than Jairus, one of the rulers of the Synagogue, appears from the midst of the crowd which had assembled, and begs Him to come and heal his little girl who was dying. Our Lord responds to the request, but for the numinous experience which was about to come He singles out Peter, James, and John alone. As we shall see, this is the beginning of yet another stage in the training of the disciples. Our Lord begins to realise that not even all the Apostles are ready for the teaching which He is desirous of imparting to them. Only the father and mother of the little girl are allowed to share with the inner circle of the Apostles the great experience. It seems to be probable that the child was, as our Lord said, not dead, but in a state of coma. However this may be, the miracle made a profound impression. We read that they were amazed with a great amazement—*καὶ ἐξέστησαν εὐθὺς ἐκστάσει μεγάλῃ*—a very strong expression indeed. We notice carefully the significant comment: "He charged them *much* that no man should know this." [2]

We must not, however, pass over in silence an

[1] Mk. v. 7. [2] Mk. v. 43.

incident (full of interest from our present point of view) which occurred while our Lord was on His way to the house of Jairus. It is the familiar one in which the woman with the issue of blood mingles with the crowd thronging Him and, touching His robe, feels herself healed of her infirmity. It is plain to see that this story demonstrates conclusively the truth of our contention that our Lord had it in Him to become a highly successful magician, had He so desired. It appears to show that He possessed in a high degree that quality which is usually called animal magnetism, for it would seem that we can rightly understand only in this way the ' power ' which in this case we are told He perceived had gone out from Him.

At the same time, the incident gives us no occasion to revise or modify our judgment that our Lord consistently strove to avoid being regarded as a magician. For, in the first place, S. Mark gives us the important information that the woman had gained her knowledge of Him not first hand but from hearsay.[1] In this way she was able to think of Him as a magician (as she assuredly did), because her fancies had been painted by the extravagant hand of rumour. Had she heard the Lord's teaching, it is probable that, even if she had set her hopes on being healed by Him, she would hardly, perhaps, have said that her object was to touch the border of His garment. In the second place, we observe our Lord's evident anxiety to identify the woman. It might perhaps seem cruel that He should thus have made the woman ' own up ' in the presence of the crowd—an operation which evidently cost her a good deal—unless we suppose, as we surely must, that His object in doing so was to estimate her character, and, if necessary, to supply a needful corrective to her state of mind. In other words, we find Him here solicitous for the good of the soul, as well as for that of the body, and this work of mercy, which was literally and in very deed wrung from Him, falls into line with His other deeds of compassion. We are

[1] Mk. v. 27.

accordingly justified in saying that this striking and life-like incident harmonises quite naturally with what we observe elsewhere concerning the principles underlying our Lord's human life.

The disciples are now to undergo an altogether new kind of experience. Our Lord goes to His native place, and, we are told by S. Mark, "His disciples follow him." [1] It is uncertain what is the precise meaning of this expression. It may perhaps point to the fact that our Lord, realising that if they did come, their faith would be very severely tested, did not actually ask them to come with Him, but left it to them to do as they liked. If they chose to do so quite of their own free will, without any suggestion from Him, then He would take it that they were ready for the test. In view of Mark's careful choice of language, it is possibly not overstraining the words to read this meaning into them. In any case, the disciples accompany our Lord to Nazareth. Here the atmosphere which He meets is entirely different. There is no kind of danger that men should regard Him as a magician. If we may take the account which S. Luke gives of His preaching in the synagogue at Nazareth as referring to this visit, then we are told explicitly that the sceptical attitude which S. Mark informs us prevailed there concerning Him found expression in the proverb, "Physician, heal thyself"—at least, so it seemed to our Lord.

The religious instinct, so far as Christ was concerned, had been altogether inhibited by habit. People had grown accustomed to Him ever since He was a child running about the village streets; they knew His family. They saw nothing numinous in Him, and, of course, their attitude to Him was anything but submissive. Even so, the reception which He received was more chilly than even He appears to have expected it would be, for we are told that "He marvelled at their unbelief." [2] This must therefore have been a somewhat bewildering experience for the

[1] Mk. vi. 1. [2] Mk. vi. 6.

disciples. What would they have made of it all? One day they see Him in the rôle of a great wonder-worker; the next, they see Him "despised and rejected of men." Surely they must have wondered, Why ever does He not perform some mighty work to convince these foolish people of the error of their ways? Mark tells us that "He could there do no mighty work." [1] The authority for such a statement must surely have been only the Lord Himself, and S. Peter must have received it from His own lips. If this be so, then we must suppose that Peter, at any rate, asked our Lord at this time why He did not perform some mighty work, and that he received this answer. It would plainly be a most valuable lesson, leading the Apostle away from all magical conceptions.

A preaching and healing tour in the surrounding villages follows. We have no means of knowing how long this lasted. When it was over, the disciples receive another lesson—in these days, it would be called expression work. They are sent out in pairs on a mission. It seems to have reproduced as nearly as possible the first beginnings of our Lord's own ministry. They preached the message of repentance, and healed many sick. Our Lord makes it quite plain to them afterwards why He sent them on this mission. We read in S. Luke xxii. 35: "And he said unto them, When I sent you forth without purse, and wallet, and shoes, lacked ye anything? And they said, Nothing." That is to say, it was in order that they might learn to depend upon Him, and to realise that His power was transferable. This was an enormously important point, and its significance can scarcely be over-estimated. It would at once begin to destroy the dangerous notion that our Lord was a mere magician, for what magician was there who would thus delegate his power?

There was, however, plainly a danger of another kind, in that the disciples might come to regard the

[1] Mk. vi. 5.

power as being inherent in themselves. They might, in fact, be tempted to regard themselves as magicians. I would tentatively suggest that it was for this reason that they were enjoined to use oil, and to anoint the sick whom they sought to cure.[1] In this way, there would be less danger of their regarding the power as inherent in themselves. No doubt, there was a possibility that they might receive into their minds magical notions about the oil; but this was a far smaller danger. If they had for a single moment begun to think that they themselves were the source of the power they wielded, it is evident that our Lord's training of them would have been completely undone. If this surmise be correct, it is an illuminating commentary on our fundamental contention in this book that sacramental religion does not in fact lend itself to magical notions so readily as non-sacramental. The first mention of sacraments in the new Israel is due to a desire to correct this very tendency.

After these great lessons, our Lord seeks to take the Apostles into retreat. They cross to the other side of the Lake, in order to escape the crowds. But it was not to be. The multitude saw them going, and was ready on the other side to meet them when they landed. Our Lord, moved with compassion, "began to teach them many things."[2] The time passes, and the evening shadows begin to fall, but the crowds still listen attentively to Him who spake as never man spake. The disciples come to our Lord and ask Him to send them away before they faint. Instead of doing this, He replies: "Give ye them to eat." It seems to be evident from this that our Lord was in no way desirous of performing a miracle. Indeed it would plainly be most dangerous for His purpose to do so. So events showed; for as soon as the miracle was over (however we may regard it, there seems to be no doubt that the crowd looked upon it as a miracle) we are told that our Lord "constrained the disciples to enter into the boat, and to go before him to the other

[1] See Mk. vi. 13. [2] Mk. vi. 34.

side to Bethsaida, while he himself sendeth the multitude away." [1] So S. Mark tells us, and it would be difficult to understand his meaning, were it not for what we are told in the Fourth Gospel. S. John tells us that the reason for this was that the crowd wished to proclaim Him king.[2]

Before the Apostles can realise what is happening, He rushes them into the boat, and gets them out of the way, and so an imminent danger is passed. It would never do for their minds, unsettled as they were, and thoroughly muddled, to be exposed to such a temptation. It would be interesting to know how our Lord managed to get rid of the crowd; but we have no means of satisfying our curiosity on this point. There can be little doubt, however, that the information which S. John provides enables us to explain the somewhat obscure narrative of S. Mark.

That a serious crisis had come seems to be shown by the fact that our Lord spends nearly the whole night in prayer on the mountain side, just as He had done before taking the momentous step of choosing the Twelve. It was a stormy night, however, and seeing them struggling with the waves His wonderful compassion brings Him to them, walking on the waves. And so they have another numinous experience. As soon as He gets on board the boat, the wind drops. We read that they were sore amazed in themselves; "for they understood not concerning the loaves, but their heart was hardened." [3] If our line of interpretation has been correct, we may take this to mean that they still tended to regard our Lord as a magician, because they failed to realise the true significance of the feeding of the multitude. If they had rightly apprehended that event, they would have also justly estimated this one.

At this point in the Marcan narrative, we are introduced once more to the Pharisees, and we are given a long account of a dispute which arose between them and our Lord on the subject of ceremonial washing.

[1] Mk. vi. 45. [2] Jn. vi. 15. [3] Mk. vi. 52.

We need not necessarily suppose that all this happened at the same time. On the contrary, S. Mark's account rather suggests otherwise. We have seen that the religious instinct of the Pharisees was blinded in relation to our Lord by habit. He now attempts to enlighten their darkness, or, in the language of psychology, to remove the inhibition, by bringing them down to fundamental questions of ethics. He shows them that defilement comes from within and not from without. Mark tells us that the explanation which He gave of His principles in this way was a 'parable.' [1] It is, in fact, such only in the rabbinical sense of the term, by which the word was employed to cover both similes and metaphors. In this case, it was the latter, or seemed to Mark to be so. In fact, it is doubtful if it was even metaphorical. In any case, our Lord speaks as plainly as He can to the Pharisees, in order to turn them to the light. There was no need for Him to wrap up His meaning on such a subject as this by one of His more usual sort of parables. What the result of the discussion was we are not told.

Our Lord now leaves Galilee, and departs to "the borders of Tyre and Sidon." [2] The reason for this step is usually taken to be that He wished to get away from the jurisdiction of Herod, and, if S. John is right in what he tells us about the incident which occurred after the feeding of the multitude, we can see that this is what we should naturally expect. It would have proved fatal to our Lord's plan of campaign had he been arrested as a political revolutionary by Herod. This supposition is strengthened by the statement of S. Mark that "he entered into a house, and would have no man know it." [3] Moreover, so far as the Marcan account goes, He would seem to have gone alone, but on this point there is a discrepancy between it and the Matthean account. A heathen woman, whose daughter was mentally afflicted, searches Him out, and implores Him to heal her child. After testing the woman's earnestness, and being assured that she

[1] Mk. vii. 17. [2] Mk. vii. 24. [3] Mk. vii. 24.

was no seeker after signs and marvels, He responds to her appeal, but He does not preach or teach. On the contrary, He immediately departs to Sidon and passes through it and the Decapolis district. All we are told about the events of this time is that He healed a dumb man. We are significantly told, however, that "he took him aside from the multitude privately" [1] before doing so. It is plain to see that He is most anxious to avoid attracting public attention. And so, when later on He heals a blind man at Bethsaida, "he took hold of the blind man by the hand, and brought him out of the village." [2]

We may pass over the first part of the eighth chapter of S. Mark, which contains what is most likely a doublet of the feeding of the multitude. In any case, there is no fresh evidence from our present point of view. In verse 22 we come to the incident at Bethsaida to which we have just referred. We observe that, after He had healed the blind man, He sent him home, requesting him not even to enter into the village.

There is another point about this miracle which it is important for us to notice. In common with the one immediately before it, we are told, our Lord made use of saliva in performing the cure. This is, of course, a well-known practice in magic, and in adopting its use Christ appears to be acting in a manner altogether different from His usual methods. It may be, indeed, as some scholars have suggested, that these two incidents are really doublets, in which case we somewhat reduce the difficulty. But even so we have to reckon with the most vivid and lifelike story in S. John ix, where we read that our Lord made clay by spitting upon the ground in healing the man born blind. We can scarcely therefore solve the difficulty even to the extent of limiting it to a single instance. How, then, are we to account for our Lord's employment of such a method?

There are several considerations which help us to

[1] Mk. vii. 33. [2] Mk. viii. 23.

meet the difficulty. In the first place, if Christ had adopted this means of healing in any of His first public miracles, it would have been a vastly different matter from using it privately as He certainly did in the case of the Marcan instances, and probably in the Johannine instance also. He would, in that case, have been giving very definite colour to the opinion that He was a magician, and have been acting contrary to His whole plan of working. Again, we observe that in the two Marcan miracles our Lord appears to exert considerable effort in performing the cure. May it not be that He thus acted in order to counteract the natural tendency to regard Him as a magician in that He employed such a method of working? If He used the spitting in order to assist the faith of the patient, while at the same time He negatived the tendency to magical conceptions in the mind of the latter by performing the cure with apparent effort, we should have a method of procedure which on our principles is perfectly intelligible. In the case of the deaf mute, our Lord, by looking up to heaven and sighing,[1] quite plainly shows that He acts not by magic, but by prayer; whereas, in the case of the blind man, where the method of looking up to heaven could obviously not be used, the cure was performed in such a gradual manner as to upset altogether any idea of a magical performance which the man might have been inclined to hold.

In the Johannine incident (which surely bears all the marks of verisimilitude) the blind man was told, after being anointed on the eyes with the clay, to wash in the Pool of Siloam. The mystical applications of this injunction do not concern us here; but it is impossible for anybody acquainted with the Old Testament not to recall to mind the story of Naaman when he reads this one. We may accordingly suppose that the blind man, who was presumably a Hebrew, would inevitably

[1] C. G. Montefiore, *The Synoptic Gospels*, says: "The word here means, perhaps, that he was praying" (*op. cit.*, i. p. 172 (2nd edn.)).

be reminded of it too, and so would at once compare our Lord in his mind not with any magician, but with one regarded as a prophet, namely Elisha. Such, in fact, we learn from his own lips, was the way in which the miracle did cause him to regard our Lord. It would seem, therefore, that we are justified in holding that our Lord performed the miracle in this particular manner chiefly in order to counteract the natural tendency which the use of the spittle would originate to look upon Him as a mere magician.

We may therefore conclude that these three recorded instances of our Lord's employment of what we must call the machinery of magic do not upset our main contention that He made it His supreme aim and object to avoid being regarded as a mere magician.

This brings us to S. Mark viii. 27. We are now approaching the climax of the Ministry—S. Peter's confession. It is surely impossible for all believers in the true humanity of our Lord to doubt the almost trembling eagerness with which He came to this decisive moment. We see Him gradually feeling His way to put the vital question by enquiring concerning the opinions which others had of Him. Possibly He was able to discern what was in their minds—or at any rate what was in the mind of S. Peter—by the tone and manner with which they mentioned these various opinions. It is in any case not likely that He would have put the question to them until He felt tolerably sure of getting the true answer. For if the wrong answer had been forthcoming, it would have complicated the situation in an awkward manner. S. Peter, however, as usual was the spokesman, and he gave the right answer.

What joy rings through the words which S. Matthew's account supplies: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar Jonah"[1]—words doubtless omitted from the Petrine account of S. Mark out of a sense of modesty, and yet words which are surely genuine. S. Peter

[1] Mt. xvi. 17.

had, in the terminology we are using, rationalised his experience of Jesus Christ rightly. His Master was the promised One. Our Lord's careful teaching had borne fruit. Yet we have to remember that Peter was not, like S. Paul, for example, a trained theologian. He was in all probability not a theologian at all. He probably had the vaguest ideas about the Messiah. His confession must not be regarded as the conclusion of a theological argument. It was rather the expression of his full and complete faith in our Lord as a great man. His confession was a matter of psychology rather than one of theology, if an antithesis can for the moment be drawn between the two.

After charging the disciples to repeat this information to nobody (for it would certainly be misconstrued), He forthwith proceeds to put before them His ideal of self-sacrifice. We shall see in the next chapter exactly the significance of this ideal for our Lord, especially in connection with His baptism. For the moment we merely notice that at this critical point in the Ministry He puts it before the disciples for the first time. S. Mark adds: "And he spake the saying openly."[1] This comment was evidently unintelligible to the other two Synoptists who, though following the Marcan account closely at this point, both omit it. Its meaning is not at first sight obvious, but the key to it is found in the Fourth Gospel, where in chapter xvi., verse 25, the same word, *παρρησίᾳ*, which S. Mark uses for 'openly' is employed to make a distinction between discourse by means of parables and discourse without parables. 'Openly' therefore means 'without parables.'

If we are right in what we have said about our Lord's use of parables, we can quite clearly see the reason for this. Parables, we have urged, were primarily directed to provoke thought, and to guard against the tendency to magic. And magic, let us never forget, invariably stands for the easy solution. It is obvious, therefore, that in first introducing the

[1] Mk. viii. 32.

teaching about the ideal of sacrifice there was no danger of its leading to the idea of magic. For the Cross is the very antithesis of the short and easy road; it is the negation of magic. It follows from this that teaching about the Cross could be imparted openly from the beginning. The only danger was that it might frighten the disciples away altogether, just because it was too inconsistent with popular notions. Yet no good purpose could have been served by wrapping up this teaching. It might as well come out plainly from the first; besides, the time was short.

The effect of this announcement upon S. Peter showed how far he still had to go in spiritual matters. He takes our Lord aside, and actually ventures to rebuke Him. The first Gospel records his words: "Be it far from thee, Lord: this shall never be unto thee."[1] Doubtless shame has caused them to be omitted from the Apostle's reminiscences, which S. Mark has given us. It was surely not merely as a Jew that he thus indignantly repudiated this ideal for our Lord. As we have seen, probably his ideas concerning the Messiah were somewhat vague and nebulous. It was perhaps rather as a man that he was horrified to think that his beloved master should come to such an end. Our Lord, we are told, turned round, and seeing the other disciples, administered a severe rebuke. Evidently He thought that they had overheard, and for their sakes as well as for S. Peter's He spoke as He did. We shall in the next chapter see a further reason for the fierceness of this admonition.

Our Lord, however, does not leave matters there. He turns even to the crowd, and announces to them the doctrine of self-sacrifice. Although we have no means of discovering the composition of this collection of people, it is somewhat surprising at first to find our Lord speaking thus openly. How could men be expected to assimilate teaching like this? No doubt, the reason was that our Lord knew that the time was getting short, and that therefore He was obliged to

[1] Mt. xvi. 22.

force the pace a little. And we have tried to show that in any case there was no danger of misleading His hearers in this matter towards magical conceptions.

Our Lord allows about a week to intervene, during which time, we may suppose, He elaborated this teaching to His disciples, and then He deliberately leads the inner circle of three aside to undergo the greatest and most 'numinous' experience which they were destined to receive in the whole of their companying with Him. "He was transfigured before them."[1]

I do not care to attempt to speculate upon what exactly happened upon the Mount of Transfiguration. In any case, it is probably beyond the range of our present knowledge. I only wish to emphasise two points which appear to be vital to any right appreciation of this mysterious event. The first is this. The revelation which our Lord received at His Baptism was renewed to Him, and imparted to the three disciples. We must reserve a fuller examination of the meaning of Christ's Baptism to the next Chapter. It will suffice to say here that, other considerations apart, it at least was closely associated in our Lord's mind with the ideal of self-sacrifice, i.e. the Cross. He saw that His divine Sonship meant this for Him. So in the present experience, if we may trust the Lucan account, our Lord was concerned with His coming death. So far as the disciples were concerned, therefore, we shall not be far wrong in assuming that one purpose of bringing them to share this tremendous experience was to familiarise them with the idea of the Cross. By being brought together in their minds with the greatest spiritual experience they had ever had, it would thereafter never be quite so unpalatable or shocking to their sense of propriety.

In the second place, it seems to be evident that in this event both He and they saw in a vision (S. Matthew[2] says explicitly that it was a vision) His death

[1] Mk. ix. 2. [2] Mt. xvii. 9.

as the fulfilment of the Old Testament Scriptures. Moses and Elijah quite plainly are typical representatives of the Law and the Prophets respectively. If these two points which we have singled out for attention hold good, then we shall see in the next chapter, when we study in some detail the story of our Lord's Baptism, that this is precisely what we should expect to find. The Voice from the cloud, "This is my beloved Son," makes it certain that the Lord's Transfiguration is definitely connected with His Baptism.

On their way down from the mountain our Lord enjoins secrecy upon the three disciples, and also speaks for the first time of the Resurrection. The greatness of this 'numinous' experience is evident from the fact that when they got down from the Mount, and the crowd caught sight of Him, we are told that they "were greatly amazed" (ἐξεθαμβήθη).[1] This is most significant. The glory of the Transfiguration was still upon Him. He finds His disciples and a crowd of people, among whom was a man who had an epileptic son with him. The man appeals to our Lord, who orders the boy to be brought to Him. Evidently they were apart from the crowd, for S. Mark tells us that when our Lord saw a multitude coming together He healed the lad without further delay.

Our Lord appears to have escaped from the crowd as quickly as He could into some neighbouring house, although we have no means of knowing where or whose house it was. When they depart they journey incognito through Galilee. Meanwhile our Lord drives home the teaching of His coming death. They failed, however, to understand. We have to remember that on this occasion all the Twelve were present, and for the majority of them it would be much harder to grasp than for those who had shared in the experience of the Transfiguration. We need not therefore be surprised to read that "they understood not the saying, and were afraid to ask him."[2]

[1] Mk. ix. 15. [2] Mk. ix. 32.

Eventually they reach Capernaum once more, and, when they are safely in the house, our Lord continues His teaching. It now becomes intensely personal. Having taught them about the Kingdom, and about Himself, He now turns to the task of teaching the disciples about themselves. He tries to bring home to them the meaning of the ideal of self-sacrificing love. We may express this in the terminology which we have adopted by saying that our Lord now may be seen directing His attention to harmonising their instinctive nature, i.e. to integrating their personalities, by preparing them to accept the ideal of the Cross. We shall see in the next chapter that this task was, in fact, not completed until the Day of Pentecost.

He begins with the powerful instinct of self-assertion. A heated discussion had taken place between them on the road, as to who was the greatest. This provided our Lord with the opportunity for some plain speaking. We are not told which of the disciples were chiefly concerned in this argument, nor who was the little child whom He set in the midst of them to point His object-lesson; but if the house where they were sitting was, as is probable, S. Peter's, we may assume that the child was also his. Supposing this Apostle to have been one of the disputants, it would be a very forcible lesson that the Lord gave him. The instinct of self-assertion is deflected into the path of religion *via* the parental instinct; in the case of S. Peter this would have taken place directly, if our supposition is correct, but in the case of the other apostles, it would have taken place indirectly.

The next lesson which our Lord gives the Apostles in this last period of intensive personal teaching concerns the herd instinct. S. John, evidently expecting to receive commendation for the action, informs our Lord that they came across a man casting out devils in His name, and that they told him to desist, because he was not one of their company. This incident reveals the presence of a fairly strong herd spirit among the disciples, and to that extent it was good.

But at the same time that spirit was hard and narrow, and our Lord had to teach them to lift the gregarious instinct up on to a higher plane. His answer shows them that, if they are to be His disciples, their outlook must be not exclusive but inclusive. The remark which our Lord is recorded to have uttered on this occasion is of great interest: "For whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink, because ye are Christ's, verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward." [1] It suggests plainly the existence in no distant time of a Christian 'herd,' or, to use a better expression, a Christian 'group,' and it points out the attitude which members of that group (which came to be called the Church) were to adopt towards even insignificant actions done to them by those without.

The casting out of devils in our Lord's name was evidently a method of procedure which has affinities with magic. W. Heitmüller [2] has shown convincingly the magical connotation, both in the Old Testament and in the New Testament, of the phrase "in the name of." It seems to be beyond question that the mere utterance of the name of God, or some other holy one, was held to be *ipso facto* efficacious. This magical significance, Heitmüller holds, runs right throughout the New Testament. It is probable that in seeking to prove his point he is led into reading magical ideas into passages where, in fact, none exist, as, for example, when he attributes a magical connotation to S. Paul's injunction to the Colossians: "Whatsoever ye do, in word or in deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus." [3] Such an interpretation is surely altogether unwarranted.

At the same time, the account of what happened at Ephesus, recorded for us in the Acts (chapter xix.), proves that the name of Jesus was early employed as a charm; and probably Heitmüller is right when he sees in the Marcan passage with which we are immediately concerned a reference to the same practice. If

[1] Mk. ix. 41.

[2] *In Namen Jesu* (Göttingen, 1903).

[3] Col. iii. 17.

so, we can only guess why our Lord does not refer to this aspect of the question. If our interpretation of Christ's mind and method is in any degree correct, it is plainly impossible for us to believe that He would in any sense countenance such a practice. The fact that He passes over this side of the matter here may well be due to His thinking that the other lesson, which He was concerned to inculcate, was by that time more urgent.[1]

At all events, we know what He said when the Apostles returned from their mission, according to the Lucan account, and told Him with evident joy: "Lord, even the devils are subject unto us in thy name."[2] He replied: "In this rejoice not that the spirits are subject unto you; but rejoice that your names are written in heaven."[3] It is perhaps legitimate to read between the lines here, and to see in these words an implied rebuke of the magical use of our Lord's name. It is as if He had said, "Do not rejoice at the power of my name, but rejoice that *your names* are written in heaven." This is just one of those instances where it is of primary importance to remember that everything turns on the manner in which the words were spoken. We are justified in concluding, therefore, that however early magical ideas may have invaded Christianity, they had no place in the mind of its Founder, nor, when their training was completed by the coming of the Holy Spirit, in the minds of the Apostles.

We return to the Marcan narrative. The ideal of self-sacrificing love which our Lord seeks to inculcate in the minds of His disciples He now puts before them in the most uncompromising manner. In order to make them realise it, He tells them that they must be

[1] This is in complete disagreement with Heitmüller's conclusion. He writes as follows: "Dann lasst sich aber auch die Frage nicht umgehen, wie Jesus sich zu einem derartigen Verfahren gestellt hat, und kaum eine andere Antwort geben, als dass er dieses auffallende Verfahren, nach unserem Berichten, nicht getadelt und somit, wenigstens indirekt, gebilligt hat" (*op. cit.*, p. 241).

[2] Lk. x. 17. [3] Lk. x. 20.

prepared to make supremely painful and costly efforts, which he likens to the sacrificing of the limbs of the body. It is an interesting analogy in the light of modern psychology. We have been seeking to show that the development of the personality of each of the Apostles was gradually achieved by the integrating of the various primary instincts in subordination to the religious sentiment, centred upon Christ. This process takes place by the deflection of psychic energy from one channel to another. Those channels from which the energy is thus withdrawn, it is not difficult to see, are, in a sense, 'cut off.' In other words, we may say that the limbs of which our Lord speaks in the passage we are considering are truly illustrative of the instincts from which the psychic energy must be drained off for the full development of character. In the case of some individuals, it will be one instinct, in the case of others it will be another instinct which will thus need to be 'cut off'; for we know that the inherited power of the various instincts varies with different people. Our Lord expresses this by speaking of the cutting off of different members of the body.

Our Lord, according to S. Mark's narrative (x. 1), now leaves Galilee and goes into Judæa beyond Jordan, i.e. on its eastern side. Crowds gather round Him again, and once more He teaches publicly. Evidently He was on new ground, and so He was free to return to the earlier methods of His ministry. Two lessons which He gave at this time are recorded for us by S. Mark. There is first another lesson on the vital subject of humility—an object-lesson, again taken from a child. The other lesson is directed against the dangerous instinct of acquisition. It was given, in the first instance, to the rich young man, who was evidently an admirable character, for we read that "Jesus looking upon him loved him."[1] Such, at least, was the impression which S. Peter gained from the incident. But Christ unerringly puts

[1] Mk. x. 21.

His finger on the weak spot in the man's character. He is essentially self-centred still. He must embrace the ideal of sacrifice, if he is to enter into life. This lesson was strange even to the disciples. We read that they were amazed at His words (Mk. x. 24).

We unexpectedly find the strongly 'numinous' word, *ἐθαμβοῦντο*, once again used here. There was evidently something in our Lord's manner, as He "looked round about,"[1] which produced this effect on the disciples. Here indeed was a numinous 'moment' far removed from the sphere of magic. For the magician is essentially concerned to acquire somewhat. This event shows therefore how far the disciples had progressed, in that they were able to see anything numinous in such an apparently commonplace incident as this. Nevertheless, S. Peter's exclamation, "Lo, we have left all and have followed thee,"[2] shows that they still had a long distance to go in the path of spiritual development. Our Lord, in His reply, expresses in the plainest possible way the teaching of the most modern psychology when He says: "Verily I say unto you, There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or mother, or father, or children, or lands, for my sake, and for the gospel's sake, but he shall receive a hundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life." And He adds the remark, highly significant for the Apostles, "But many that are first shall be last; and the last first" (Mk. x. 29, 30, 31).

We are now given in the Marcan narrative a graphic picture. The last journey to Jerusalem has begun. We can see the little band, with our Lord walking in front of them alone. According to the best attested text we read that they were amazed (*ἐθαμβοῦντο*). It is, however, possible that we should read, "And He was amazed"—i.e. by the shadow of approaching death. We have the same word employed of our Lord

[1] Mk. x. 23. [2] Mk. x. 28.

in the Agony in Gethsemane. And yet, Otto is surely right in saying that He, who for months, and even years, had lived with the Cross before Him was not the victim of common fear. It was a spiritual experience surely through which He was passing. Was it a recurrence of the attacks of the Tempter?

However this may be, the disciples were overawed by His manner. We read that "He took again the twelve" [1]—i.e. after the interval occupied by the renewal of public teaching in Judæa, and on the east of Jordan. He tells them what is their destination, and why they are going to Jerusalem. S. Mark gives us no clue to enable us to judge the effect of this terrible announcement upon the Apostles, but in the Lucan account we read that they failed altogether to understand what He was saying.

How little they understood is indeed revealed by the next incident which Mark records; the coming of James and John, and their request for the chief places in the Messianic Kingdom. When we bear in mind that these were two of the chosen inner circle of three, who were evidently the most spiritually advanced, it is strongly borne in upon us how terribly difficult was our Lord's task. When the other Apostles hear this, they are furious—which can only be interpreted to mean that they themselves would have done the same thing, if they had thought of it. Once more, the Lord with infinite patience repeats the lesson of humility.

In chapter xi. S. Mark gives us the opening of the final act in the mighty drama of the Incarnation. Before we consider it, let us pause to review our brief survey of our Lord's earthly ministry. As we have followed the plain, and almost bald, narrative of Mark, we have seen grace and truth proceeding from the central Figure, in an inseparable and intimate blend. We have seen our Lord's appeal to man's instinctive nature; we have seen His power to dominate that nature, a power so great that He had constantly to guard against the tendency to regard Him as a

[1] Mk. x. 32.

mere magician. What was an essentially similar form of the same tendency was the movement to crown Him an earthly king, which, according to the Johannine narrative, found expression after the feeding of the multitude. When we come to study in some detail the account we have of our Lord's temptations in the wilderness, we shall see Him fighting this very tendency, and gaining a decisive victory over it. We have sought to show that in His public ministry He overcame it by never allowing grace to proceed from Him, apart from some measure (as great a measure as possible, in fact) of truth. We have seen how this object was secured by the method of teaching by parables, which are so closely associated in the Gospel story with the works of grace.

In this narrative of S. Mark (supplemented occasionally by one or other of the rest of the Gospels) we seem to have been able to distinguish what we may call, in the terminology which we have borrowed from Dr. Otto, certain ' numinous ' moments. They appear quite clearly in the story for those who have eyes to see them, although unless one were looking for them they would pass unheeded. It is precisely this natural and unobtrusive nature of their mention in the Gospels which bears so strongly in favour of their historical value. They are not at all the kind of statements which would have been forged by a later writer in the interests of ecclesiastical dogma. Among these numinous moments, three in particular seem to be outstanding: (1) the wonderful draught of fishes; (2) the stilling of the storm; (3) the Transfiguration. We have seen how each of these fits quite naturally into a definite scheme, which we must suppose our Lord to have had in His mind. The first numinous moment, which was vouchsafed to the earliest disciples on the Sea of Galilee, seems to belong to a period when these moments were granted (though not indiscriminately) to all and sundry. In the synagogue, for example, we have seen that the general public witnessed one in the healing of the lunatic. It seems to be likely that the

incident on the Lake of Galilee concerned only the little group of disciples. The characteristics of this first group of numinous moments would appear to be well summed up in the reply which our Lord is reported to have sent back to the Baptist, when he sent messengers to enquire whether He was the Messiah or not: "Go your way and tell John the things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have good tidings preached to them" (Mt. xi. 4, 5). That is to say, this first group of numinous moments comprised largely what we may perhaps call numinous works of mercy. They were deeds of the kind suggested in the very passage which our Lord expounded in His discourse in the synagogue at Nazareth—the 61st chapter of Isaiah.

On every occasion, when one of these numinous experiences is vouchsafed to men, our Lord, we have seen, invariably accompanies it with teaching, given in the form of parables. In this way He strove to counteract the tendency to see in these experiences something merely magical. This tendency, however, seems to have been so strong in the case of the crowd that our Lord was unable to grant them any 'higher' numinous moments. On the contrary, as time goes on, we see Him seeking to avoid giving more experiences of the same kind even, because they were leading to grave misunderstanding.[1] It appears to have been only in response to great need, and out of sheer compassion, that, after a while, He vouchsafed any more of these moments. Even then, He accompanied them by words solemnly charging the persons concerned to tell nobody what had happened.

[1] Klausner (*op. cit.*, p. 272) holds that the reason for this was that our Lord's miracles were not always successful, and He was afraid to attempt them too often. But since nothing succeeds like success, it would be precisely the first miracles which would be most unlikely to succeed. Once our Lord had successfully performed wonders, therefore, He was little likely to fail subsequently. Moreover, what evidence is there of His failure?

Not only to the general public did our Lord soon cease to vouchsafe more of these numinous moments, except under great pressure of need, but it was also thus in relation to the Pharisees, and to the official leaders of religion. For these men had in a very short space of time gone to the extreme length, not merely of regarding Him as a magician, but as a dealer in black magic. Plainly, therefore, to such as these no further numinous revelation was possible.

In the case of the Twelve, however, it was different, and so we come to the second stage of numinous revelations. This was initiated by the stilling of the tempest; and we have seen how at this point the attention of the disciples is turned from the Kingdom to the King, and they begin to wonder who this can be. This stage is completed by Peter's great confession of faith.

The third stage, which our Lord was compelled to reserve for an inner group of three, was introduced by the Transfiguration. The experience here vouchsafed to the chosen three was not comprehended until after Pentecost. S. Peter, who as usual was the spokesman, on this occasion showed quite unmistakably that he was utterly at sea. But on the Day of Pentecost he showed equally plainly, as we shall see in due course, that he had been able to 'rationalise' this experience.

If our analysis of the Gospel story had been in any degree correct, then we are able to see how carefully our Lord planned out every stage in His great work, and how He left nothing to accident or to chance. When we come to the final stages of the work of redemption, this same impression of forethought and plan becomes still more forcible.

We turn, then, to the events of Holy Week. On the Sunday our Lord makes His solemn entry into the Holy City, surrounded by His followers. This event was obviously carefully planned. As in the case of the Last Supper, which was to follow in a few days, He had arranged everything beforehand. Riding upon

the beast of peace, He claims openly to be the Messiah. For our present purpose, we have to note not only the familiar truth that here our Lord sets aside any possible claim to be an earthly conqueror, but also that in the hour of His triumph He does everything He can to give the lie to any thoughts of Him as a mystery-monger, or a magician. Hence it is that we find no miracle recorded among His public, and, as we may say, official actions during this week. Nor does He speak by parables. This is what we should expect to find, if what we have said concerning His motive and purpose of teaching by parable is correct. There is, indeed, one parable which goes back to this time; it is the story of the Wicked Husbandmen. It does, however, but serve to support our position. For it stands apart from the rest of the parables spoken openly, being akin to those directed towards the Apostles only. That is to say, its meaning lies upon the surface, plain for all to see; and we are definitely told that His hearers quickly apprehended the lesson it was designed to teach. It was none other than the lesson that He was the unique Son of God.

It is evident that our Lord was compelled, before the end, to make His claim openly, for the benefit of later generations, if not for that of His contemporaries. By so doing, He had to run the risk of arousing false and magical ideas in the minds of His hearers. But by waiting to the end, and by making the claim not in ignorant and superstitious Galilee, but in well-learned and critical Jerusalem, He was reducing the danger to the minimum. Add to these considerations the fact that in less than a week afterwards He knew that He was going to suffer a death of utter weakness, and shame—a death, which, to all but those who had the eye of faith, would appear to make Him a sheer impostor—and we understand that our Lord was able to maintain what we have seen to be His principles firmly to the end.

One event, however, there is among the happenings of this week which appears to stand on a different foot-

ing from the rest, and which on the face of it looks like a piece of magic, pure and simple—the cursing of the barren fig-tree on the Monday morning. It is true that it took place in the presence of the disciples alone. This certainly removes some of the difficulties which it raises in our minds. Nevertheless, it is an incident which is difficult and strange. There are some who hold that its face value is its only value; it is a piece of undisguised magic. Such a position is adopted, for example, by Otto Stoll, who speaks roundly of our Lord as "the Magician of Nazareth." [1] He does not, indeed, regard Him as an impostor, as Renan did; on the contrary, he holds that He had great, and *bonâ fide* powers of suggestion, and he refers to this incident as the *'Feigenbaumtrick,'* which he likens to the famous mango trick. Our Lord, in fact, is reduced to the level of a common conjuror.

It is impossible to accept such an explanation seriously. What we have said makes it clear that it is altogether out of harmony with the whole of the rest of our Lord's earthly life, so that it is a highly unscientific hypothesis to explain the present problem. At the same time, it must be admitted that to find a satisfactory solution is a matter of extreme difficulty. No doubt we are justified in thinking that this story, as it has come down to us, has suffered in transit, so that we may well doubt whether we can be certain as to what actually did happen. The significant Matthean addition to the Marcan narrative, whereby it is said that the fig-tree *immediately* withered away, is sufficient to show this, and to reveal the tendency (which we have already noticed more than once among our Lord's hearers) to think of Him as a magician.

Whatever precisely did happen, it is at least certain that our Lord at once translated the event from the realm of magic to that of religion, by making it point to a lesson on faith in God. He thereby implicitly disavowed any kind of claim to be regarded as possessed

[1] *Suggestion und Hypnotismus in der Völkerpsychologie* (Zte. Auf.), p. 229.

of magical powers, for He clearly implied by what He said that what was done to the fig-tree was the effect of faith in God. It is, indeed, possible that by performing an act which on the face of it looked like a piece of pure magic, and then explaining that it was the result not of magical power inherent in Himself but of faith in God, He sought to get rid once and for all of every trace of magic from the minds of the Apostles. If this be so, then this event was a last desperate expedient on our Lord's part to teach the Twelve the lesson which we have seen that it was one of His chief intentions to impart, and which they were so slow to learn.

In the events of these last days of our Lord's earthly ministry, we have to remind ourselves, the truth to which we have already drawn attention holds good in a pre-eminent degree, namely, that the impression which our Lord created is of greater significance than even what He said or did, and it is precisely this impression which it is so hard for us, after nearly twenty centuries have elapsed, to catch. We can only dimly guess what that impression was, but it is something to be aware of our limitations in this respect, instead of being sublimely unconscious of their existence, as are so many.

It is not to our purpose to consider in detail all that our Lord said and did in these last solemn days. We pass on to the same night in which He was betrayed. The simple things which our Lord did on that night have been the centre of fierce dispute and misunderstanding. We may at least be sure of this in the light of our review of the Ministry; our Lord acted as no magician. On the contrary, He was clinging to the hard, cold reality of effort and self-sacrifice. He was investing that with the glory of the numinous. Here, if anywhere, it is fatal to ignore the impression which our Lord made upon those present—the look in His eyes, the tone of His voice, every movement of His body. And yet these things lie beyond us. We are left with the alternative of trusting the tradition of

the Apostles which they have handed down to us and adopting a position of utter agnosticism in these matters. There is no way ' back to Jesus.' The road is barred. Our own findings in this brief survey suffice to reveal this to us, even if the endless ' reconstructions ' and ' interpretations ' of the modern mind have not already sufficed.

After the Last Supper comes the Agony in the Garden. Otto has emphasised the numinousness of this, but perhaps we shall hesitate to follow him when he tells us that our Lord's ' amazement ' was that of the creature in the presence of the Creator. But he is surely right in insisting that it was no mere fear of death which caught our Lord in its grip. We have to remember the presence of the three members of the inner ring of Apostles. Why were they there? Was it in order that He might have the solace of their human companionship? Or was it rather that they might have yet one more supreme numinous moment, wherein the meaning of prayer and sacrifice should be revealed to them? Perhaps we may say that it was for both reasons, but surely the latter above all. The Apostles may have been heavy with sleep, but at least one of them was awake enough to give us the never-to-be-forgotten picture of the Agony beneath the olive shades. It was thus that our Lord gave the last numinous revelation prior to the Cross.

And so we come to Calvary. Here, if anywhere, is the saying true that the numinous can only be experienced and not described. We are so familiar with the wonderful story of our Lord's Passion that we are perhaps inclined to overlook its mysterious power over us; for this power is unquestionable, as everybody who has heard it read, not altogether unworthily, to a congregation in church can testify. Yet what we have, in fact, is just the account of a brutal murder, carried out in one of the most revolting ways ever devised by the cruelty of man. Possibly only those who have actually witnessed a crucifixion can rightly appreciate the significance of this. We seem compelled to admit

that it is the numinousness of the Central Figure which alone accounts for it. Herein surely is the explanation of the strange saying of the centurion: "Truly this man was the Son of God." [1] That verdict, we submit, is forced from the lips of all who, with minds unblinded by prejudice, will ponder long and deeply the story of the Gospels.

Of the Resurrection appearances I shall not speak. If we confine ourselves, as we have in the main attempted to do, to the Marcan narrative, they lie outside our purview. But if there is any truth in the findings of our treatment of the earthly life of Jesus of Nazareth, it is evident that they are entirely congruous, even if they are not actually demanded by it. Moreover, our examination of that life will enable us to see clearly the reason why our Lord, according to the records, did not appear to any but faithful believers and disciples. It would have been entirely contrary to the whole method of His life to have done so. On the other hand, if our interpretation of that life seems, on other grounds, to be false and misleading, the account of the Resurrection appearances will scarcely be able to rehabilitate it.

[1] Mk. xv. 39.

Chapter VI

THE HOLY SPIRIT

We have spoken of grace as being the stimulation of the religious instinct, and of other instincts aroused in connection with it. We now proceed to ask how this view of grace enables us to understand what we mean by the Holy Spirit. It is safe to assert that no part of orthodox Christian theology is in such a state of darkness and confusion as the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Our theory of grace will therefore be considerably strengthened if it should lead to an intelligible theory of the Spirit.

The stimulus which we have called grace is normally regarded as being in some sort 'external' to the organism; whereas, on the other hand, the instinct itself is regarded as being 'internal.' Can this distinction be rightly maintained, or are we simply the slaves of a local metaphor? If not, how exactly are we to understand the meaning of the distinction?

The answer seems to be that the distinction is well founded, since it can be expressed in other ways. For we know that stimulus of itself is insufficient to produce any result; it must synchronise with predisposition in the organism. Apart from this, no response to the appropriate stimulus will take place. William James drew attention to this phenomenon, which he characterised under two 'laws'—the Law of the transitoriness of instincts, and the Law of the inhibition of instinct by habit. James pointed out, for example, that in the case of the lower animals, if the instinct to suck is not stirred shortly after birth, the animal never learns to suck at all. He did not assert, as we have already had occasion to observe, that all instincts were transitory in this way, but he cited sufficient evidence to prove the point which we are here concerned to make, namely, that stimulus, apart from predisposition to meet it, is powerless to achieve any result. This same point is proved once more by the other law which

James formulated as follows: "When objects of a certain class elicit from an animal a certain sort of reaction, it often happens that the animal becomes partial to the first specimen of the class on which it has reacted, and will not afterwards react on any other specimen." [1] This Law is exemplified by numberless familiar examples, and accounts for the natural conservatism of nature, animal and human. It illustrates very clearly the truth that stimulus without predisposition is powerless. The name which we commonly give to this predisposition is appetite.

If this principle holds good of instinct in all cases, then it must hold good of the religious instinct, and we shall have to enlarge our conception of grace to include the internal predisposition as well as the external stimulus. This internal appetite is the basis of our longing for the divine. It may be called 'internal' grace to distinguish it from 'external' grace which is produced by stimuli from without. About the latter we have already spoken fully; it is our intention to attempt to show that the former is to be identified with the work of the Holy Spirit.

In the New Testament writings it will not be denied that the Holy Spirit is generally regarded as the source of both light and power. The result of the Pentecostal outpouring was to strengthen the recipients of it to live more Christ-like lives, and also to teach them certain truths about Christ and God. The point, however, which has been commonly overlooked is that the increase in power and the increase in knowledge are inseparably connected. As we shall show in a moment, they are simply two sides of the same operation.

We have to remember that modern psychology has taught us (what we certainly did not know scientifically before, though all moralists and sages knew it) that a great deal of the darkness in the mind of man has a moral and spiritual origin. There are none so blind as those who will not see. In other words, this

[1] *Principles of Psychology*, ii, p. 394.

darkness is frequently due to the repression of ideas and thoughts associated with one or more of the instincts. Before enlightenment can take place, these repressions must be broken down. As a rule, this breaking down of barriers in the mind takes place more or less suddenly. That there was such a sudden breaking down of barriers in the minds of the Apostles at Pentecost is certain beyond doubt, by reason of the strange phenomenon, known as Speaking with Tongues, which took place on that occasion. We shall return to this question afterwards. What we have to do now is to discover, if we can, what repressions were broken down on that occasion, and how their overthrowing resulted in an access of strength (as it evidently did) to the first disciples.

The work of Christ was plainly not finished at the Crucifixion. One stage was finished, indeed, but more remained to be done. If we read the Gospel story carefully in order to discover the state of mind in which the Apostles found themselves when the Lord was crucified, it is fairly evident that they were not integrated personalities. In Pauline language, they were still natural men—i.e. their various instincts were not yet harmonised into a consistent whole. Certain instincts in particular were refractory. There was, for example, the instinct of acquisition. S. Peter voiced this without camouflage, when he said: "Lo, we have left all and followed thee, what then shall we have?"[1] Their instinct of self-assertion finds lively expression in the miserable dispute as to who should be the greatest. Their instinct of gregariousness was anything but Christian when it led some of them to rebuke somebody for doing the same things as themselves, simply because he did not belong to their own circle. Their instinct of combat prompted the very last action which any one of them did for their Master before His death, when S. Peter drew the sword impulsively in Gethsemane. Their instinct of fear led them to run away at the last as fast as

[1] Mt. xix. 27.

their legs would carry them. It is fairly obvious and plain to see that the Apostles were anything but integrated personalities at the time of the Crucifixion. They were men utterly weakened by an internal conflict of various competing instincts.

Are we able to say that they were not only weak but blind? That is to say, can we find out whether there were any special truths whereof they were ignorant, which may be correlated with this defective power we have noted above? There seem to have been two truths which pre-eminently had so far evaded their understanding, and they are these: the meaning of the Cross, and their relation to the Gentiles. A study of the records makes it clear beyond question that the giving of the Holy Spirit led them to make good both these deficiencies. It is possible, I believe, to show that this was achieved by the integrating of the various refractory instincts mentioned above. For there can be no doubt that after Pentecost these instincts *were* thus integrated. They care nothing for personal gain any more; there are no disputes as to who is the greatest now; there is no attempt to use force now; above all, there is a complete absence of fear. In a word, they are integrated personalities. Suddenly, as the result of some external stimulus, they are completely harmonised personalities, and at the same time they are led to understand the meaning of the Cross. Moreover, the way was made ready for the solution of the problem of their relation to the Gentiles, as we shall see in due course.

The truth of what happened to the Apostles at Pentecost seems to be that they suddenly became integrated and enlightened precisely because their refractory instincts had hitherto prevented them from understanding the teaching which our Lord had given them about the Cross. This teaching was flatly inconsistent with the natural dictates of all the five instincts which we have mentioned as being specially rebellious, namely, acquisition, self-assertion, gregari-

ousness, combat and fear. Once they could be brought to assent to the truth that self-sacrifice was the divine method, giving it, in Newman's phrase, a real as distinct from a merely notional assent, then the offence of the Cross was removed, and at the same time they had found a power which was able to sublimate into higher channels the hitherto refractory instincts. Instead of regarding the Cross as a ghastly mistake to be forgotten as quickly as possible, they saw that it was the work of God; they understood that self-sacrificing love was the secret of peace, and so their feet were guided into the way of peace once for all.

This interpretation of what happened at Pentecost appears to be in accordance with what we are told in the New Testament. We know how bitterly the disciples, as represented by their spokesman, S. Peter, resented from the first moment it was suggested to them the idea that their Master was to die a violent death. S. Mark tells us that when the subject was again broached by Him they were afraid to ask Him about it. Nor must we forget (as we may easily do) the horror which the actual crucifixion must have raised in their minds. We are so familiar with the narrative that we are inclined to overlook the magnitude of this. It would lead to a repression of all the unpalatable teaching which they had received just previously, and to an accentuation of those refractory instincts.

It is true, as we know full well from the radiant opening of S. Peter's first Epistle, that Easter Day was a day of triumph for them; but we must not allow ourselves to forget that even then the Cross was still something to be forgotten. It was conquered, but it was not explained. Even on the eve of the Ascension we know that the little band of disciples had no conception of the meaning of the Cross. They still had their hopes of an earthly kingdom. But from the Day of Pentecost we find something different. We find S. Peter, in the very first sermon that he preached, on that day saying plainly that the Crucifixion was

no mistake, but a divinely appointed event. We can only infer from this that the teaching which Christ had given them about the Cross, and which had been repressed by their disobedient instincts, had broken through, and at the same time had subdued those self-same instincts. It seems, then, that the essential meaning of Pentecost was that for the first time in history human personality was integrated by the operation of the Holy Spirit.

We have not yet said anything about the cause of this great happening. What induced that repressed material thus suddenly to break through? The New Testament says unhesitatingly that it was the stimulus of the Risen and Ascended Christ,[1] and possibly Professor Burkitt is right when he says that the appearance of our Lord to above five hundred brethren at once, of which S. Paul speaks in 1 Corinthians, relates to Pentecost. Be this as it may, there can be no doubt whatever that the first disciples regarded what happened at Pentecost as being due to the operation of Christ. "This Jesus did God raise up, whereof we all are witnesses. Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath poured forth this, which ye see and hear."[2]

We may now turn to consider the accounts of the outpouring on the Gentiles, in the person of Cornelius and his friends. So far as the Apostles' state of mind is concerned we have light only upon the attitude of S. Peter; but perhaps we shall not be far wrong in assuming that his condition is typical of the rest of the apostolic band. What we seem to find here is that the instinct of gregariousness is brought completely into line by the recognition of the truth that the Gentiles were to be admitted to the privileges of the new Israel. The actual work of integration appears

[1] So in 1 Pet. i. 10, we even find S. Peter saying that the foreshadowing in the O.T. of the Passion was the work not of the Spirit of God merely, but of the Spirit of *Christ*.

[2] Acts ii. 32, 33.

to have been done at Pentecost. The call of Cornelius merely served to bring out what was latent. We are given details of what went on inside S. Peter's mind at this time. We know that the problem was occupying his thoughts to such an extent that he had a dream in which his inherited antipathy to the Gentiles found an outlet in likening them to unclean animals. But when the knock came to the door, and the friends of Cornelius appeared, he was quite clear that he must obey the summons, "making no distinction." This is something which would have been quite beyond him prior to Pentecost. The conflict was, in fact, solved for him by the power of the indwelling Spirit, who was gradually leading him to a full apprehension of the truth. That is why, on this occasion, there was no speaking with tongues on his part, since there was no disintegrated part of his soul which needed to find expression.

On the other hand, that there was a mild degree of repression, in the form of forgetfulness, prior to the moment when the Holy Spirit was poured out on Cornelius and his friends, we know from his express words; for, when he was recounting the story to the assembly of the faithful at Jerusalem in after days, he told them that he "remembered the word of the Lord, how that he said, John indeed baptised with water; but ye shall be baptised with the Holy Ghost."[1] The strange fact that S. Peter remembered these words (the narrative suggests that it was for the first time) now rather than at Pentecost proves that they had been repressed, in spite of the fact that they had been spoken by our Lord after the Resurrection. It is possible to hazard a probable guess as to the reason for this act of forgetting. We know that S. Peter was the brother of S. Andrew, one of John's disciples, and therefore possibly one of his disciples too. In any case he would have come under his influence. But John's baptism was only for Jews, and therefore the words of our Lord concerning His

[1] Acts xi. 16.

baptism would naturally, in view of the context in which they were spoken, be regarded as having the same sphere of application. If this was the case, then it is possible to see why any thought that they applied to the Gentiles also should have been repressed, and hence why they should have leapt to mind at this particular moment, when it was realised that their application was world-wide.

A word may be said in passing on the difficult subject of the glossolaly. Although it seems to be impossible, from the evidence at our command, to arrive at any certain conclusion as to the precise nature of these utterances, modern psychology enables us without any doubt whatever to find a general category in which to place them. They may be taken quite certainly as evidence of the bursting forth of repressed thoughts and desires. If there is any truth in our analysis of the state of mind of the Apostles just before the Day of Pentecost, then we can go further and say why it was that they spoke with tongues; that is to say, we can point to the particular instinctive forces which prompted the phenomenon. In this connection, it is important to observe carefully, as was pointed out above, that on the occasion of the second outpouring (on the Gentiles) the Apostles themselves did not speak with tongues. That the Gentiles did so is, on our theory, to have been expected, since *their* refractory instincts were suddenly brought into line. They were not a casual collection of Gentiles. On the contrary, Cornelius was a peculiarly devout and chosen individual, and it is hardly likely that he would have summoned any but those who were like-minded among his kinsmen and friends to hear what S. Peter had to say. No doubt they had studied and pondered upon the life of Jesus of Nazareth, and had gradually been brought close to a complete surrender to Him.

But a barrier there certainly was, in that what they had heard of Him might lend colour to the opinion that His message was for Jews only. This would naturally lead to resentment, and an unrighteous

feeling of pride or self-love, intensified by race consciousness. We may perhaps suppose that it was the sudden integration of the sentiments based upon these instincts with the rest of their personalities which led these men to break out into speaking with tongues. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that they were influenced by the report of what had happened at Pentecost, and that there was an element of unconscious imitation predisposing them to this form of activity. By the time of the outpouring upon the little group of John's disciples at Ephesus, there would be a still greater probability of this factor exercising an influence on the course of events. Speaking with tongues was beginning to be fashionable, as we know, from S. Paul's admonitions on the subject in 1 Corinthians xiv, it soon came to be. The dangerous idea began to grow up that a person was not a true Christian unless he could boast of this experience. We know from what happened later that history has more than once repeated itself in this matter.

If there is any truth in the foregoing account of what happened at Pentecost, then we may translate what we have stated in terms of psychology into the language of theology by saying that the Apostles were converted at Pentecost. This makes it desirable to compare and to contrast the conversion of the Twelve with the conversion of him who regarded himself as the thirteenth apostle. We said in the fourth chapter that the conversion of S. Paul has affinities with magic, and we sought to show that the errors caused by his doctrine of irresistible grace took their rise from this fact. Are we to conclude, therefore, that the happenings at Pentecost were magical likewise? By no means; there are highly important differences between the two events.

In the first place, let us bear it carefully in mind that there is definite evidence of dissociation in the case of S. Paul, witnessed by his blindness, which was clearly of a psychogenic nature. In the case of the Apostles there is no evidence that there was anything

more than repression. This distinction is of vital importance. For repression is a perfectly normal experience, common to everybody. Dissociation, on the contrary, is definitely abnormal and pathological. In the case of S. Paul it was the suddenness of the dissociation which gave to him the impression of the overwhelming nature of grace, and which ultimately led later thinkers astray, as in fact it did not lead him. For, as we have seen, this experience was in his case counterbalanced by other experiences.

The conversion of the Twelve at Pentecost, although it appears to have been of a 'sudden' variety, was quite different in character. The Apostles were not, like S. Paul, thrown into a state of dissociation as a result of it. On the contrary, they were fully integrated, and began forthwith to proclaim the Gospel.

In the second place, we may perhaps see the reason for this difference between the two cases. S. Paul was what none of the Twelve was—a Pharisee. He himself makes it quite clear to us that it was as heir of the great Pharisaic tradition that he was plunged into the fierce internal conflict which he has so graphically described to us.[1] The Twelve, on the contrary, belonged to an altogether different *milieu*. It would seem that before their contact with Christ began they had been ordinary, simple, working folk. The probability is that they were not what we should call specially 'religious' at all. That they were "pure in heart" must surely be the case; but beyond this they were scarcely different from their companions and friends. They were most probably content to go quietly on their way, without making any very desperate efforts to attain 'righteousness,' and without any particular sense of sin. The consequence was that when Christ came across their path, their reaction to Him was totally different from that of Saul of Tarsus. Instead of being repelled, as the latter was, by what as a strict Pharisee he could only regard as a religious upstart, they were immediately and strangely attracted

[1] Supposing the account in Rom. vii. to be autobiographical.

to Him. It did not in the least concern them that He might not be orthodox. They knew little, and probably cared as little about orthodoxy. They just followed Him because they could not do otherwise. "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." [1] This precisely expresses their attitude of mind. Under these circumstances, therefore, there would be no internal struggle of the kind which distracted S. Paul. Their conversion took place by a gradual and almost imperceptible process, in all its early stages, at any rate. It was not until the end that the struggle began—a struggle not in any way connected with or intensified by systems of theology, but the struggle of weak human nature to escape the claims of self-sacrifice.

Yet we must not suppose that S. Paul's conversion is belittled by what we have said. It was a genuine conversion indeed, as is proved by his subsequent life. Being what he was, it could have taken place in no other way. We shall, however, go sadly astray if we regard it as normative for humanity in general. It probably never would have been so regarded, had not two of the most powerful personalities in the whole history of Christianity—S. Augustine and Luther—had similar experiences themselves, which led them, not unnaturally, to seize upon and to over-emphasise this side of S. Paul's life and teaching.

It is important that we should notice that the resolving of the conflict which had issued in the dissociation, and the receiving by the Apostle of the Holy Spirit, are definitely linked together. "And Ananias departed, and entered into the house; and laying his hands on him said, Brother Saul, the Lord, even Jesus, who appeared unto thee in the way which thou camest, hath sent me, *that thou mayest receive thy sight, and be filled with the Holy Ghost.*" [2] This exactly harmonises with our theory of the pouring out of the Spirit at Pentecost. The coming of the Spirit then, as in S. Paul's case, was simply another way of

[1] Jn. vi. 68. [2] Acts ix. 17.

expressing the fact that a true integration of a divided personality had taken place. In strictness, therefore, S. Paul's conversion did not take place on the road to Damascus, but in the city itself in the house of Ananias.

Such, then, was the great Apostle's experience of the 'grace' of God. In later years, when he came to write theological letters to his fellow Christians, we know how often the word 'grace' fell from his pen. It appears nearly a hundred times altogether, apart from the Pastoral Epistles. Possibly it will seem to many that the word as he used it does not bear the interpretation which we have been at such pains to fix upon it. It is not, of course, claimed that S. Paul, when he used the word, had in mind the set of theological ideas which we have associated with it. Plainly it would have been impossible for him to do so, since the psychological categories which we have employed to assist us are scarcely a generation old. Nor can it be asserted that our distinction between grace and truth was one which he had in view. But I think that we can quite definitely claim that the key to the understanding of the word 'grace,' as S. Paul uses it (apart from the occasions when he employs it in the untechnical sense of kindness or favour) is to be found in his conversion experience; and, further, that the key to that conversion experience is the unification of his personality by a powerful appeal to his religious instinct by the Risen Christ.

If proof for this position be demanded, it is surely found in the fact, by no means adequately grasped, as a rule, that every one of his epistles (including the Pastoral Epistles, if they are his) opens with a salutation in which 'grace' and 'peace' are correlated; and, with the possible exception of the letter to the Colossians, where the text is open to doubt, the grace and peace are said to be from God, the Father, and from our Lord Jesus Christ. In view of this language, is it possible to question what was fundamentally in the Apostle's mind, when he used the word grace?

It was the power which had integrated him, and harmonised the conflicting forces in his personality into one. From this great experience, when subsequently he came to reflect upon it, no doubt important inferences as to the character of God, and the position of man, might be drawn. In particular it was inevitable that he should contrast this experience with his previous experience when he was under the Law. But the fundamental meaning of grace for the Apostle must always have been the same. If he had, in his day, met a psycho-analyst, and the test word 'grace' had been given to him, it is scarcely open to doubt that his reaction would have been 'peace.'

The true significance of this 'peace' which was indissolubly linked in the Apostle's mind with 'grace' can only be adequately understood by remembering that it arose as a dissociation. It is precisely this element which is one of the most striking characteristics of dissociation as distinct from repression. Indeed, it appears to be its biological function to give peace, for we know that nature abhors a conflict in an organism just as she abhors a vacuum. The dissociation is the price of peace. There are numberless instances of psychogenic blindness in the Great War which illustrate this truth—cases, for example, where the conflict between fear which prompted the desire to return home to safety, and the other instincts of self, such as self-assertion and the herd instinct, prompted the desire to stand fast, was solved by the soldier becoming blind, and being able to return to a place of safety with entire self-respect and honour. Such cases were always altogether at peace, and bear a marked contrast to the neurasthenics who, wearied by the struggle with continually active repressions, were a misery to themselves all the day long.

Even so, we may believe, Saul of Tarsus suddenly found 'peace' on the road to Damascus. The moment came when that part of him which saw in the Jewish Law the supreme embodiment of truth refused to see it any longer. Henceforth he was blind

to it altogether for a season, and so he obtained peace. Nevertheless, the conversion had not truly taken place. It had begun, or rather the final stage of it had begun, but it was not completed. The completion took place when the split-off portion of Saul's personality was reunited with the remainder of it, in the moment when Ananias laid his hands upon him. From that moment, instead of refusing to look at the Jewish Law any more by reason of resentment against it, he was able to relate it truly to Christ. He was able to see that it was not in fact an enemy to be resisted, but rather, to use his own phrase, "a schoolmaster to lead us to Christ." [1]

Quite in accordance with this view of the meaning of the gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost is S. Paul's teaching on the 'fruit' of the Spirit in Galatians. As is well known, he begins with the great triad, Love, Joy, Peace. The other six 'fruits' appear to be to some extent departmental; these are each co-extensive with the whole personality, and are expressions of it. If we may attempt to sum up in one word what S. Paul means by love, it is quite certain that we must do so in the word 'Calvary.' "The love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge that one died for all." [2] "The Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." [3] In other words, love is, for S. Paul, self-sacrifice, and thereto agreeth his great hymn in praise of love. And this is what we have seen to be the essential power and gift bestowed at Pentecost, and by means of it were the personalities of the Apostles harmonised.

This leads on to the second on S. Paul's list of the fruits of the Spirit, namely, joy. Joy, in the view of most modern psychologists, is a derived emotion, which operates in and through the activity of a dominant sentiment. The more powerful and comprehensive the sentiment, the greater and the more enduring is the joy. We should therefore naturally expect to find joy placed immediately after love, if

[1] Gal. iii. 24. [2] Cor. v. 14. [3] Gal. ii. 20.

love has the power which we have claimed for it—i.e. the power of harmonising human personality. That S. Paul was right here the record in the Acts of the Apostles clearly shows; for nothing is more remarkable than the joyfulness of the early Christians after the gift of Pentecost. The third 'fruit,' namely, peace, once more springs from a perfectly harmonised personality. In fact, it is true to say that for a lasting peace in the soul nothing less than a full and complete integration of the personality will suffice. It follows, therefore, that Love, Joy and Peace provide an accurate description and analysis of the condition of mind which, on our view, obtained in the case of the Apostles at Pentecost.

These things being so, we may surely claim that our theory of grace does justice to S. Paul's teaching on the subject, and, in addition, throws a great deal of light upon the experiences which underlay that teaching. We are enabled to see that if his conversion had followed a more normal course, such as that which took place at Pentecost, he would, on occasion at least, have expressed some of his teaching rather differently, and he would not have used language which later generations were destined to exaggerate, and could scarcely fail to misunderstand.

We are now in a position to attempt to formulate a doctrine of the Holy Spirit. We may sum up the results of our discussion thus far in the following five propositions:

(1) At Pentecost the Apostles received power through the integration of their personalities, and the acceptance by their minds of the ideal of Calvary, these two operations being simply different aspects of one and the same process.

(2) The sudden breaking down of certain repressed instincts led to Speaking with Tongues.

(3) The same process, *mutatis mutandis*, took place in the outpouring of the Spirit on the Gentiles, as also in the conversion of S. Paul, and all other converted Christians.

(4) The Apostles believed that what happened to them at Pentecost was due to the influence of Jesus Christ, who was still alive, acccording to their firm conviction.

(5) Grace consists not only in the external stimulus of the religious instinct (and of others in association with it), but also in the internal appetite, or predisposition, which characterises it and all other instincts.

In approaching our difficult task, it will assist matters if we can make clear to ourselves what is the goal to which we hope to attain. Perhaps we may express it most simply in the following way. Granting that the Holy Spirit has worked in the world from the beginning, the question to which we wish to find an answer is, In what way can it be truly said that He 'came' at Pentecost? Or, in other words, What is the essential difference between the Old Dispensation and the New?

The position which we shall seek to maintain in reply to this question is that the clue to the answering of it is to be found in the distinction which we have affirmed between stimulus and appetite. We have said that there is in man a religious instinct, and that grace is the name which we give to the stimulation of it. But it is clear that the religious instinct, like any other instinct, is powerless apart from the impulsion of appetite just as it is blind apart from the guidance of the right stimulus. In itself an instinct is a mental structure or disposition, which will not operate unless it is internally moved by appetite. If, therefore, we postulate that the appetite behind the religious instinct is the work of the Spirit of God, we seem to have a doctrine of the Spirit which is both consistent with the facts, and intelligible. We shall attempt to show that this is the case. This appetite is, in fact, the basis of the human longing for the divine, expressed in the oft-quoted words of S. Augustine, "Fecisti nos ad te, Domine, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te."[1] It is the crowning element in

[1] *Confessions*, i. 1.

human nature. If this is so, then what happened at Pentecost was that this instinct in the Apostles was stimulated by the Ascended Christ, God and Man, and thereby it was enabled to harmonise ordinary human nature for the first time. We may express this differently by saying that the Spirit of God for the first time completely held sway over men. In the past, although the Spirit of God had greatly influenced humanity, it had never been able to dominate the 'unruly wills and affections of sinful men,' simply because an adequate stimulus was not available. It was, however, supplied by the Perfect Humanity of Christ on the Day of Pentecost.

It will perhaps be thought that it is impossible thus to limit the operation of the Holy Spirit to the religious instinct alone. Are not all our instincts God-given? Undeniably this is the case, and they must each and all be regarded as being due to the Spirit of God. But the same applies to the powers of conscious thought, and indeed to all the endowments of man, both physical and spiritual. "In him we live and move and have our being."[1] Such a way of thinking is clearly in accordance with Old Testament usage. At the same time it is true to say that there is a tendency found there to regard the operations of the religious instinct as being specially due to Him. It is in the lives of those whom we call prophets that He is uniquely revealed, and it is through them that He specially manifests His power. So we say in the Nicene Creed, "Who spake by the prophets," thereby summarising the work of the Old Dispensation. In this way we give expression to the doctrine of degrees of immanence, a doctrine which is demanded by any truly theistic view of the world. In the men in whom the religious instinct was more influential and dominant than it was in the rank and file of humanity we thus find the manifestation *par excellence* of the work of the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament.

It is indeed to this truth that the Hebrew tradition

[1] Acts xvii. 28.

as a whole bears striking witness, and it is its most distinctive mark, whereby it is sharply distinguished from other traditions. It is, for example, altogether different from the Greek tradition, which looked for the chief manifestations of the divine not in the inspirations of prophets, but in the reasonings of the philosophers. But the Hebrew mind thought it true to say that "the world by wisdom knew not God." [1] The supreme revelation of the Spirit was not in the magnificent thought of Plato, but in the foolishness of the Cross of Christ prefigured by Moses and the prophets. For once the stimulus of the actual Cross had been given by the historic Christ, and accepted freely, the appetite of the religious instinct was stirred to such an extent that all the rest of the human personality was harmonised as a result. Apart from man's endowment with this instinct, no such harmonising seems to be possible; or, in other words, man cannot fulfil his destiny. Here is the wide channel for the Divine Spirit to flood the whole human landscape; in comparison with this, other channels are but tiny rivulets, which speedily dry up, and are easily turned aside or dammed by every obstacle. It is for this reason that there is justification and value in limiting the word 'grace' to the operations of the religious instinct and speaking of the latter as the sphere of the Spirit's operations upon man. For it is pre-eminently the source of the divine in man. Apart from it, so far as we can tell, man is in no way essentially different from the lower animals, who nevertheless, in some sense, must be regarded as having their being in God. "Thou takest away their breath and they die." [2]

We have said that 'ordinary human nature' was for the first time harmonised by the power of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. But human nature in the person of the historic Christ had been thus harmonised before, and, as we have seen, the perfect humanity thus achieved provided the requisite stimulus to let

[1] 1 Cor. i. 21. [2] Ps. civ. 29.

loose the maximum forces of the Holy Spirit in the religious instinct, as it is found in ordinary human nature. In strictness, we should say in fallen human nature; we shall be able to consider later what meaning our theory enables us to attribute to this expression.

If we study the record of the earthly life of our Lord, we seem to find there human nature developing gradually and in perfect order. From the first the Holy Spirit was able to be the supreme influence in that life, which was thus lived as human life was intended to be lived. But it fell on a day, so we read, when Christ was about thirty years of age, that our Lord, being baptised by John the Baptist, as He came up out of the water, consciously realised for the first time this supreme fact. Now, if there is any truth in our theory of the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, it will follow that the inner meaning of Christ's Baptism was that He consciously realised and accepted then for the first time the ideal of self-sacrifice—i.e. of the Cross. That is to say, at this moment, the ideal of self-sacrifice which had been more or less unconsciously His in the comparative ease and quiet of the simple village life at Nazareth, was definitely accepted by Him in His capacity as the Messianic Son of God.

That this was, in fact, the case seems to be clear from His own words later, in which He spoke of His coming death as a baptism. "I have a baptism to be baptised with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished." [1] And again: "Jesus said unto them, Ye know not what ye ask. Are ye able to drink the cup that I drink? or to be baptised with the baptism that I am baptised with?" [2] The significance of these words has been too frequently overlooked. Why should our Lord have regarded His coming death as a baptism, unless the baptism that He had already undergone was associated in His mind with the Cross? We can conclude with certainty, therefore, that this was the case, and we find our theory of the Holy

[1] Lk. xii. 50. [2] Mk. x. 38.

Spirit somewhat unexpectedly confirmed. Moreover, the symbolism of the dove in the baptismal vision is quite intelligible on this view, for the dove is the only sacrificial bird under the Old Covenant.

Our Lord's Baptism, therefore, was His Pentecost. In principle it was identical with the baptism of the Apostles which, according to S. Peter, He "poured forth" upon them. It was the conscious acceptance of the ideal of self-sacrificing love (which means the Cross) in each case. And yet there was a vitally important difference between the two events. As we have seen, the baptism of the Twelve at Pentecost was the culmination of a long struggle in which the Holy Spirit had been resisted, to use the expression of Stephen in his great speech. But by the power of the stimulus provided by the Ascended Christ the Holy Spirit was enabled finally to prevail. Far otherwise was it with the Christ Himself. There is no evidence of any struggle here. The data indeed are scanty, but the glimpse which we have of Him as a lad of twelve reveals to us a perfectly smooth and steady growth in obedience to and apprehension of the Father's will. In His case human nature unfolded itself naturally, like a flower, in the sunshine of the Father's presence, by the inherent power of His Personality. There was no disobedience, and so we find no evidence of repression or dissociation. There was no pathological symptom, as in the case of S. Paul; no speaking with tongues even, as in the case of the Apostles.

Nevertheless, our Lord's human nature was human through and through. He was in all points tempted like ourselves, precisely because He was possessed of all our human instincts. It was inevitable, therefore, that He should endure some internal struggle, and such indeed was the case. Immediately after the Baptism, He goes out into the wilderness to face up to the consequences of this newly accepted ideal, and forthwith the forces of His humanity for which that ideal was going to mean repression, or rather sublimation, began to assert themselves, and so we get the experiences

known as the temptations. What meaning we are to attribute to these we shall consider in a moment. But we must grasp first the great significance of the fact that they took place *after* the Baptism, and not before it. That is to say, we do not find in these temptations a conflict brought about by disobedience to the known will of the Father, as, for example, the conflict in the case of the Apostles was brought about. We find the totally different phenomenon of a consciously accepted ideal of sacrifice causing a protest to be uttered by those elements of our human nature which would thereby have to submit themselves to it. To put it somewhat differently, the temptations were caused by the other instincts attempting to rebel against the consciously assumed command of the personality by the religious instinct, which in the case of our Lord was always in control, but now for the first time was so by a deliberate act of will, rather than by virtue of an unself-conscious nature, as before.

We may indeed, if we choose to do so, maintain that temptations similar to these had taken place before in our Lord's life. Of this it is, of course, impossible to speak with certainty. In this case, the matter is not essentially different, for, assuming as we must that the temptations were generically the same as those of which we have an account, they do not seem to rise from anything of the nature of a consciousness of having done wrong, but solely from the frailty of human nature.

We proceed, then, to consider our Lord's temptations, as they are recorded for us, from this point of view. Our remarks will not be an attempt at an exhaustive theory of their meaning, so much as an effort to elucidate by means of them the meaning of the work of the Holy Spirit. We have said that in our Lord's perfect humanity the religious instinct, by which He, as man, was enabled to hold unbroken communion with the Father, presided from the first. At His Baptism, however, we have seen that the full consequences of maintaining that communion were

consciously realised by Him, presumably for the first time, and at any rate with a force and power not known before. His Divine Sonship meant for Him the following of the path of sacrificial love. He consciously accepted it, and forthwith experienced the inner joy of the Father's good pleasure. But the consequence of this acceptance of the Cross, for such it was, was a revolt, or rather an attempted revolt on the part of the lowlier, if not the lower, elements in human nature against this ideal. We know, too, that a similar revolt took place in the Garden of Gethsemane just before the end. There we are told that He thought of the experience as a drinking of the cup; here He thought of it as a baptism. How closely associated the two were in His mind is evident from His association of both the ideas together in the Marcan passage, already quoted, in which He refers to His coming sacrifice as a baptism.

Such a revolt as this we should naturally expect to find in the period of Christ's life which immediately followed upon His Baptism. We have now to enquire how far this is the case. In pursuing this enquiry we do not, of course, fail to remember that we are dealing with a high and mysterious question, which is *ex hypothesi* beyond our normal experience, and to that extent above our understanding. Nevertheless, we are bound to use our knowledge of human nature, as far as it goes, to enable us to gain such understanding of these matters as is possible for us. Not to avail ourselves of this knowledge is to throw away the only ladder we have to assist us in scaling the heights.

We turn, therefore, to consider the story of our Lord's temptations, following upon His Baptism, as that story is told in the First and the Third Gospels. The Marcan account is brief, and, since it adds nothing to the other two accounts, with the exception of the mention of the presence of the wild beasts, we can for our present purpose ignore it. Our aim will be to endeavour to see what instincts rose in rebellion against the religious instinct, and what the precise

nature of the ensuing conflict was. In this way, it may be that we shall not only obtain fresh light on the meaning of our Lord's temptations, but we shall also perhaps find additional evidence to support the main thesis which we are endeavouring to uphold concerning the nature and work of the Holy Spirit.

The first temptation—to turn stones into bread—is plainly due to a conflict between the instinct of hunger and the religious instinct. Possibly other instincts were concerned as well; almost certainly they were, for isolated instincts do not operate as a rule in human nature, as they may do in the lower animals. But at any rate the chief instincts in this conflict were the two we have mentioned. The result of the conflict was that hunger was sublimated into the path of religion. This is clear from the Old Testament passage which rose to our Lord's mind, and by the aid of which the repulsion of the attack was made. "Man shall not live by bread alone." [1] S. Matthew gives the second half of the quotation as well, and this makes what was evidently in our Lord's mind quite explicit: "But by every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of God." [2]

If our interpretation of the meaning of our Lord's Baptism is correct, then it is not difficult to see the reason for His refusal to satisfy the pangs of hunger. He had just finally chosen the ideal of self-sacrifice, and part of that sacrifice for Him was the undertaking of the long fast, as it has been for many religious devotees before and since. During this time He would have the opportunity of making a long retreat away from all human companionship, but in the presence of the Father.

There is a difficulty which arises in connection with this temptation in that it is placed first in the list of temptations, while we are expressly told that he 'afterwards' hungered. We surely cannot doubt that He must have hungered long before the end of the forty days. We shall return to this difficulty later. Mean-

[1] Dt. viii. 3. [2] Mt. iv. 4.

while, let us pass on to the second temptation. We shall follow S. Luke's order which, in view of the first Evangelist's love of grouping, is perhaps the more likely to be correct. But we have to remember that in a matter of this kind there is, strictly speaking, no 'order.' The various temptations may have alternated and recurred again and again, in different forms, and the accounts we have are probably just typical instances selected from a large mass of material.

In the second temptation our Lord sees all the kingdoms of the world, and feels the desire to fall down and worship the devil, in order that He may obtain possession of them. The conflict in this case seems to be between the religious instinct, and the instinct of self-assertion. Our Lord is tempted to abandon the ideal of self-sacrificing love for that of power. It may have been spiritual power which was in His mind, or it may have been temporal power. Possibly the two were inextricably intertwined, as indeed perhaps they always are in the last instance. The sublimation here is very clearly shown to us. "Thou shalt *worship* the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." [1]

The third temptation was to cast Himself down from the pinnacle of the Temple. The sublimation is not at first sight so obvious here as in the other two temptations. Our Lord meets it by a quotation from Deuteronomy, as He had met both the others. But the application of the quotation to the circumstances is not so clear on this occasion. "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." [2] But when we refer back to the source of the quotation we are at once enlightened, for it continues "as ye tempted him in Massah." How did the Hebrews tempt God in Massah? The answer is that they doubted. They said, "Is the Lord among us or not?" [3] It seems to be obvious, therefore, that in this temptation our Lord is being tempted to doubt his Messianic Sonship. This

[1] Lk. iv. 8; Mt. iv. 10. [2] Lk. iv. 12; Mt. iv. 7.
[3] Exod. xvii. 7.

suggestion is confirmed by the words with which the temptation is introduced, "If thou art the Son of God." He is evidently being tempted to abandon the ideal of self-sacrificing love. But in what way? What instincts are operating as the channels of the temptation? When our Lord is bidden by the Tempter to cast Himself down, I would suggest that He is being tempted to have recourse to flight; not, however, flight from His difficulties, so much as flight over them, which from the psychological point of view comes to the same thing. But the temptation to flight is the temptation to fear. Our Lord's human nature is shrinking from the pain and suffering of the ideal He has chosen.

But how was He thus to fly from His difficulties? Plainly if He was *not* the Son of God, there was no obligation upon Him thus to embrace this painful and high ideal; and so the natural shrinking of the flesh leads Him to the temptation to doubt. In the same way in the first temptation, there was evidently no need for Him to continue His fast, if He was not the Son of God. There was nothing to prevent Him from seeking immediately the comforts of ordinary life. Hence the temptation in that case too was introduced with the words, "If thou art the Son of God." If such is the meaning of these temptations, then a great light is thrown upon the tremendous scene in which S. Peter makes the great confession, and our Lord reveals to man for the first time the secret which had been revealed to Him at His Baptism. For when S. Peter attempts to dissuade Him from following such an ideal, He turns almost fiercely upon the Apostle, and calls him "Satan." How natural this was, if Peter's words brought back to His mind the vivid pictures of the terrible temptations in the wilderness!

It seems, then, that if we view the Lord's temptations as a conflict of instinctive forces, we gain considerable insight into their real meaning, and we are able to appreciate the comment of the first and the third Evangelists that our Lord was "led" by the

Spirit during the forty days. S. Mark says that the Spirit "driveth" Him into the wilderness. Both of these words are singularly appropriate as descriptive of instinctive forces.

It is, however, possible to pursue the line of thought somewhat further. It will be remembered that a few pages back we encountered a difficulty, which for the time being we left on one side. It was the difficulty created by the fact that we are told that our Lord hungered at the *end* of the forty days, whereas the temptation in which hunger figures is placed first in both the accounts in which it is related. I pointed out that it is impossible to doubt that our Lord felt the pangs of hunger long before the end of that period. Why then are we told that "He afterward hungered"? With some hesitation I would suggest that we gain an answer to the difficulty, if we assume that in these stories of our Lord's temptations we are concerned with imagery derived from His dreams. Not only, indeed, do we gain light on this question, but also, on a number of other obscurities in the accounts.

To confine ourselves for the moment to this particular difficulty, we can readily see that the first temptation to come to our Lord *in sleep* would naturally concern the most imperious instinct in our nature, namely, hunger. But in waking life so great was our Lord's devotion to His mission, that He would scarcely notice His hunger, in much the same way as a soldier in the heat of battle oft-times does not heed his wounds. In psychological language, our Lord was sublimating the instinct of hunger. Yet we know that it is never possible to sublimate *all* the energy associated with any particular instinct, and so at last, as in this case, it makes itself felt in waking life. That is to say, in the dream series the temptation arising from the instinct of hunger would be the first; but in the waking series it was in fact last. In this way the contradiction would be solved. It would, however, be more accurate to say that in the dream series the

struggle against hunger was felt all along. This seems to emerge from the fact that in S. Matthew's account, at the close of the third temptation, we read that the devil left Him, and that angels came and ministered unto Him. The word used for 'ministered' (*διηκόνουν*) is most commonly used of ministering food, and, if our present theory be correct, we have in that statement the close of the dream in which the angels come and sustain His famished body.

Let us examine the dream theory more closely to see how far it fits in with the facts as a whole. There can be little doubt that the imagery of the story of the temptations becomes easily intelligible on the hypothesis that this theory is true, and it is by no means easy to account for it except on the supposition that we are dealing with visions of some kind. If our main contention concerning the conflict of instincts in the temptations is correct, however, the most natural kind of vision to assume is dream vision. Moreover, the actual contents of the visions are exactly those which might be expected to occur in dreams, in which, as we now know, actions are represented as taking place which in fact are beyond the bounds of possibility. In this way, there is no difficulty for example, in the vision wherein our Lord is tempted to turn stones into bread. But on any other theory, whether it be a vision theory or otherwise, we are faced by the difficulty that He is being tempted here to do something which surely partakes of the nature of the impossible. Once more, in what other set of circumstances can we imagine our Lord seeing Himself as standing before the devil, and being asked to fall down and worship him? It is not easy to reconcile such a conception with what is usually understood by a 'vision.' In a dream such imagery is altogether natural.

It is, however, especially on the third temptation (still following S. Luke's order) that the dream theory seems to throw most light; and it is this temptation in particular which has been found most difficult to interpret. We have already said that we are here con-

cerned with the impulse to flight, and the emotion of fear. On the hypothesis that the symbolism in this temptation is dream symbolism we have a perfectly intelligible picture. The devil tempts our Lord by setting Him on a pinnacle of the Temple. In other words, our Lord is levitated by the action of the devil, and finds Himself standing on this particular eminence. But apart from dream symbolism it is enormously difficult to interpret this experience. Again, in the temptation itself our theory renders us assistance. Our Lord is bidden to cast Himself down. It is customary to interpret this as an inclination on the part of our Lord to cast Himself from that point and to descend in triumph, borne of angels amid the wonder-struck and gasping crowds below. Yet there is no reference or allusion of any kind to such crowds. If we are to interpret the picture as it is given to us, instead of reading into it ideas which are not there, the temptation is just to cast Himself from the pinnacle, borne up by angelic hosts. This, in terms of dream symbolism,[1] is just the normal functioning of the instinct of flight, representing the taking of the line of least resistance.

Moreover, if this be correct, we are enabled to see that this temptation is the converse of the one before. In the latter we have a conflict initiated by the instinct of self-assertion, which, according to the Matthean version, is represented as the climbing of an exceedingly high mountain, a piece of imagery quite in accordance with the conventional type found in dreams. In this temptation, on the other hand, is manifested the impulse to fly—i.e. to take the line of least resistance, relying upon the aid of angelic hosts. We know from what happened in Gethsemane that our Lord associated angelic hosts with the temptation to run away from difficulties. "Thinkest thou that I

[1] If the Freudians and others are right in holding that flight in dream symbolism *invariably* has a sexual significance, this could be admitted without damaging our thesis, provided that we are allowed to see more than one 'level' in the symbolism here.

cannot beseech my Father, and he shall even now send me more than twelve legions of angels?" [1] The words "even now" surely receive an added meaning if our interpretation of the third temptation is correct. In the mind of Christ there lingered the memory of that early conflict, and He still felt the force of the old temptation. Even at this late hour he had to battle with the suggestion to shirk the ideal of the Cross. How strong a light does this throw upon the reality of His humanity!

It will perhaps be objected that we can hardly be dealing with dream imagery in the account of the temptations, for, had this been the case, then our Lord would have seen Himself doing the things which He was being tempted to do. That is to say, He would have been represented as actually turning the stones into bread; as actually falling down and worshipping Satan; as actually casting Himself from the pinnacle of the Temple. For in our experience of dreams we find ourselves performing the prohibited actions. The reason for this, however, is that we are to a greater or a lesser extent divided personalities, so that a considerable degree of repression results, in consequence of which the dream imagery takes on that particular form. It has been our contention that our Lord, on the contrary, suffered no division of personality, and therefore He was in no sense the victim of repression or dissociation. In His case, therefore, the dream picture would represent without distortion the conflict as it figured on the fully conscious plane. No doubt, the data may be taken to show that we are not concerned with dream imagery at all; but if the facts fit the dream theory in all other respects better than they fit any other theory, such a conclusion will be unlikely to be true. Especially will this seem to be the case when we remember that we are not altogether without analogies to the alleged dream pictures in the story of the temptations. They are, in fact, to be found in the dreams of little children. The evidence seems to be

[1] Mt. xxvi. 53.

conclusive that here the dreams image the conscious conflict or problem without any distortion. The reason for this is precisely because in the case of small children there is little, if any, repression. If, therefore, we meet the same phenomenon in the case of our Lord, it is what we should expect to find. It does but strengthen the evidence which goes to show His difference from all other men. We see, for example, the difference between Him and the Apostle Peter, even after the latter's conversion at Pentecost. In the dream which He had prior to the arrival of the men from Cornelius, he saw himself doing what he ought not to have done, namely, refusing to eat what God had cleansed. There was some degree of repression here, therefore, although the events which immediately followed showed that it was but mild. In the case of Christ there would not seem to have been even this. In His dreams He was still one with the Father.

We may now pause to review the result of our investigations of our Lord's temptations. We said that they arose from a conflict of instincts in His human nature; and we have tried to show how in each of the three different temptations which are recorded for us, we see the religious instinct contending with and sublimating one of the fundamental instincts. In the first, we saw it was the instinct of hunger; in the second it was the instinct of self-assertion; in the third it was the instinct of fear. But if we were to leave the matter here, we should plainly be guilty of a misleading simplification. As we suggested above, we never meet isolated instincts in our experience of human nature. It will therefore be worth while to consider how far we can observe the presence of other instincts engaged in the conflict.

In the case of the temptation to turn stones into bread, we are concerned not only with the instinct for food, but also, if our analysis is correct, with the instinct of fear. In the temptation to fall down and worship Satan we are able to discern not only the self-assertive instinct, but also the instincts of acquisition,

of curiosity and of construction. The first of these three is plainly present. But can we doubt that all the instinctive forces which go to make up a great leader in any capacity were operative on this occasion? Our Lord was evidently conscious of great powers within Him. Those powers were essentially the same as those which find an outlet in the great thinker, and the great administrator and builder of empires. We cannot doubt surely that Christ had it in Him to have become either of these had He chosen. But He sublimates these powers into His great mission as the Messianic Son of God. Nevertheless, we are almost certainly justified in seeing their instinctive tendencies reflected in this second temptation. In the final temptation we have found primarily operative the instinct of fear, and we have suggested that in conjunction with it we are probably right in detecting the presence of the gregarious instinct. Our Lord had to meet and to overcome all the traditional influences which had impinged upon Him from His earliest youth. What these were we are to some extent able to judge from the incident in the ministry when His brethren sought to lay hold upon Him and to restrain Him.

We may perhaps see the dead weight of conservatism pulling Him back here in this temptation. It afforded Him such an easy way out of the path of sacrificial suffering. We may surely suppose that here was a strong appeal to the instinct of submission to earthly authority. He was peradventure being tempted not so much to be an orthodox Messiah, as to listen to the thought that it was absurd for Him to imagine that He was the Messiah at all, in view of His simple origin. In addition to all this, He would be prompted to fly from the face of His difficulties by the natural shrinking of His human flesh from the pain and suffering which He could not fail to know would be His, if He pursued His course relentlessly. In other words, we find another primary instinct pulling Him away from the ideal, the instinct of

repulsion. It must surely have been with Him, as with S. Peter later; the idea of the suffering ideal was altogether repulsive.

If our analysis has been in any degree correct, then we observe that practically all the fundamental instincts are plainly engaged in the terrible conflict of the temptations. If we take McDougall's list of thirteen as approximately correct, then we may say that we find evidence of the presence of them all, with three exceptions. One of these exceptions does not amount to much importance, namely, the instinct of appeal, for it is not only not generally recognised, but also it is in any event not of great moment in human life. The other two exceptions are the significant ones of the sex instincts—i.e. those of mating and parenthood. It would surely be altogether wrong to argue from this that sex was something which had no place in our Lord's humanity. That would surely rob the Incarnation of more than half of its significance. We are of necessity bound to believe that our Lord sublimated these instinctive forces in our nature like all the rest.

Moreover, our experience tells us how readily this part of our nature has offered itself in the service of the Divine. Our Lord Himself, moreover, gives us more than a hint when he remarks that some have "made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake."[1] We cannot accordingly suppose that in the period of the temptations this instinct was not greatly in evidence. But if we are concerned with dream imagery, as we have suggested, then it is plain to see why no record of the fact should have come down to us. The dream theory, therefore, accounts for all the data provided by the stories of the temptations. Moreover, it harmonises with the view of the Holy Spirit which we seek to maintain. We see in the struggles in the wilderness the Holy Spirit in complete control of human nature. One by one, as the fleshly instincts rebel, we see them reconciled

[1] Mt. xix. 12.

before our eyes, and the perfect balance and harmony of the personality maintained.

The story of the temptations, then, gives us a deep insight into the perfection of our Lord's humanity. He was tempted in all points like ourselves, yet without sin; we can now see precisely how this came about. Accordingly we are able to attach a full meaning to the statement that it was this same Jesus, human and divine, who acted upon the disciples on the Day of Pentecost. The ideal of self-sacrifice, revealed in a human life for the first time since the world began, began to draw all men, as, according to the Johannine account, He had said that it would.

It is important that we should grasp the full significance of this truth. We have said that the experience at Pentecost meant enlightenment for the Apostles on two matters of supreme importance. These were the meaning of the Cross (i.e. the full expression of self-sacrificing love) and the inclusion of the Gentiles in God's Kingdom. When we turn back to the account of our Lord's earlier Ministry with this in our minds, it not only harmonises with what we find there, but also elucidates certain difficulties. Take, for instance, the difficult passage in S. Luke xii. 49, 50: "I came to cast fire on the earth; and what will I, if it is already kindled? But I have a baptism to be baptised with; and how am I straitened until it be accomplished."

If the fire which our Lord is to cast on the earth is the fire of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, and the baptism with which He was yet to be baptised was the Cross, we are then able to understand His words. We may interpret them in the following way. The fire which He thinks to kindle on the earth is the fire of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. If that fire were, at the time of speaking, already kindled, His will and purpose would have been already accomplished. But such in fact was not the case. It could not be until He had undergone the Passion and the Cross, and until then He felt "cribbed, cabined, and confined,"

because He could not make His appeal to the Gentiles. This interpretation agrees with the teaching of the Servant Songs in Isaiah, in the last of which (whatever obscurities exist) it is certain beyond doubt that the death of the Servant is regarded as effecting the conversion of the Gentiles. We know that our Lord had accepted for Himself this position.[1]

It seems accordingly to be evident from all this that the culmination of the self-sacrifice of love on the Cross and the conversion of the Gentiles were definitely associated in our Lord's mind. Such also is the Johannine representation of our Lord's teaching. When at the close of the Ministry some Greeks seek Him, and He is told of it, He utters the words: "The hour is come, that the Son of man should be glorified. Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth by itself alone; but if it die, it beareth much fruit."[2] At first sight they are enigmatical enough, although they bear the mark of verisimilitude. But they harmonise perfectly with the view which we seek to uphold. It is as if our Lord had said that the Gentiles cannot enter the Kingdom until He has passed through death, but that the hour of His subsequent glorification was now nigh. If our theory is correct, He meant by that glorification the outpouring at Pentecost.

If, therefore, we have found on other grounds (as we have done) that these two points were illuminated for the Apostles as a result of the Pentecostal outpouring, our findings receive strong support from our Lord's own words. If we venture to enquire why it was that Christ should have believed that it was only through the consummate sacrifice of the Cross that the Gentiles could be gathered in, naturally only a

[1] F. D. V. Narborough, *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*, has shown that this is the point of our Lord's reference to the 'sign of Jonah,' who alone among the O.T. prophets converted the Gentiles (*op. cit.*, p. 36).

[2] Jn. xii. 23, 24.

tentative answer can be given. We have seen that such was the teaching of the Servant Song in Isa. lii. and liii., and there can be no doubt that this influenced our Lord's mind. Nevertheless, there must have been a deeper reason than this. Perhaps it was that He realised that if He had appealed to the Gentiles straight-away before He had by His Cross and Passion converted the Apostles, He would have put such a stumbling-block in the minds of the latter that they might have been overwhelmed. Even as it was, it was hard enough for them to learn their lessons. Had this one been added, it might have proved too much for them altogether. Our Lord, therefore, feels compelled to wait, and to perfect the work He had begun in them before passing to the greater tasks beyond.

The stimulus at Pentecost, then, was produced by the perfect human nature of Christ—human nature which had all along unfalteringly expressed self-sacrificing love. Previous to Pentecost, the religious instinct in man had received innumerable stimuli, but they had all been in some measure inadequate to harmonise human personality, because they had been mediated through phenomena, which were not able fully to reveal the nature of God. In the manifold glories and wonders of the natural world, these stimuli had rained upon man's inherently religious being from the beginning of the creation; and they do so until this day. Still more powerfully perhaps, and certainly more clearly, through those whom mankind has agreed to call prophets, "who have been since the world began," has the stimulus been received. But when God came to be revealed finally in a perfect Human Life, then the stimulus reached its maximum power—at least, it did so when that life was completed. Then, and not until then, could the fullness of the Spirit be given. And so we read, "The Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." [1] That is to say, the glorified Jesus alone could call

[1] Jn. vii. 39.

forth the maximum powers of the religious instinct.

After Pentecost the same power which converted the Apostles began to work upon others. Thus we read that Stephen was "a man full of faith and of the Holy Spirit."[1] And we have had occasion to see how the same power resolved the conflicts in the soul of Saul of Tarsus, and taught him the truth of the Cross and of the call of the Gentiles. This power was so overwhelming that it is not surprising that men tended often-times to speak of their conversion as if it were entirely due to Christ, and to overlook the complementary work of the Holy Spirit and *vice versa*. It is here that we most naturally find an explanation of the fact that a writer like S. Paul, for instance, seems to use interchangeably the phrases 'in Christ,' and 'in the Spirit.' Some scholars have sought to maintain that he identifies Christ and the Spirit. It is unnecessary to resort to this hypothesis, which, in fact, raises more difficulties than it solves.

The standpoint which we have taken up with regard to the meaning of Pentecost, however, gives rise to a serious problem, which so far we have ignored, but which we cannot pass over in silence, although it would require a treatise to attempt to deal with it. The problem, which will no doubt have suggested itself to the mind of the reader, is this. If we are to regard 'grace' as being not merely the external stimulus, but also the internal impulsion; and if, further, although we reserve the word 'grace' for the impulsion which springs from the religious instinct, we do not deny that the psychic energy of our instinctive nature as a whole is the work of the Spirit of God, in whom we live and move and have our being, what room is left for human initiative? The answer, on the face of things, is, None. If we accepted such a conclusion, we should, no doubt, be in agreement with much modern psychological thought, which tends to regard the ego as an epiphenomenon. But to do this is to undermine the whole basis of morality.

[1] Acts vi. 5.

Dr. N. P. Williams has recently remarked that this problem has not essentially been altered since its treatment by Kant. We may perhaps content ourselves with a statement of the conclusion of the former writer. After quoting extracts from the writings of thinkers of such widely differing points of view as M. Bergson, Dr. W. Brown, and Mr. Tansley, to show the practical necessity for belief in some power of self-determination, he concludes as follows: "In the light of these considerations, it may reasonably be claimed that the doctrine of 'partial determinism'—which, while admitting that conduct is the result of the interplay of stimulus, complex and instinct, nevertheless affirms that consciousness has, within limits, a real power of guiding psychic energy into this complex rather than that, and of gradually modifying the contents of the preconscious and unconscious by voluntary 'sublimation'—would seem to be the only one which does justice both to man's moral nature and to his intellectual experience." [1]

It is appropriate that we should at this point enquire whether our doctrine of the Holy Spirit can do anything to elucidate the manifold problems connected with the doctrine of what is most unfortunately known as original sin. Professor Williams has said that the latter is to be understood as a defective power of inhibition, and he rightly shows that such deficiency in power is the result of the lack of instinctive control. But he seems greatly to err, when he claims that this weakness is due to a deficiency in the strength of the herd instinct. He assumes without any kind of proof that the moral sentiment is based on this particular instinct. So far from adducing evidence in support of his unwarranted assertion, he quotes a passage from Mr. Bertrand Russell, which, in fact, militates against his own position. He quotes Russell as saying: "Men's collective passions are mainly evil; far the strongest of them are hatred and rivalry directed

[1] *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, p. 485.

towards other groups." [1] He entirely overlooks the fact that *quâ* herd instinct, and from the point of view of psychology, allegiance to a small herd is just as good as allegiance to a large one. If Russell is right in saying that "men's collective passions are mainly evil," it is a remarkable *tour de force* surely, to find in the herd instinct the source of morality.

If, however, we are right in holding to the existence of a religious instinct, we are able to find a more satisfactory explanation of man's inherited tendency to do wrong. Williams, on his theory, advocates the fashionable opinion that the first 'sin' was not so much a fall as a failure. Possibly it was; and yet if we are allowed to posit the existence of a religious instinct, we can see that the sense of obligation is most naturally grounded in this instinct, and that the first act of disobedience arose when man refused to respond to the call of God through this instinct, whatever precisely may have been the outward stimulus. In a true sense of the words, he then resisted the Holy Spirit. He chose to take the path of egoism. As a result of repeated actions of this kind, it is not difficult to see that the religious instinct would be inhibited by habit, and thus become weak. This weakness, transmitted by heredity, is, we suggest, what we know as original sin. At all events, we know that instincts *are* inherited in varying degrees of strength; and there is nothing impossible in the supposition that the religious instinct became progressively weaker through heredity. We seem to have, in fact, something which may without impropriety be called a Fall.

If we are to take this view, then it is plain that we must find the basis of the moral law in religion. It seems to be far too commonly assumed by many modern writers that morality and religion have originally nothing in common, and that their identification did not arise until very late in the evolutionary

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 482.

process. But the only arguments adduced to support this theory are from the practices of modern savages, many of which, we have sought to show, instead of revealing the true nature of religion, should, on the contrary, be looked upon as perversions of the religious instinct. Moreover, we have to remember that the attempt in philosophy to ground the sense of obligation on anything but a theistic basis has never proved intellectually satisfactory, and in practice religion has ever been the bulwark of morality.

Let a quotation from the late Dean Rashdall's book, *The Theory of Good and Evil,* here suffice: "We may be able, perhaps, to give some meaning to morality without the postulate of God, but not its true or full meaning. If the existence of God is not a postulate of all morality, it is a postulate of a sound morality; for it is essential to that belief which vaguely and implicitly underlies all moral beliefs, and which forms the very heart of morality in its highest, more developed, more explicit forms. The truth that the moral ideal is what it is whether we like it or not is the most essential element in what the popular consciousness understands by 'moral obligation.' Moral obligation means moral objectivity. That *at least* seems to be implied in any legitimate use of the term; at least it implies the existence of an absolute, objective moral ideal. And such a belief we have seen imperatively to demand an explanation of the Universe which shall be idealistic or at least spiritualistic, which shall recognise the existence of a Mind whose thoughts are the standard of truth and falsehood alike in morality and in respect of all other existence. In other words, objective morality implies the belief in God." [1]

We may now, at the conclusion of our survey of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, return to a fuller consideration of the question which we postponed in

[1] *Op. cit.*, ii, p. 212.

Chapter IV, namely, the problem of the grace of Infant Baptism. We said there that it is possible to claim that, given the stimulus of the Risen Christ in the sacrament of Holy Baptism, a real impression is produced upon the psyche of the infant. It is sometimes objected that it is impossible to form any conception of this. In reply it can at least be said that admitting (as we commonly do) that the new-born infant is a bundle of innate tendencies, there can be no *a priori* objection to holding that appeal can be made from the first to any of these, although we may have no experience to provide us with language apt to describe the effect of that appeal. The real difficulty surely lies farther back in the word ' tendency.' Yet, however unsatisfactory the word (and however vague the idea) we do not seem to be able to get on without it.

But perhaps we are not, after all, entirely in the dark in this matter. If we consider for a moment some other instinct such as, for example, curiosity or hunger, it is evidently true that the innate tendencies thus named can be stimulated in the infant from the first. In these instances we can *see* the response to the stimulus manifested in specific actions. In the case of the religious instinct, there is admittedly no *visible* response made by the babe. The vital question seems to be whether we are entitled to infer from this that the stimulus has awakened no response of any kind. Our contention is that it is at least conceivable that the application of the stimulus in this case has been accompanied by some stirring of the religious instinct in the child which will make it more sensitive to any manifestations of the divine in the future.

It will perhaps be said that the chief difficulty does not consist in our being unable to see any response, but rather that this theory necessitates our adherence to the view that an invisible stimulus (the Risen Christ) can awaken a response in the unconscious mind of the infant. No doubt we cannot get

inside the mind of a baby in arms any more than we can get inside the mind of an animal, but it is nevertheless true that our own experience does at any rate provide us with analogies to the case we are considering. There is, for example, a well attested phenomenon in which, in the case of two close friends or relatives, when one of them is in distress or trouble of some kind, the other subconsciously realises that something is wrong. He has, as we say, 'an uneasy feeling' about his friend. The only way of understanding this experience, which is by no means an uncommon one, is to regard it as the subconscious arousal of the fear instinct by an invisible stimulus. No doubt there are differences between the two cases. In particular, we cannot argue with certainty from a subconscious mind with which is associated a conscious mind to a subconscious mind which is, so to say, on its own, as in the case of the baby. Nevertheless, the analogy is a close one and deprives the objection of much of its force, even if it does not altogether remove it. Moreover, we have to bear in mind that the difficulties surrounding the doctrine of the grace of Infant Baptism are intimately associated with those caused by belief in the efficacy of intercessory prayer generally. The two doctrines, it would seem, stand or fall together.

We have said that stimulus, if it is to be effective, must be met by appetite. This appetite, we have argued, is due to the operations of the Holy Spirit in all the instincts, but pre-eminently in the religious instinct. Now the last-named, like any other instinct, will of course be subject to inhibitions. In the case of the adult, these inhibitions will be due to evil habits, i.e. to what we call sin. In the case of the infant, this source of inhibition plainly does not exist at first, but there are nevertheless the inherited inhibitions which we have sought to equate with what is known as original sin. These inhibitions will, of course, vary with different individuals in accordance with fluctuating influences of heredity. But in no case will they

be non-existent, and in no case, we may suppose, will they be absolute.[1]

The effect of Baptism, then, upon the child will be that the stimulus of the Risen Christ will appeal to appetite through the religious instinct in such a way as to liberate that appetite, and to sweep away the inherited inhibitions which were choking it. This is to say, in the clumsy language of psychology, that the effect of baptism is to wash away original sin. It will follow, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is not so much *given* in Baptism, as given a chance. He is liberated by the power of the Risen Christ, through the waters of the font, in response to the prayers of the Church.

We must draw our speculations to a close. We have sought by means of them to keep open the door for faith in the beliefs of the historic Church. More than this we dare not claim, for our ignorance of the mind and its operations is still very great.[2] But if (to change the figure) we have done anything in this book to show that such fragments of knowledge as we possess concerning the human mind are at least not inconsistent with the pattern shown in the Mount, even if it is going beyond the present evidence to say that this pattern can yet be clearly recognised in them, it shall suffice.

If there is any degree of truth in the view of magic and of grace put forward in this book, then it brings before us in striking contrast the magician and the priest. The method of the former we have seen to consist in the taking of the path of least resistance by the use of psychic power (i.e. the power of personality) which enables him to effect, both for himself and for others, an artificial escape from reality, and to dominate the world by his phantasies. The method of the priest, on the other hand, is, as everybody

[1] If they were, then, on this theory, Baptism would have no effect at all in such an instance.

[2] See the remarks on this subject by W. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 449–50.

knows, sacrificial. We can see the precise significance of this. In contrast to the magician, he clings to the hard facts of reality, and does not shun the pain and suffering of the world; rather does he rise by means of it. It is, in very truth, the heart of his being.

Our examination of the meaning of grace has shown us clearly how our Lord fulfilled perfectly the priestly office. We have seen how He resolutely refused to yield to the constant temptation to play the magician, a rôle so fatally easy to one of His tremendous power of personality, and how He followed the priestly ideal of sacrifice. At every stage in His human life His humanity was perfect. This meant that He was able to call forth from others the latent forces of the Spirit, in whom man lives and moves and has his being. It was necessary, however, for that priestly life to pass through the consummation of a sacrificial death. Then, ascending up on high, He was able to do what all other priests had been able only dimly to foreshadow, for He alone had truly lived the priestly life. He was able to make atonement between God and man, since, robed in perfect humanity, He was (and is) able to draw out to the full the hidden powers of men, and thus enlighten them and make them one.

The magician, standing apart from the rest of mankind, so far as may be, domineers over the life of man, and splits it up; the priest, identifying himself with all humanity, enters into the deepest woes of human life, and makes it whole. "Ye know that they which are accounted to rule over the Gentiles lord it over them; and their great ones exercise authority over them. But it is not so among you: but whosoever would become great among you, shall be your minister: and whosoever would be first among you, shall be servant of all. For verily the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many."[1]

[1] Mk. x. 42-5.

I. INDEX OF NAMES

Abrahams, I., 136 *n.*
Aquinas, Thomas, 115, 119
Aristotle, 93, 130
Arunta tribe, 48 ff.
Augustine of Hippo, 60, 99, 105, 114, 115, 180, 185

Bacon, 32
Balfour, A. J., 90
Barnes, Bp. E. W., 107-109, 111, 120
Baudouin, C., 4, 11-14, 19, 110
Bergson, H., 206
Beth, K., 30, 57, 92
Bovet, P., 76
Brahma, 34
Braid, J., 2, 25
Brown, W., 3 *n.*, 7 *n.*, 206
Browning, R., 71
Burkitt, F. C., 175

Calvin, 105, 106
Carr, H. Wildon, 4
Codrington, 54-56
Coué, E., 11-14

Diffusionist School, 23
Dimond, S. G., 105 *n.*
Drever, J., 61, 62
Durkheim, E., 43, 48 *n.*, 49, 51, 70, 71

Elworthy, F. T., 28

Frazer, J. G., 22, 27, 29-32, 39, 43, 44, 49, 50, 91
Freud, S., 7, 11, 16, 19, 24, 62, 197 *n.*

Gillen, 43, 47, 48, 49 *n.*

Hadfield, J. A., 3
Haldane, J. S., 73 *n.*
Hart, B., 7
Headlam, Bp., A. C., 136, 138
Heiler, F., 93, 107 *n.*, 108 *n.*
Heitmüller, W., 157, 158 *n.*
Hügel, F. von, 71, 86 *n.*
Huxley, Julian, 72, 83

Inge, W. R., 59 *n.*, 73 *n.*
Isaiah, 68 *n.*, 100

James, E. O., 59 *n.*
James, W., 79, 132, 170, 171
Jevons, F. B., 92
Jung, C. G., 52

Kei Islands, 32
Klausner, J., 126 *n.*, 163 *n.*
Köstlin, J., 106 *n.*

Lenin, 26 *n.*
Lévy-Bruhl, H., 41
Luther, 105, 180

Maccabees, 101
McDougall, W., 4-7, 18, 19, 62, 63, 68, 69, 110, 121, 201, 211 *n.*
McDowall, S. A., 88
Malinowski, B., 26 *n.*, 35, 36, 42
Marett, R. R., 32, 37-40, 43, 55, 59 *n.*
Marshall, H. R., 60
Melanesians, 54-56
Mesmer, 1, 39
Miller, H. Crichton, 4 *n.*
Montefiore, C. G., 150 *n.*
Morgan, J. Lloyd, 4, 5
Moses, 99, 112, 155, 187
Murray, Gilbert, 40
Mussolini, B., 26 *n.*
Myers, C. S., 4

Nancy School, 2, 3, 11
Narborough, F. D. V., 203 *n.*
Newman, J. H., 96, 174
Newton, 65

Otto, R., 36, 61, 80-82, 131, 133, 161, 162, 168

Pascal, 89
Pater, W., 124
Paterson, W. P., 59 *n.*, 90
Paul, S., and mystery religions, 106, 107
  conversion of, 101-105, 111, 178, 179
  teaching about grace, 102, 103, 114
Pelagius, 115

Pharisees, 101, 132, 135, 136, 147, 148, 164
Plato, 16, 22, 67, 69, 137, 187
Prince, H. Morton, 15

Quick, O. C., 68, 116, 121

Rashdall, H., 107, 208
Renan, 166
Rivers, W. H. R., 3, 4, 7, 17, 109
Russell, B., 206, 207

Sadducees, 101
Salpêtrière School, 2, 3
Schoolmen, 115
Shand, A. F., 82, 83, 97
Smith, G. Elliot, 23
Smith, H. Maynard, 57
Spencer, H., 43, 47, 48, 49 *n.*
Spinoza, 73
Stoll, O., 166
Stout, G. F., 4
Streeter, B. H., 134
Suarez, 115

Tansley, A. G., 206
Taylor, A. E., 69
Temple, Archbp. W., 102, 108
Tennyson, 82
Tertullian, 53
Thouless, R. H., 75, 76

Webb, C. C. J., 87 *n.*
Wesley, John, 104
Whitfield, 104
Williams, F. E., 45, 46
Williams, H. Monier, 34 *n.*
Williams, N. P., 206 ff.
Wundt, W., 28

II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Acceptivity, 11
Anæsthesia, 53
Animatism, 40
Animism, 39, 40, 42, 56
Appetite, 171
Arianism, 116
Auto-hypnosis, 47, 48
Auto-suggestion, 11
  reflective, 12

Baptism, 107, 116
  and magic, 107, 118
  Infant, 116-118, 209 ff.
  of our Lord, 154, 188 ff.
Buddhism, 73

Calvinism, 104
Canalisation, 75, 86
Churinga, 49, 51
Contention, 11, 12
Conversion, 78
  of S. Paul, *see* Paul.
  of the Twelve at Pentecost, 179
Cross, the, 153, 154, 156, 161, 173 ff., 187, 188, 202, 203
Crucifixion, 168

Deflection, 73, 76, 122
Determinism, 205 ff.
Discrimination, power of, 64
Dissociation, 3, 12, 15-18, 20, 21, 52, 103, 106, 118, 126
Divine, existence of, 87-90
  nature of, 69

Emotion, 124
Evil Eye, 28, 29

Faith, and Grace, 97, 98
  a gift, 99

Grace, Chap. IV, *passim*.
  and faith, 97, 98
  and instinct, 95
  and magic, 103-105, 107, 108, 112
  and peace, 181, 182
  and suggestion, 21, 94, 95, 108-110
  and truth, 113, 114, 118, 121, 123, 161
  "congruent" theory of, 115
  "efficacious," 115
  in Old Testament, 99-101
  "internal" and "external," 171, 185
  irresistible, 102, 105-107
  prevenient, 99, 110
  sacramental, 107-111
  semi-physical conception of, 107, 110, 111
  "sufficient," 115
  tertium quid theory of, 115
  Addit. note on meaning of, 124

Holy Communion, 107, 108, 116, 119, 120
  Receptionist theory of, 121
Holy Spirit, 118, Chap. VI, *passim*.
  fruits of, 183, 184
Hypnosis, 18-20, 64, 66, 67
  and dissociation, 3, 15-18, 20, 21
  and instinct, 15, 66
  and magic, *see* Magic.
  and *rapport*, 3, 18-21, 38, 39
  and suggestion, 1-15, 21
  auto-hypnosis, 47, 48

Ideo-motor theory, 11
Incarnation, 96, 112, 113, 116
  extension of, in sacraments, 120
Instinct, 5-21
  and the Eucharist, 122
  and grace, 95
  and intelligence, 56, 64-68
  and religion, 59-86, 129 ff., 185
  and stimulus, 4, 7, 14, 60, 62, 82
  and suggestion, 7-21
  criteria of, 61-63
  inhibition of, by habit, 171
  Lamarckian view of, 88
  Law of transitoriness of, 79, 170
  nature of, 4, 68
Instincts, conflict of, 15, 16
Intelligence, 5, 6
Isaiah, Servant Songs, 203

Jansenism, 115

Laughter, instinct of, 63
Law, Jewish, 101, 114, 182
  of contact, of contagion, 30, 41
  of participation, 41, 42, 45
  of reversed effort, 12, 13, 102
  of similarity, 30, 41

Magic, and grace, 103-105, 107, 108, 112
  and hypnosis, 21, 24, 26, 28, 29, 33, 34, 39, 47, 56, 57
  and religion, 90-93
Magician and priest contrasted, 211, 212
Mana, 39, 51, 54-56
Memory, 17
Mesmerism, 1, 28
Methodism, 104, 105
Miracles of our Lord, 133-166
Molinism, 115
Morality and religion, 207, 208
Moral sense, 17
Mystery religions, 106, 107

Necromancy, 29
Numinous, the, 80, 82, 85, 121, 131 ff., 154, 160, 162-164, 167, 168

Objectification, 76
Od, Odylic force, 1
Original sin, 206, 207, 210, 211

Parables, teaching by, 128, 137-139, 148, 152, 165
Pentecost, Day of, 156, 164, 173, 174, 179, 202 ff.
Personality, 15
  alternating, 15, 16
  dominant, 25-27, 52, 55
  integration of, 129 ff., 159, 172, 173
Perversion, 55, 63, 73-75
Phantasy, 9, 32, 36, 48
Platonisation, 76

Rapport, 3, 18, 19, 21, 38
Real Presence, 121
Reflex action, 5
Regression, 75
Religion, and instinct, *see* Instinct.
  and magic, 90-93
  and sentiment, 60, 82, 83
  nature of, 69-72
Repression, 75, 78, 172
Resurrection of our Lord, 155, 169
Revelation, 77, 78

Scotism, 115
Sentiment, 60, 82, 83, 97, 98
Signum diaboli, 53
Sleep, 16, 18, 19
Speaking with tongues, 172, 177, 184
Spell, 25, 26, 28, 38
Subjectification, 76
Sublimation, 76, 122
Suggestibility, 8-10, 15
Suggestion, 1-21, 37
  and grace, *see* Grace.
  and hypnosis, 1, 2, 3-15, 21
  and instinct, 7-21
  definition of, 3, 4, 21
  instruments of, 119, 120
  post-hypnotic, 66, 67

Temptations of our Lord, 162, 190 ff.
Totemism, 43-49, 73, 74
Transfiguration of our Lord, 154

Unction of the sick, 146

Will, 12, 13

Yucca moth, 6

Zwinglianism, 121

Made and Printed in Great Britain
by Hazell, Watson & Viney Ltd.
London and Aylesbury

234.1 S
D512